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The aim of the thesis is to evaluate recent work in artificial intelligence (AI). It is 
argued that such evaluation can be philosophically interesting, and examples are 
given of areas of the philosophy of AI where insufficient concentration on the 
actual results of AI has led to missed opportunities for the two disciplines — 
philosophy and AI — to benefit from cross-fertilization. The particular topic of 
the thesis is the use of AI techniques in psychological explanation. The claim is 
that such techniques can be of value in psychology, and the strategy of proof is 
to exhibit an area where this is the case. The field of model-based knowledge-
based system (KBS) development is outlined; a type of model called a 
conceptual model will be shown to be psychologically explanatory of the 
expertise that it models. 
A group of major philosophies of explanation are examined, and it is discovered 
that such philosophies are too restrictive and prescriptive to be of much value in 
evaluating many areas of science; they fail to apply to scientific explanation 
generally. The importance of having sympathetic yardsticks for the evaluation of 
explanatory practices in arbitrary fields is defended, and a series of such 
yardsticks is suggested. The practice of providing information processing models 
in psychology is discussed. 
A particular type of model, a psychological competence model, is defined, and its 
use in psychological explanation defended. It is then shown that conceptual 
models used in model-based KBS development are psychological competence 
models. It follows therefore that such models are explanatory of the expertise 
they model. Furthermore, since KBSs developed using conceptual models share 
many structural characteristics with their conceptual models, it follows that a 
limited class of those systems are also explanatory of expertise. This constitutes 
an existence proof that computational processes can be explanatory of mental 
processes. 
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Preface 
This thesis is the result of quite a long intellectual journey. As I began my 
D.Phil. research in the philosophy of AI with Andrew Rein in 1986, I was 
intrigued by the possibilities of AI. At that time, the thought experiments of 
Dennett, Hofstadter and Searle, together with the genuine excitement that 
accompanied the first major books on connectionism by Rumelhart, McClelland 
et al, seemed to suggest that an exciting science fiction world was just around the 
corner. On the other hand, sceptical Cassandras such as Roy Harris, and Baker 
and Hacker, were making play with the notion that human behaviour — 
particularly  linguistic behaviour — was intrinsically too complex to be 
mechanistically describable or reproducible. The assumptions of the two camps 
seemed irreconcilable; I did what seemed logical and turned to the discipline 
itself in an attempt to resolve the matter. 
I was fortunate to go to Eugene Charniak and Drew McDermott's Introduction to 
Artificial Intelligence, still today one of the finest textbooks on AI around, even 
after ten years. I was amazed that the work reported there, on the properties of 
Lisp, vision, language parsing, search strategies, memory, uncertain reasoning, 
planning, etc., was simply absent from the work both of the thought 
experimenters (pro- and anti-AI), and the neo-Wittgensteinians. I began to 
wonder what relevance their a priori ruminations had to the functioning 
discipline of AI, and I resolved to investigate in a more practical fashion. 
Hence, in 1988-9, I took an M.Sc. in software engineering at the Programming 
Research Group at Oxford, and in 1990, took up a post as a researcher into 
knowledge acquisition for knowledge-based systems in the AI Group, Dept. of 
Psychology, University of Nottingham. Gradually, I have come to realize that the 
gap between the philosophy of AI and the practice of AI is even wider than I 
anticipated. In particular, what seems to be missed from most philosophical 
discussion is an appreciation of the importance of having a functioning system. It 
is important for AI, since naturally a program that doesn't work is useless. But it 
is equally important for philosophy and psychology, because an important factor 
in the evaluation of proposed psychological mechanisms is the question of 
whether they could produce the required output in real time under realistic 
memory constraints. The computer is the only tool we have for attempting to 
answer such questions. Preface   viii 
So when a thought experiment begins "Suppose we had a machine that ...", that 
assumption covers a multitude of questions related to the actual construction and 
operation of such a machine. In AI, we often learn more from the process of 
building systems than we do from the finished system itself. 
Finally, one attractive aspect of the subfield of AI reported in this thesis is that it 
is relatively mundane, and yet (as I hope to show) psychologically significant. 
Much attention has (rightly) been given to high-profile work in AI and cognitive 
psychology which purports to uncover the secrets of cognition (e.g. the work of 
Newell, Simon and Shaw, the work of Brooks, work on SOAR, work on PDP, 
the work of Edelman). However, as a result of my work at Nottingham, I am 
firmly convinced that, if you want to know about expertise, you would be well-
advised to eschew the monolithic approach and go to knowledge-based systems 
research. It will tell you nothing about vision, or language comprehension, or the 
operation of the brain; but it gives an unrivalled account of expertise. This 
suggests an agreeable picture of AI as a heterodox activity, with different people 
working under different sub-paradigms, all contributing to a whole which is 
greater than the sum of its parts.  ix 
Analytical Table of Contents 
Chapter One: A Metathesis Concerning the Philosophy of AI 
Two competing styles of philosophy are discerned, and evaluated, in the context 
of the philosophy of AI. 
1.1 The Importance of Being Artificial 
The competing notions of top down and bottom up philosophy are introduced. 
Top down philosophy involves the development of a theory and the application 
of that theory to various problems or areas of interest. The result of top down 
philosophy tends to be that discussion is driven by philosophical concerns. 
Bottom up philosophy, in contrast, is driven by concerns that have arisen in non-
philosophical contexts. In particular, a bottom up approach to the philosophy of 
AI will tend to attempt to interpret the actual results of AI research (as opposed 
to interpreting unrealistic thought experiments). This should make bottom up 
philosophy more influential on the practice of AI. 
1.2 Three Examples of Philosophical Debate About AI 
To indicate that there can be problems with top down philosophy, three examples 
of the application of philosophical theory applied to AI are given. 
1.2.1 Example: The Turing Test 
For example, most philosophical discussion of the Turing test has concentrated 
on the alleged over-generosity of the test in ascribing intelligence to intuitively 
non-intelligent systems. However, consideration of standard AI systems shows 
that the Turing test is also biased against existing and foreseeable systems, by 
disregarding the likely ways that intelligent machines would be used. 
1.2.2 Example: The Problem of Induction 
As another example, we note that the field of machine learning poses an extra 
problem for the philosophy of induction; not only do inductive hypotheses have 
to be justified, but also such hypotheses have to be selected from other Analytical Table of Contents    x 
competing hypotheses. This problem of hypothesis selection has generally been 
neglected by philosophers, despite its pressing nature. 
1.2.3 Example: Narrow versus Wide Content 
As a third example, we consider some arguments that have followed on from 
Putnam's Twin-Earth thought experiment, and from the eliminativist arguments, 
both of which have been thought to have methodological implications for AI. 
The implications turn out to be impractical, (a)  because there is no well-
developed computational paradigm that will exactly fit the requirements of these 
arguments, and (b) because standard, 'vanilla flavoured' symbolic AI is the only 
branch of AI with relatively tractable semantics (this at least in some cases will 
be important). Furthermore, the arguments we consider have a very monolithic 
view of which computer programs could have psychological interest. 
1.3 The Philosophy of AI 
Having established that bottom up philosophy has some applications in the 
philosophy of AI, we move to consider a definition of what AI is. 
1.3.1 AI and Intentionality 
It is unhelpful for AI to be viewed as an attempt to produce intentionality, or 
human-like intelligence. 
1.3.2 Two Views of AI 
On the contrary, AI should be seen as research into a disparate collection of 
computational problem solving methods. In fact, because of the unclarity of 
philosophical definitions of such concepts as 'intelligence', this way of viewing 
AI is likely to make important contributions to the general philosophical 
discussion. 
1.4 Example: Modelling Expertise 
Our aim will be to look at the particular AI practice of building knowledge-based 
systems, with a view to looking at its psychological significance. Analytical Table of Contents    xi 
Chapter Two: Of MYCIN Men: Knowledge-Based System Development 
Methodologies 
The ideas underlying the field of KBS development are put forward in this 
chapter. 
2.1 What Knowledge-Based Systems Are 
We begin with the general ideas behind KBSs. 
2.1.1 Brief Historical Notes 
Knowledge-based systems (KBSs) or expert systems are introduced in their 
historical context. A KBS is a computer system that attempts to reduplicate 
expert performance by the manipulation of large quantities of knowledge about 
the domain in which the expert has her expertise. These systems are an 
increasingly important technology in science and industry. 
2.1.2 Knowledge Representation 
Knowledge is stored in KBSs using a special-purpose computer language called 
a knowledge representation language (KRL). KRLs are usually based either on 
logic or on 'chunks' of knowledge called frames (or both). Neither formalism is 
entirely satisfactory, either in terms of efficiency, semantics, or transparency to 
an expert. 
2.1.3 Verification and Validation 
The ability of a KBS to do the job it is intended for is estimated by a process 
called verification and validation (V&V). The requirements of V&V mean that 
often high level descriptions of the KBSs functions are required, as well as the 
implementational (programming language) specification. 
2.1.4 Explaining KBS Output 
Furthermore, the output of a KBS has to be explainable by the system for the 
system's user. This is so that controversial output can be verified (and, if 
necessary, overridden). This also means that the knowledge stored in the KBS Analytical Table of Contents    xii 
has to be describable at higher levels that would simply be required for the KBS 
to produce the right output. 
2.1.5 Knowledge Acquisition 
These various requirements have led to the development of a field of AI practice 
called knowledge acquisition (KA). This is the practice of getting information 
out of the expert and into the machine. The KA process needs to identify which 
knowledge will be required for the functioning of the system, which knowledge 
is required for V&V, and which for explanation, and also needs to represent that 
knowledge perspicuously in the system's KRL. For this reason, KA is often 
referred to as a 'bottleneck' in KBS development. 
2.2 Model-Based Knowledge Acquisition and KBS Development 
We now turn our attention to a particular group of methods for developing 
KBSs, model-based methodologies. 
2.2.1 KBS Development as Model Refinement 
To get round the KA bottleneck, one type of KBS development methodology 
concentrates on the construction of models to guide the KA process. Three 
models are developed in the course of a KBS development project: a 
requirements specification, which only takes into account the task to be 
performed by the system; a conceptual model, which models the expertise 
required to perform the task; and a design model, which further considers the 
computational constraints on the system. The relationship between the 
conceptual model and the expertise is introduced and discussed briefly. 
2.2.2 Conceptual Models 
This is an important section, for it discusses in detail the properties of conceptual 
models; our claim in Chapter Five will be that such models are explanatory of 
expertise. A conceptual model is a model of the expertise required to solve a 
particular problem. It will not always be a model of a single expert. The 
knowledge acquired and put in the model can be typed epistemologically, 
resulting in a four-layer structure. The domain layer contains the static 
knowledge of the domain objects and their interrelations. The inference layer is a Analytical Table of Contents    xiii 
specification of the basic inferences made by the experts in problem-solving; 
these inferences can be grouped together in an inference structure. The task layer 
contains the knowledge about how these basic inferences are grouped together to 
achieve goals. This knowledge controls the inferences. Finally, the strategic 
layer contains the knowledge about how to configure a set of goals to solve a 
large scale problem. It is arguable that there is not principled distinction between 
the task and strategic layers, and many models will not have a strategic layer at 
all. Karbach et al have shown that the four-layer model can be seen as 
representative. Groups of domain-independent skeletal models (containing 
inference and task layer knowledge) can be put together as model libraries, to 
ease the modelling task for knowledge engineers. 
2.2.3 Two Philosophies of Modelling 
Two ways of modelling expertise are introduced. The first way is to emphasize 
the similarities between the expert and other experts; the second is to emphasize 
the dissimilarities. Most KBSs are built using the first philosophy. This 
introduces the need for us to argue — as we will in §5.2.3 — that this philosophy 
is adequate for the explanation of expertise. 
2.2.4 Knowledge Acquisition Techniques 
There are various KA techniques to capture various types of knowledge. 
Unstructured interviewing, structured interviewing, self-reports, protocol 
analysis, card sorting, laddering and repertory grids are discussed. Repertory 
grids are particularly interesting because they can uncover knowledge in a form 
in which the expert will not typically recognize it. 
2.2.5 The Psychology of Knowledge Acquisition 
Much psychological investigation has been performed into the efficacy of these 
techniques. In particular, it has been noted that the contrived techniques (such as 
repertory grids) result in the acquisition of knowledge that is used in problem-
solving (since the solution of the problem by the expert cannot be easily 
explained without the postulation of the knowledge), of which the expert is not 
conscious. Furthermore, KA techniques can often be used to critique faulty 
expert performance. Therefore, KA techniques will not automatically be used to 
create a model of the expert's conscious reasoning. Analytical Table of Contents    xiv 
Chapter Three: Scientific Explanation 
Having developed an account of conceptual modelling, we will try to show that 
such models are psychologically explanatory of expertise. The first step, then, is 
to say what is meant by 'explanation'. Our account must satisfy two constraints. 
On the one hand, since we have adopted the bottom up approach to philosophy, 
we should be certain that the philosophy of explanation that we endorse is 
maximally congenial to current scientific practice. On the other hand, the 
philosophy of explanation that we endorse must be independently convincing. 
3.1 What We Are Talking About 
We shall take explanations as being intended to confer understanding. 
3.1.1 Scientific Explanation and Scientific Understanding 
We decide only to discuss scientific explanation in this thesis, and leave 
unanswered the question as to how far our comments will apply to non-scientific 
explanation. Scientific explanation is keyed to the notion of scientific 
understanding. Again we do not define this notion rigidly. However, we do set 
the condition that scientific understanding is (at least partly) an instrumental 
notion. If a scientist understands some phenomenon, this means that she can 
carry out her research/development in the context of that phenomenon. 
3.1.2 Explanation as a Process and Explanation as a Product 
Explanations can be seen as processes or products. We show that conceptual 
models can be seen as either processes or products, and therefore the priority of 
process over product or vice versa is irrelevant for our results. 
3.1.3 Full and Partial Explanations 
A distinction is drawn between full and partial explanations depending on how 
far the explanation gets the scientist towards her goal. On this view, a conceptual 
model can be seen as a full explanation (assuming for the moment that it is 
explanatory at all) of the expertise required to solve a problem, or a partial 
explanation of how to solve the problem with current computational tools. We 
will take the psychological problem to be solved to be that of providing an Analytical Table of Contents    xv 
account of expertise, so that we will take conceptual models to be fully 
explanatory or not at all. Finally, we show that the full/partial distinction is not 
the same as an honorific distinction between scientific and non-scientific 
explanation. 
3.1.4 Good Explanation and Bad Explanation 
Explanations can be good (successful in conferring the intended understanding) 
and bad (unsuccessful). This applies to conceptual models too. Indeed, 
depending on how the conceptual model is to be taken, a model can at once be a 
good explanation of one phenomenon and a bad explanation of another. 
3.2 Top Down Accounts of Explanation 
We now examine some current theories of explanation in the philosophy of 
science. 
3.2.1 Review of Some Top Down Accounts 
We mention Hempel's deductive-nomological model which sees explanation as 
the provision of an argument whose conclusion is the explanandum; Salmon's 
statistical-relevance model which provides an argument in terms of the 
probabilities of the possible events; Brody's causal model and essential property 
model both try to marry a Hempelian account with Aristotelian insights; Lewis 
and Railton suggest that a full explanation of an event is nothing less than its 
complete causal history; Ruben's dependency model generalizes Lewis's account 
to include non-causal relations. These accounts are not descriptive, but are 
concerned with setting a standard. 
3.2.2 The Lack of Top Down Consensus 
One reason to reject top down views is that there seems to be no consensus 
emerging in the philosophy of explanation. If there were such a consensus, then 
we might represent ourselves as approaching a correct view, but not if not. 
Salmon discerns three types of top down view, and we note that all three views 
are vulnerable to particular types of counterexample. The deductivist view wants 
explanations to be arguments, and is vulnerable to counterexamples exploiting 
the asymmetries of explanation. The mechanist view wants explanations to posit Analytical Table of Contents    xvi 
mechanisms, and is vulnerable to new contexts where such mechanisms are 
irrelevant. The pragmaticist view suggests an account that takes contextual 
elements into account, and is vulnerable to suggestions of 'anything goes' 
relativism. The pragmaticist view is most nearly similar to a bottom up view. 
3.2.3 Ideals of Explanation Do Not Explain Alternative Explanatory 
Practice 
A second reason is that ideal explanatory forms do not explain actual practices. 
If an actual practice departs from the ideal, then the ideal needs to be 
supplemented with an account of the differences. But this account is sufficiently 
explanatory of the practice in its own right. This is not true of a (good) bottom 
up account. 
3.2.4 Actual Explanatory Practice Needs a Philosophical Account 
A third reason is that there is an explanatory (or quasi-explanatory) practice 
going on in science that, even if it falls short of an ideal, stands in need of 
philosophical analysis. Scientists often criticize colleagues' explanations, and 
they standardly do not refer to the philosophical literature to do that. Indeed, 
were they to do this, they would have to resolve all the philosophical problems 
because of the lack of consensus discussed in §3.2.2. This critical practice is 
philosophically unexamined. 
3.2.5 Two Top Down Responses 
The top down theorist may respond in one of two ways. He may insist that his 
account of explanation defines the correct scientific practice. In that case, he falls 
foul of the arguments for bottom up philosophy in general discussed in Chapter 
One. Or he may claim that a discipline that fails to meet the ideal conditions is 
simply not explanatory — the instrumental account of understanding given in 
§3.1.1 is more of an engineering than a scientific norm. This begs the question, 
but risks leaving the philosophical account irrelevant. 
3.3 A Bottom Up Account of Explanation 
A bottom up account of explanation would need to give accounts of: (1) the 
audience and its interests; (2) the basis for the fruitfulness of the explanation; Analytical Table of Contents    xvii 
(3) the responsibility the explanans has for the explanandum; (4) the contrastive 
class should be clear; (5) it should be clear that the account does not entail total 
relativism; (6) what is being explained should be clear. 
3.4 Types of Explanation: Causal and Non-Causal 
Another distinction is between causal and non-causal explanation. The very 
existence of the latter is a controversial issue. 
3.4.1 Non-Causal Explanation 
An argument, endorsed by both the mechanist Ruben and the pragmaticist 
Achinstein, is given to show that non-causal explanation is possible. 
3.4.2 Normative Explanation 
One type of non-causal explanation is normative explanation, the production of 
norms governing a practice. It is shown how normative explanations can be 
explanatory even when the practice fails to achieve its goal, or when the norms 
are not consciously followed. 
3.4.3 Causal Explanation 
Causal explanation is the production of a causally relevant property of the cause. 
The obvious type of causal relevance is causal efficacy. However, there will be 
problems is this is the only type of causal relevance. 
3.4.4 Program Explanation 
We circumvent this problem by using Jackson and Pettit's notion of a program 
explanation. Such an explanation produces a property of the cause that will make 
probable that a causally efficacious property is available. 
Chapter Four: Psychological Explanation 
Having discussed explanation generally, we now move on to the specific topics 
that are of relevance for psychological explanation. Analytical Table of Contents    xviii 
4.1 Computational Models in Psychology 
We first establish the possibility of computational models being explanatory in 
psychology. Computational models suggest mechanisms, that may be more or 
less metaphorical, for psychological behaviour. If they are content using models, 
they will also lead to the understanding of some behaviour in terms of the 
components of such behaviour. 
4.2 Levels of Explanation 
If a computational model is explanatory, then it has to be decided which of the 
various properties of the model are taken to be the explanatory ones. 
4.2.1 Marr's Three Levels 
Marr's three levels of explanation, the input/output level, the algorithmic level 
and the implementational level, are introduced. However, they are unlikely to be 
adequate for the purposes of KBS development. 
4.2.2 Explanation at Level 1.5 
Peacocke's level 1.5 is introduced. At this level, the explanatorily relevant parts 
of the model are the input/output relations, together with a specification of the 
information drawn upon. This turns out to be ambiguous between a specification 
of the body of information to be drawn upon, and a specification of the states of 
information to be drawn upon. Since this distinction is crucial for AI purposes, 
we need to resolve the ambiguity. 
4.2.3 Explanation at Level 1.6 
We introduce a new level of explanation, level 1.6, which is as level 1.5 with the 
addition of the constraint that not only must the body of information the model 
draws upon be specified, but so must the ontology of that body. Level 1.5 is 
defined for our purposes by its neglect of this ontology. If one takes a firmly 
extensional view of information, levels 1.5 and 1.6 collapse into each other; we 
will not be insisting on such a view. We also make no claim that level 1.5 as it is 
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4.2.4 Models of Expertise 
To show that level 1.6 can be informative, we use the example of a model for 
KBS development, which shows that the distinctions made at level 1.6 are 
crucial in our chosen field of AI. A model at level 1.5 would not be as useful in 
this context. This does not entail that such models are explanatory, only that 
level 1.6 models are required. 
Chapter Five: Conceptual Models, Competence Models and Psychological 
Explanation 
We now have to show that conceptual models are psychologically explanatory of 
the expertise they model. 
5.1 Competence Models and Psychological Explanation 
We begin with a lemma: competence models are psychologically explanatory. 
5.1.1 Models of Problem-Solving 
A competence model is defined as a decomposition of a problem domain. A 
problem domain is a triple containing a set of problems, a set of solutions and a 
solution relation. A competence model is built around a decomposition of the 
solution relation into a set of inferential relations and a set of inferential types, 
each of which is a set of inferential primitives. The model is completed by the 
addition of a competence theory, which specifies the relationships between the 
inferential relations and the solution relation. 
5.1.2 Psychological Competence Models 
We can put further conditions on admissible competence models: the 
decompositions should be predictive; competence must be related to but not 
restricted to performance; competence models must rationalize performance; 
they must be developed within information processing contexts; they must 
describe the production of performance; and they must describe the set of 
admissible outputs, not attempt to determine output. Competence models that 
meet these conditions are defined as psychological competence models. Analytical Table of Contents    xx 
5.1.3 The Explanatoriness of Psychological Competence Models 
We show that the six conditions on good explanations as given in §3.3 apply to 
psychological competence models. As explanations, psychological competence 
models answer such questions as why did X do that? and how did X accomplish 
that? Various audiences might be interested in such explanations, particularly 
ones which are interested in information processing accounts of problem-
solving. These models are explanatory at level 1.6 by virtue of the 
decomposition into inferential relations, inferential types and inferential 
primitives, and, if the inferential relations are suitably chosen, can be 
explanatory at level 2. 
5.2 Conceptual Models and Competence Models 
The argument is completed by showing that conceptual models are psychological 
competence models. 
5.2.1 Modelling Methodologies and the Alternatives 
Our results will only apply to systems developed using models. Systems built 
using other methodologies such as rapid prototyping will not be covered by our 
result. However, a number of systems are built using model-based development 
methodologies, and there are a number of advantages to building systems that 
way. 
5.2.2 Conceptual Models and Competence Models 
Conceptual models are psychological competence models. First of all, they are 
competence models. The inferential primitives of the conceptual model are 
contained in the domain layer. The inferential types and inferential relations of 
the conceptual model are located at the inference layer. The competence theory 
is contained in the task and strategic layers. Conceptual models also meet the 
requirements on psychological competence models that were set out in §5.1.2. 
The interested audience for conceptual models as explanations is, of course, the 
same audience that is interested in psychological competence models. This 
includes KBS developers. Analytical Table of Contents    xxi 
5.2.3 Off-the-Peg Models 
There is a worry that only custom-built conceptual models can truly be 
assimilated to psychological competence models. However, some conceptual 
models are taken from model libraries. This is shown not to be a problem, in at 
least a large number of cases. By examining the KADS interpretation model 
library, the Generic Task library and the GDM library, we found that either static 
models could be altered in domain-dependent ways to customize them, or that 
decompositional modelling techniques were able to model a much larger variety 
of problem-solving than static techniques. 
5.2.4 The Argument Completed: Conceptual Models, Knowledge-Based 
Systems and Psychological Explanation 
We are now able to complete the main arguments of the thesis. 1)  Since 
conceptual models are psychological competence models, and since 
psychological competence models are explanatory of problem-solving, 
conceptual models are explanatory of problem-solving. 2) If a KBS is developed 
from an explanatory conceptual model by model refinement, then to the extent 
that it retains the structure and ontology of the original conceptual model, it too 
is a psychological competence model of the expertise, and is therefore 
explanatory of the expertise. 
5.3 Knowledge-Based Systems, Normative and Causal Explanation 
The final task is to decide which type of explanation KBSs provide. 
5.3.1 Normative Explanation? 
A conceptual model provides a normative explanation of a practice, in the sense 
that it provides a manual for how to perform the task in an optimal way. 
5.3.2 Causal Explanation? 
It is difficult to see the items in a conceptual model corresponding to causally 
efficacious properties in the brain. However, for an explanation to be causal, the 
properties singled out have only to be causally relevant, not efficacious. Hence it 
is reasonable to suggest that conceptual models are causal explanations, because Analytical Table of Contents    xxii 
their properties are causally relevant by programming for causally efficacious 
properties. 
5.3.3 Conceptual Models and KBSs are Both Normatively Explanatory and 
Causally Explanatory 
Hence we get the interesting result that conceptual models (and KBSs) are 
explanatory in the two ways suggested above. However, no firm consensus has 
emerged with respect to causal explanation in psychology, so this result must be 
more tentative than the main results of §5.2. 
Chapter Six: Conclusion: Expertise and Artificial Intelligence 
Finally, we review our conclusions. 
6.1 Review of Chapters One-Five 
We begin with a reiteration of our results about: bottom up philosophy, KBS 
development methodologies, scientific explanation, computational explanation in 
psychology, and psychological competence models. 
6.2 Artificial Intelligence as Explanatory 
We have given an existence proof of the question in the thesis subtitle: there are 
artificially intelligent systems (KBSs) which are explanatory of mental processes 
(the operation of expertise). 
6.3 Expertise in Context 
Expertise is a highly context-sensitive faculty. Conceptual models must include a 
great deal of contextual information: what they model is a system containing 
expert and world. Hence we must be clear that what is explained by conceptual 
models is the operation of expertise in a context. 
6.4 Normative and Causal Explanations 
On the basis of the fact that expertise can be explained, using the same model, 
either causally or normatively as is required, we make the tentative suggestion Analytical Table of Contents    xxiii 
that such coincidence of explanatory types might be characteristic of expertise: 
expertise can be defined as that psychological faculty which can be explained at 
once normatively and causally.  24 
Chapter One: A Metathesis Concerning the 
Philosophy of AI 
"The devil take you!" said Don Quixote. 
"What a peasant you are, and yet what apt 
things you say at times! One would almost 
think you had been to school." 
"But I swear I can't read," replied Sancho.  
Cervantes Don Quixote 
1.1  The Importance of Being Artificial 
Robert Sokolowski once asked an interesting question about artificial 
intelligence (AI): is intelligence like flowers or light (Sokolowski 1988)? In 
particular, when it is fabricated, does it merely simulate the 'natural' 
phenomenon, or is it an example of the phenomenon itself? Artificial light 
certainly is light, but on the other hand, artificial flowers are not themselves 
flowers. 
One can approach this question in two ways. In seeking to determine whether an 
artificial X is an X, one can either look at the X, or at the artificial X. The 
philosophy of AI has tended to take the first approach, and its practitioners have 
tended to examine the properties of the X (intelligence), judging the artificial X 
on its ability to 'measure up' to standards discerned in the natural X. There is 
nothing inherently wrong with this approach, of course. If interesting and 
defining properties of the X can be discerned, then the question can be settled 
merely by proceeding to an examination of the artificial X to see whether it 
possesses those properties. The problem in the case of intelligence is that no 
clear set of such properties has been isolated and agreed upon. The viewpoints of 
Dreyfus and McCarthy, Searle and Pylyshyn, Nagel and Dennett seem 
irreconcilable, even after a couple of decades of discussion. 
This suggests a failure of the 'top down' approach in this field. Obviously, one 
can't always expect philosophy to issue determinate answers to relatively 
nebulous questions such as this, but one would expect something like progress to 
be made. However the three major survey anthologies of papers on the topic 
(Anderson 1964; Haugeland 1981; Boden 1990a) have not shown any evidence 
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The way I have described the impasse clearly suggests that I am going to favour 
the alternative 'bottom up' approach to this question about AI. But what does that 
entail? The idea is that the philosopher who takes this road will examine the 
properties of the artificial X, and seek to pronounce his judgment on that basis. 
Obviously, there is less of a clear cut distinction here than my description 
suggests. The top down philosopher needs to examine the artificial X before he 
judges it; the bottom up philosopher needs to examine the natural X at least in 
some respects if he wishes to discuss the artificial X in the context of Xs in 
general. But note that the properties of the debate will subtly alter as a result of 
the change in perspective from top down to bottom up. The bottom up 
philosopher will examine how the artificial X operates in its context; what are 
minor problems for the top down philosopher may well turn out to be major 
stumbling blocks from the bottom up point of view. This, of course, will tend to 
mean a shift in focus from the traditional interests of the philosopher to the rather 
more arcane technical literature of the artificial X. In the case of intelligence, the 
bottom up philosopher will turn from close readings of Descartes and de la 
Mettrie, Dennett and Searle, to examination of the less well-known results of 
such scientists as Lenat, Clancey, Newell, Rumelhart and McClelland. 
The result of this switch should be beneficial; it should mean that philosophy 
could provide an extra influence on the work in this area, in the way that 
jurisprudence can influence the law or that the philosophy of quantum mechanics 
has influenced theoretical physics. And on the other hand, traditional 
philosophical questions could be illuminated by the new light coming from the 
field of AI. Obviously, this new input will need some interpretation; because AI 
is not discussed explicitly from the point of view of the philosophy of mind, the 
process of discovery of the relationship between AI and positions in current 
philosophy of mind is not so simple. But then this may not be a bad thing; the 
relationship between AI and the philosophy of mind is not so clear either. Any 
philosopher who makes relatively quick and easy identifications between 
positions in the two contexts is likely to be oversimplifying somewhere along the 
line. 
Top down philosophy of AI tends to initiate discussion from the premisses of 
various thought experiments. Suppose we came across a room in which someone 
blindly followed explicit instructions on cards, such that his output was a perfect 
conversation in Chinese. Suppose someone made a molecule-for-molecule 
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his death, and had sufficient theory of neurophysiological cause and effect to 
extrapolate forward. All these thought experiments, of course, have the potential 
to be informative, and crystallize important intuitions about the mind and its 
relation to the brain. But it is difficult to move from an appreciation of the issues 
raised in these thought experiments to issues raised in day to day AI research. 
We do not have the technology to build molecule-for-molecule replicas — and 
even if we did, we probably wouldn't. The production of a series of instructions 
for carrying out Chinese conversations would involve a colossal amount of work. 
The neuroscience involved to produce a conversation with the deceased 
Einstein's brain is so far beyond present capability as to be unimaginable in 
detail.  
The result of the unrealistic nature of these philosophical sojourns into science 
fiction is that it is difficult to determine exactly how these thought experiments 
should impress us. It is a legitimate activity to hold the rest of the world constant 
while hypothetically musing on what might have been; however, so much of the 
world — in practical terms at least — must be altered to accommodate the 
science fiction scenarios, that what follows from what in those contexts is not at 
all obvious (witness the very large scale of disagreement here). 
Far better, I would like to claim, to base philosophical discussion firmly on the 
bedrock of current practice. In the context of the philosophy of AI, this involves 
a firm grasp of the nature of research in AI. This, of course, does not imply the 
paternalistic view that only scientists are qualified to talk philosophically about 
science; it does, however, imply that one should have a practical account of the 
technology under discussion ready at hand. One should know what one is talking 
about. Interestingly, it also implies that 'purely' technological debate may well 
have important philosophical consequences. 
This leads us to the most basic point about technology, which is that the benefit 
of a machine comes from its complementing human activities, not in its imitating 
them. A man can dig with his hands, but a shovel, though analogous to a hand in 
a number of ways, differs crucially: it is much harder and more resistant to 
stress; it is made of metal; it is a flat, curved plane, with nothing analogous to 
human fingers. A shovel might be an 'extra hand', but to judge its performance 
by standards set by the human hand would be ridiculous. A shovel can do one 
thing well — dig — and in virtually every other context is a less impressive 
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number of examples of philosophical argumentation taking a line that seems to 
require that a computer do everything as well — or as badly — as the human 
mind or the human brain. Since AI systems are very rarely created with that 
intention, that means that the argument has been effectively prejudged from the 
outset. Instead, the ideal relationship between AI and philosophy ought to be a 
symbiotic one, like that between Don Quixote and Sancho Panza; AI as Sancho 
should keep Quixotic philosophy's feet on the floor, while philosophy should 
provide a lead with respect to the interesting issues AI should be exploring. The 
result may well be a discipline moving onward in as comic a way as the original 
Quixote and Sancho, but the rate of progress should be increased. Be that as it 
may, to indicate some of the areas in which mismatch between 'pure' 
philosophical discussion and the realities of ordinary AI endeavour has already 
arisen, we shall briefly examine three examples of philosophical debate and its 
(in)applicability to AI.1 Then, bearing these examples in mind, we will discuss 
how AI should be defined. This will complete our introductory task. 
1.2  Three Examples of Philosophical Debate About AI 
1.2.1  Example: The Turing Test 
Our first example concerns an old chestnut: the Turing test (Turing 1950). The 
Turing test is well enough known for us to gloss over the details; the idea is that 
one important characteristic of intelligence is that the performance produced by 
application of the intelligence is indistinguishable from comparable human 
performance. But when the properties of machines are seriously considered, it 
turns out that the Turing test is going to give counterintuitive answers. It will 
tend to suggest that some performance that might normally be regarded as the 
product of intelligence is unintelligent, because too dissimilar to comparable 
human performance, and, conversely, that all sufficiently clever mimicry is the 
product of intelligence, whatever the intuitions might say. Now, the mere 
existence of contrary intuitions should not, by itself, be decisive, and certainly 
there are philosophers who take the supposed intuitions about the mind much too 
seriously. Even so, a test for intelligence should remain at least roughly 
congruent to general 'folk' concepts. And it it important to note that this is not 
because of a failure of the setup of the test itself — no tightening of the 
                                                 
1It has recently been argued that a similar mismatch appears between business practice and the 
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regulations will do the trick. The problem is that the test tends to ignore factors 
resulting from facts about the operation of machinery. 
One point we should note here immediately is that Turing himself is very clear 
that his test is a sufficient but not a necessary condition for intelligence. Hence, 
strictly, failure to pass the test would not entail the unintelligence of the 
machine, though some writers do take the passing of the test to be both necessary 
and sufficient for intelligence (Harnad 1991). Even so, there are not many tests 
for, or general definitions of, intelligence which have gained wide approval. 
Therefore failure to pass the Turing test could reasonably be taken as fairly 
strong evidence that the machine is unintelligent (Hauser 1993c). The converse 
problem, when an unintelligent machine passes the test, is arguably more serious 
— if passing the Turing test is a sufficient condition, we get the unwelcome 
result immediately. 
There are, then, two cases to consider where the Turing test simply 'gets it 
wrong'. The first case is the most often noticed, presumably because of prior 
prejudice against intelligent machines — the case where the test will pronounce 
a system intelligent, where it appears that the output on the basis of which the 
pronouncement was made was produced using totally mechanical means. We can 
easily demonstrate this with an example, that of arithmetic. 
The powers of arithmetic of computers and calculators are well-known. They get 
the right answer in the blink of an eye. Furthermore, they make interesting errors 
which many a human would make — sometimes they even give up the ghost and 
output an error. The performance is arguably only trivially different from the 
human performance (except in terms of speed — and not always even then). In 
fact, one can imagine circumstances in which the performance is literally 
identical. The test judge asks the human to add 32 and 57; the human picks up 
the calculator and presses the following buttons in sequence: '3', '2', '+', '5', '7', '='. 
Now the judge 'asks' the calculator to add 32 and 57 — but asking the calculator 
to do this simply is pressing the sequence '3', '2', '+', '5', '7', '='. Hence it is 
arguable that the test should claim that, as far as calculation goes at least, such 
systems are intelligent. 
But surely the computer's method of calculation is of interest here; the arithmetic 
unit of a computer is hard-wired in. Let us take a moment to consider how such 
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up of a small number of primitive elements at the digital logic level (Tanenbaum 
1984). In a digital circuit, only two possible values are allowed. Usually in a 
computer's digital circuits, a voltage between 0 and 1 volt represents one of the 
values (a binary 0), and a voltage between 2 and 5 volts represents the other (a 
binary 1). These values can be manipulated by gates, arrangements of transistors 
which usually take one or two inputs and give an output that (when the output's 
voltage is interpreted as one of the binary signals) is a function of the input(s). 
Tanenbaum (1984, pp.59-61) discusses the way that gates actually work. Some 
gates and their 'truth tables' are given in Figures 1.1-1.3 (note that the different 
shapes of the gates are conventional representations, and not of any physical 
significance). 
So, for example, in Figure 1.1, if the voltages of both A and B can be interpreted 
as binary 1s (i.e. their voltages are both between 2 and 5 volts), then the voltage 
of X will also be interpretable as binary 1. Otherwise, X's voltage will be in the 
range of the binary 0 (with the proviso that it is indeterminate what will happen 
if the voltage of either A or B is between 1 and 2 volts, or greater than 5 volts). 
Hence the gate is an AND gate. 
A
B
X
AND
A  B   X 
0  0   0 
0  1   0 
1  0   0 
1  1   1
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A
B
X
A  B   X 
0  0   0 
0  1   1 
1  0   1 
1  1   1
OR
 
Figure 1.2: An OR Gate 
A
B
X
XOR
A  B   X 
0  0   0 
0  1   1 
1  0   1 
1  1   0
 
Figure 1.3: An XOR Gate (Computes the Exclusive-Or Function) 
These gates can then be combined to produce circuits that can perform arithmetic 
operations. Figures 1.4 and 1.5 show the circuits that enable the computer to do 
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A
B
Sum
Carry
A  B   Sum Carry 
0  0   0      0 
0  1   1      0 
1  0   1      0 
1  1   0      1
•
•
 
Figure 1.4: A Half-Adder 
An array of these circuits can perform binary addition. For example, if one 
wished to add two 16-bit numbers (i.e. numbers between 0 and 65,535), one 
would have the half-adder (Figure 1.4) representing the rightmost (unit) digit, 
and fifteen versions of the full adder (Figure 1.5) each representing one of the 
other fifteen. A smaller example will give the idea of how these adders work. 
Suppose we wish to add 011 and 101 (two 3-bit numbers). We need one half-
adder and two full adders. The rightmost (half-) adder takes as input the two unit 
digits of our numbers (i.e. 1 and 1). For the sum, 1 and 1 both pass into an XOR 
gate, and therefore 0 is output. For the carry, 1 and 1 pass through an AND gate, 
which therefore outputs 1. This circuit is linked up to the next (full) adder (which 
will deal with the middle digits) by the carry output of the half-adder which 
becomes the carry in input of the full adder. Hence we have, going into the 
middle adder a 1 (from the first number), and a 0 (from the second number) as 
our A and B, and a 1 as carry in. To compute the sum, the A and B (1 and 0) pass 
through an XOR gate, which outputs 1. This output becomes one of the inputs to 
another XOR gate, the other input being the carry in (1). Hence the sum output is 
1 XOR 1, which is 0. For the carry out, A and B are passed through an AND 
gate, to give 0 (1 AND 0 = 0). Next, the output of the first XOR gate (which 
computed A XOR B), 1, is passed through another AND gate, together with the 
carry in, 1, to give 1. The outputs of these two AND gates then pass through an 
OR gate, which then outputs the carry out, which is 1 (0 OR 1 = 1). This carry 
out becomes the carry in of the leftmost circuit, together with the digits 1 and 0, 
to give a sum of 0 and a carry out of 1. This carry out becomes the fourth digit 
(since we have no other inputs). Hence, our 3-bit adder has taken as input 011 
and 101, and output 1000. Converting binary to decimal, that is input 3 and 5, 
and output 8. The arrangement of adders, inputs and outputs is given in Figure 
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have to 'ripple' from right to left along the array of adders before the sum can be 
completed (faster adders that avoid this delay can also be built (Blaauw 1976)). 
A
B
Carry out
Carry in
Sum
•
•
•
•
A B Carry Sum Carry 
    in         out 
0 0 0     0   0 
0 0 1     1   0 
0 1 0     1   0 
0 1 1     0   1 
1 0 0     1   0 
1 0 1     0   1 
1 1 0     0   1 
1 1 1     1   1
 
Figure 1.5: A Full Adder 
Full 
Adder
Full 
Adder
Half 
Adder
AB
A + B  
Figure 1.6: A 3-Digit Ripple-Carry Adder 
There does seem to be a consensus (but see Hauser (1993ab) as an example of an 
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have intelligence ascribed to them — even though their output can be easily 
interpreted as addition. Hence, few would claim that the passing of the Turing 
test with respect to arithmetic should be taken as the only evidence that 
intelligence is 'in use'. Of course, I am appealing to intuitions that a ripple-carry 
adder itself is not a mechanism that is likely to fall under any definition of 
intelligence (although it might be the case that a ripple-carry adder could be a 
component of some intelligent system). 
But there is another case where the Turing test misses the mark, and this is the 
less visible problem — the case where the test fails to ascribe intelligence to 
systems that are at least arguably intelligent. Or, rather, the test has a built-in 
bias against artificial systems. Being artefacts, AI systems are built for a reason. 
Some machines are built or programmed as 'pure research', of course. However, 
most research in the field is driven at least partially by commercial 
considerations. The point here is that a commercial system — for example, a 
knowledge-based system such as we will be discussing in this thesis, or a face or 
voice recognition system, or a theorem prover, or whatever — is intended to 
perform some task, within some corporation or organization, where its operation 
is commercially viable. But this means that the machine must have some 
differential advantage over a human who can perform some comparable task. 
This advantage might just be cost, of course; it will simply be cheaper in some 
cases to use a machine to do some task than it would be if a human were used. 
An example of this might be a face recognition unit used as a 24-hour security 
system where it is cheaper to run the system than to pay the guard. However, in 
other cases, the advantages will be other than simply the gain of equivalent 
performance for lesser cost — the commercial differential will stem, at least in 
some cases, from a difference in performance. So the artificial face recognition 
system might beat the security guard for a number of performance-related 
reasons such as: the artificial system cannot be bribed; is less likely to bow to 
apparent authority (e.g. someone disguised as a general); cannot be threatened; 
can memorize 4,000 faces in an hour. This result is not surprising, of course; 
artificial systems are built and used to complement human abilities, not to mimic 
them. But it does follow that the Turing test will fail to be a reasonable yardstick 
for intelligence (if AI systems are to be allowed to compete here at all) because 
the Turing test legislates against anything that complements human performance, 
and  rewards mimicry. This, in effect, is French's charge (1990). He has a 
problem with the Turing test's assumed definition of intelligence; he notes, 
rightly, that the definition cannot be general because of the importance of the A Metathesis Concerning the Philosophy of AI    34 
conversational abilities required by any system that passes the full version of the 
test as described by Turing. We are interested in a weaker charge, that the test 
actually rules out virtually all existing and foreseeable pieces of software, 
because such software will, in the nature of the case, not only fail to reproduce 
such conversational abilities, but in practice will deliberately eschew such skills.  
This result actually is generalizable. Any test which purports to be a simple test 
for intelligence such as the Turing test, or a component of such a test, should at 
least be developed with an eye to the context in which software development 
takes place. Three brief examples show that this is not always the case. Some 
thinkers have supposed that reproducibility is an important factor. But some 
people are unable to reproduce; furthermore, a reproducing machine would not 
really be very useful. Even so, some software is able to reproduce itself — this is 
how computer viruses work, but no-one would suggest that that ability adds 
anything to the intelligence of the viruses. Other philosophers (Harnad 1990) 
have talked of the Total Turing Test, a version of the Turing test where the 
machine has to move around in the world and interact with it. This ignores the 
fact that virtually no machine is developed to do that, save in an abstract way 
(but cf Brooks 1991). Most AI systems are designed to fill computational niches 
in organizations and corporations, but this is the extent of their situatedness 
(O'Hara and Shadbolt forthcoming discuss the importance for psychology of this 
type of contextualization). Still other commentators (e.g. the connectionists) talk 
about graceful degradation, the ability to produce decent performance, albeit at a 
decreasing level, in unfamiliar situations. Again, this ignores the obvious fact 
that most AI systems are intended for a single task, and that graceful degradation 
in those circumstances has no utility at all. In fact, in many applications, graceful 
degradation is a negative attribute. It is often important not to use computers in 
circumstances where their output is not entirely reliable, whereas the temptation 
to use a computer in inappropriate circumstances may be large when the 
performance only degrades partially. 
We have discussed two cases where the Turing test arguably fails to produce the 
right results about intelligence. It is plausible that in each case, a different notion 
of Turing test is in operation. In the first case (where a calculator is pronounced 
intelligent), the test is really dependent on IO (input-output) relations, with 
perhaps some small set of performance-related criteria (e.g. reaction times) as 
supplementary. In the second case, however, emphasis is laid on characteristics 
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are characteristic of intelligence generally. Not only that, but study of the current 
state of technology will show that such characteristics are generally ignored by 
designers of 'intelligent' systems, for the reasons outlined above. Hence, 
whichever version of the Turing test you buy, only one of these criticisms 
applies to it. Nevertheless, our main point survives: in each case, reflection on 
the nature of the computers (and the use of computers) leads us to suppose that 
highly counterintuitive results will follow from the use of whichever version of 
the Turing test is chosen (and therefore that informed reflection on the actual 
real-life use of computers should lead us to reject the Turing test as a test for 
intelligence). 
1.2.2  Example: The Problem of Induction 
Our second example of the inappropriateness of the top down approach with 
respect to the philosophy of AI concerns induction. The problem of induction is 
well known, hinted at by Locke, and stated explicitly by Hume. Many 
scientific/empirical generalizations of the form ∀x.Fx are based on a finite 
quantity of, typically observational, experiments. Yet of course, we cannot 
deduce the universally quantified law from the conjunction of the finite quantity 
of instances (unless — the rare case — we have independent grounds for 
supposing that we have observed all possible instances). Repeated observation is 
not even allowed as a basis for the assertion of the generalization in many 
sciences (e.g. mathematics, where Goldbach's conjecture, for instance, remains a 
conjecture, not a theorem). 
Investigation of the surrounding issues in philosophy has tended toward the 
justification of so-called ampliative induction (i.e. induction that attempts to 
establish truths that extrapolate beyond the data). So, for instance, philosophical 
questions may be asked about the type of evidence that is required to establish an 
inductive hypothesis; Bacon, Mill and Keynes argued in favour of a type of 
ampliative induction known as variative induction, which claims that the 
inductive hypothesis is better supported if the instances cited in its support are 
drawn from a relatively wide variety of types, while the opposing position, 
enumerative induction, championed by Carnap, suggests that mere multiplicity 
of supporting instances is the relevant factor. An orthogonal position, 
Bayesianism, stresses the subjective gradation of a reasoner's belief, with the 
result that the variative/enumerative controversy can be sidestepped. A second 
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techniques to the analysis of induction. A third set of questions concerns the 
attack on Humean scepticism (and related paradoxes such as the paradox of the 
ravens, the 'grue' paradox and the lottery paradox).1
All this is, of course, very important, and philosophically and logically deep. But 
note how this work all stems from the work of Bacon, Pascal and Hume. The 
concentration on the philosophical literature produces a corresponding 
concentration on the problems that absorbed the great philosophers (Bacon in 
particular would not have approved of that!); the development of rules for the 
manipulation of evidence takes place, not against the background of actual 
scientific practice, but instead as a means of minimizing the departure from the 
purity of truth-preserving manipulation of premisses in a logical argument. 
However, induction is also a technological problem in AI. The field of machine 
learning (ML) is an area of research into the possibility of getting machines to 
discover inductive generalizations. Sets of observations are described in some 
canonical way (the case data), and general rules are suggested and tested by the 
machine. Clearly, all three traditional sets of questions are extremely relevant to 
this practice. Each rule induced by the system will be associated with a measure 
of confidence or certainty in the generalization; if variative induction is required, 
then some measure of variety of the case data will have to feed into the 
calculation of the confidence (if not, some measure of the number of cases will 
suffice). Most ML systems are numerically based, so the exploration of 
Pascalian probability analysis is clearly relevant. The various inductive 
paradoxes are problematic for the output of ML systems as well as for the output 
of more familiar inductive practices.2 Yet study of the actual practice of ML 
                                                 
1The straightforward scepticism trades on the logical possibility that one could build up a 
massive body of favourable evidence for a hypothesis, while being unable to rule out the logical 
possibility of one countervailing instance, which would, of course, falsify the universally 
quantified hypothesis. The paradox of the ravens (Hempel 1945) concerns the relative usefulness 
of positive evidence. Intuitively, it should be the case that any evidence which is entailed by the 
hypothesis should support the hypothesis. But then the observation of a white handkerchief 
should support the hypothesis "All ravens are black", by virtue of its support for the logically 
equivalent hypothesis "All non-white things are non-ravens"; this seems counterintuitive. The 
'grue' paradox (Goodman 1954) depends on generalizing from noticing that all observations of 
green things are observations of grue things (where something is grue iff it is green until the year 
2100 and blue thereafter), and therefore any hypotheses involving the notion of greenness are 
supported to precisely the same degree as the analogous hypotheses with 'grue' substituted for 
one or more occurrences of 'green'. Yet we do not take grue-like predicates seriously in our 
actual inductive practice. The lottery paradox (Kyburg 1965) trades on the idea that it seems to 
follow that, since each lottery ticket is practically certain not to win the raffle, no lottery ticket 
will win the raffle. 
2Though in this case it should be noted that, as with most inductive practices, one can ignore 
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reveals a further serious problem that is addressed much less often by the 
philosophical community, the problem of hypothesis generation. What the ML 
system must do is to search for possible rules in a space of possibilities that will 
grow as the case data are described more elaborately. For example, suppose the 
algorithm works by inducing over a range of cases. If each case consists of an 
object, with, say, the values of m associated attributes, then in the case of simple 
rules (i.e. rules which relate single atomic propositions as antecedent and 
consequent) concerning binary attributes only (i.e. attributes with two possible 
values), there will be 2m(m - 1) possible relationships to check. So, to give a 
small example, suppose that the domain of the cases is football teams, and the 
data have three binary attributes: successful?,  well supported? and good to 
watch?. Then the ML system will have to search for twelve possible rules: 
All successful teams are well supported.   All well supported teams are successful. 
All unsuccessful teams are well supported.   All well supported teams are unsuccessful. 
All successful teams are good to watch.   All teams that are good to watch are 
       s u c c e s s f u l .  
All unsuccessful teams are good to watch.   All teams that are good to watch are  
       u n s u c c e s s f u l  
All teams that are good to watch are well   All well supported teams are good to 
 supported.      watch. 
All teams that are not good to watch are well   Well supported teams are never good to 
 supported.      watch. 
 
It can easily be seen that the complexity will increase if conjunctions are allowed 
in the antecedent, or disjunctions in the consequent. But the main problem here 
is the restriction to binary valued attributes. An ML system might possibly get 
away with disallowing conjunctive antecedents and disjunctive consequents, but 
ultimately will have to support multi-valued attributes. 
The point here is that there is an 'unknown problem' of induction. The 
justification of induction is a serious question; but, for ML purposes, more 
serious is the problem of selecting hypotheses to test from the vast space of 
possible hypotheses. This space must somehow be cut down, so that inductive 
hypotheses are selected with some kind of prior probability of ampliative 
success. The greater seriousness of the latter problem in ML stems, of course, 
from a prosaic technological problem; if the system doesn't run, its output cannot 
be tested, and so therefore if the system takes arbitrarily large amounts of time to 
process detailed cases, the pressing problem is not the justification or validation 
of the output, but the production of output in real time. This is not a problem that 
philosophers have often treated — indeed, philosophers have rarely considered 
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Bacon remarked that knowledge is not communicated in the same 
order as that in which it was discovered. But he drew no sharp 
distinction between the concept of induction as a process of research 
or gradual discovery and the concept of induction as a pattern of 
proof or of graded justification, though the former is concerned with 
temporal sequences of events and the latter with timeless relations 
between propositions. Mill had approached this distinction by 1851, 
when he claimed, in the third edition of his System of Logic, that even 
if his inductive methods were not methods of discovery they were at 
least methods of proof. And since Mill's day most writers on 
induction have concentrated on the logic of inductive proof rather 
than the methodology of inductive discovery. (Perhaps the only 
systematic exceptions to this tendency today are computer scientists 
writing about the construction of expert systems.) 
(Cohen 1989, p.11) 
 
When we talk about knowledge acquisition for expert systems later in the thesis, 
we shall see how a main problem with the evaluation of expert testimony is that 
most expert testimony is intended implicitly to be justificatory of the output, 
rather than a description of the actual process of discovery. Interestingly, a 
similar problem can be seen in the philosophy of science, where, for example, a 
theory like Popper's falsificationism, though it claims to have methodological 
repercussions, is mainly concerned with 'what follows from what', i.e. Cohen's 
timeless relations between propositions. Fortunately, in the philosophy of 
science, the problem is less pressing, since scientists are relatively good at 
suggesting useful hypotheses. ML systems, in contrast, need to have that ability 
programmed into them. 
This, of course, is a serious problem for ML. However, it also turns out to be a 
problem for the philosophers of justification. Standardly, Bernoulli's law of large 
numbers is used to show that, as more instances are observed, the formula 
learned will be more probably true (Cohen 1989, pp.21-2). However, Bernoulli's 
law only applies to a given formula; in other words, if there is some independent 
way to secure a hypothesis in which we have confidence, then there is no 
problem. But this is not the standard position in ML, and, worryingly, it is at 
least possible that situations will arise in other contexts where no given inductive 
hypothesis is available. Bergadano (1993) shows that as the set of possible 
inductive hypotheses grows, the accuracy of the estimates of the probability of A Metathesis Concerning the Philosophy of AI    39 
those hypotheses will diminish. Although an increase in the number of examples 
will tend to increase accuracy, it is also true that as the language for describing 
the domain gets richer (which will automatically increase the number of possible 
hypotheses), the confidence we can have in our judgments will decrease. Of 
course, in some circumstances this will not matter too much. For instance, if the 
set of training examples contains a large proportion of all possible examples, 
then increasing the number of possible hypotheses will probably increase 
accuracy (as there will be more of a chance of selecting an applicable 
hypothesis). However, since the usual situation is that there are infinitely many 
possible examples not contained in the training set, this is little comfort. 
The problems that Bergadano explores in the analysis of induction therefore turn 
out to be relevant to the philosophical discussions to which we have alluded. 
Indeed, the relevance of this ML problem is greater even than the above 
argument suggests — Bergadano (1993, pp.39-47) explores the possible 
solutions to this new inductive problem from within various standard 
philosophies of inductive inference (for the record, according to Bergadano, 
Carnap's inductive logic framework seems more promising than both the 
classical probability approach of uniform convergence and subjective 
Bayesianism). Hence it might be the case that this ML problem could help 
adjudicate between various rival accounts of induction. 
So, whatever the details of the disputes over induction might be, we can say that 
by the analysis of the requirements of a particular functioning technology, ML, 
we discover (a)  that the standard philosophical accounts of induction, while 
clearly relevant for ML, do not fully describe the inductive problem as it presents 
itself in ML; (b) that in fact the ML problem is arguably a special case of a 
ubiquitous problem of general philosophical interest; and (c) that it turns out that 
the ML problem can be seen as a method of judging between a number of 
competing philosophical accounts. Again the bottom up approach to philosophy 
proves useful in ways unavailable to the top down approach. 
1.2.3  Example: Narrow versus Wide Content 
Finally in this section, we can briefly consider a third example: the ongoing 
debate about 'narrow' and 'wide' content, which has been taken to impinge on 
debates in the philosophy of AI. The narrow/wide content debate stems from 
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on a molecule-for-molecule replica of Earth, where the only difference is that for 
each molecule of H2O on Earth, on Twin-Earth there is a molecule of a complex 
compound XYZ which is macroscopically indistinguishable from H2O. Now 
consider a man M who thinks "I would like a glass of water." Then on Twin-
Earth there is another man, Twin-M, who also thinks "I would like a glass of 
water." There is no relevant physical difference between the two men. However, 
M is having a thought that refers to H2O, whereas Twin-M is having a thought 
that is related to XYZ. Hence, the argument goes, the two men, who by 
hypothesis have no relevant physical differences between them, must be thinking 
different thoughts, from which it follows that the physical facts about M and 
Twin-M alone are not sufficient to establish the contents of their thoughts. 
The argument is very controversial, and we needn't evaluate it here. What we are 
concerned with is the further argument that the Twin-Earth speculations are an 
important negative indicator for AI; that AI must somehow, if it is to develop as 
a discipline of psychological importance, defuse that argument. This argument, 
which can perhaps be seen most clearly in some of the papers in (Pettit and 
McDowell 1986), goes roughly along the following lines: 
What the Twin-Earth argument, and related arguments, show is that the 
content of at least some psychological states is not dependent, as 
might intuitively be thought, solely upon other states of the subject. 
The content of these states is essentially partially dependent on 
environmental factors. Therefore, the exact content of what I think is 
not necessarily up to me. 
 
Now, what gets postulated in AI is a view, roughly, that psychological 
states can be explained by the development of computer programs 
which, all being well, have the same IO relations as the human 
psychological faculties that they are intended to model, and satisfy 
other evidential standards as well (whatever they may be — see 
Chapter Four). There will be a supposed correspondence between the 
internal states of the machine, described at some level, and the 
psychological states which are the explananda of the endeavour. 
 
However, what the Putnam argument shows is that the psychological 
states can only be specified semantically in terms that are broad or 
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specifiable using internal criteria: the environmental circumstances 
are irrelevant to the description of a computer. Hence computational 
states cannot fully model psychological states. 
 
This argument can be attacked at several levels. At a basic level, the Twin-Earth 
argument depends on the intuition that meaning determines truth conditions — 
the idea being that two propositions, one of which is true and another false in 
identical circumstances, are necessarily non-identical. This is certainly a 
plausible line to take, but it is a suppressed premiss of the argument. At a wider 
focus, one could argue, for various reasons, that the Twin-Earth argument is 
simply unconvincing. Jerry Fodor (1987) attempts something of the sort; Tyler 
Burge (1986) also implicitly recognises the force of this sort of complaint by his 
attempts to produce a similar argument to Putnam's, a 'tighter' argument less 
vulnerable to 'irrelevant' criticisms. Alternatively, one could deny that the Twin-
Earth argument is relevant to AI after all, by denying the premiss that 
computational states have to be described 'narrowly' (Wilson 1994). At a wider 
focus still, one could argue, with Andy Clark (1989), that even if the Twin-Earth 
argument goes through unimpeded, the relevance to cognitive science and AI is 
at best limited, since the relationship between mental or psychological states, and 
the 'inner' causes of those states, is doubly mediated, both by relations to the 
external world — as Putnam claims — and by a holistic method of ascription of 
psychological states which entails that one ascribes a group of psychological 
states to a subject on the basis of observed series of behaviours. These are all 
top-down arguments. As part of our bottom-up practice, we can add further 
evidence by considering the nature of cognitive science and AI, and considering 
what action it would be practical to take in the face of these arguments.  
This additional evidence would also be relevant to another, related, debate, 
which can be seen as coming from what, in some sense, is the opposite (though 
still top down) direction. The eliminativist programme of research, led by the 
Churchlands (1979, 1986), claims that standard 'folk psychological' terms cannot 
be the basis of a truly scientific psychology, and that any scientific psychology 
would have to be based on discernible structures/processes in the brain. The folk 
psychological terms, revealed as having been referring to nothing 
(systematically), would then cease to be employed, rather in the way that terms 
such as 'witch' or 'phlogiston' have ceased to be employed, or else would undergo 
radical alteration, rather as the term 'humour' has. The standard responses to 
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even a proto-scientific one (e.g. Wilkes 1991), and to refuse to accept the post-
elimination discourse as distinctively psychological (McCulloch 1986). Again, 
these are, I think, perfectly reasonable counter-arguments to the eliminativist 
claims. But in this section what I want to show is that such eliminativist 
arguments run counter to much of the spirit of AI. This, of course, need not be 
fatal to the arguments themselves; what I do want to establish, however, is how 
destructive such arguments can be when applied to the domain  of AI. 
The destructiveness comes because the eliminativist claims also lead fairly 
naturally from the psychological/philosophical claim, to a methodological claim. 
The methodological claim is quite straightforward: if psychology should be 
based around facts about the structure of the brain, then a machine intended for 
psychological modelling should be structurally similar. In other words, the 
current use of computers with von Neumann architectures (the standard form of 
computer architecture, not at all brainlike) should be stopped (for AI purposes), 
and instead some sort of computation based on neuronal structures should be 
used. 
So, we have two arguments that supposedly cause trouble for AI: the Twin-Earth 
argument and its variants, and the eliminativist argument. They are motivated by 
different emphases, but have an analogous effect when applied to AI. The Twin-
Earth argument claims that computational states, since they are specified without 
reference to the environment, are ruled out of the psychological court; the 
eliminativist argument says that (folk) psychological states, since they are 
apparently unrelated to the computational states in the brain, are ruled out of the 
scientific court. 
The methodological variant of these arguments is to say that what AI should be 
doing is modelling the underlying computational structures of the brain in some 
way. So, the methodological variant of the Twin-Earth argument says that if a 
computer is to have psychological states, for example, then what should be 
attempted in AI is the production of a rich repertoire of behaviour using methods 
analogous to those used by the brain, since the brain has genuine causal powers 
which can be captured internally, 'narrowly'. Hence when the computer is 
transferred from context to Twin-context (or when we compare the states of a 
computer on Earth with those of its twin), its psychological states will vary in the 
same way as a human's. The position then would be roughly analogous to 
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content, and the environment completes the determination; intelligent computers' 
states would have the same bipartite content. The job of the computer scientist 
would be to look after the narrow content; the broad content would be provided 
by the context. Hence computer scientists shouldn't try to program computers 
with the whole content; they should instead seek to represent narrow content in 
their programming languages. 
Similarly, the methodological variant of the eliminativist argument says that AI 
should not be modelling folk psychological entities, with their relations of 
rationality, etc., but instead should be focussing on modelling the logical 
structure of the brain. In each case, the claim is made that AI should cease to 
focus on the symbolic areas upon which it has traditionally focussed. 
The obvious beneficiary of these views, of course, in the AI field, is the field of 
connectionism (Rumelhart et al 1986, McClelland et al 1986). We will not go 
into connectionism in any detail here, suffice it to say that a connectionist system 
is made up of 'nodes', each of which is a very small processor capable of 
rudimentary computation, connected in a directed graph by 'connections'. The 
connections carry signals to the nodes, which then act as inputs to 'activation 
functions', one of which is associated with each node. The activation function 
determines, on the input, whether the current node will send a signal or not to the 
other nodes with which it is connected. The association with the brain is clear: 
nodes are analogous to neurons, connections to synapses, and the activation 
functions model the readiness of a neuron to fire, given suitable signals from the 
neurons connected to it. The analogy with the narrow content debate is that the 
states of the nodes and their connections are like narrow content (invariant across 
contexts), while broad content is provided by the (context-sensitive) 
interpretations of the states of the output nodes. On the basis of these analogies, 
the methodological variants of both the Twin-Earth and eliminativist arguments 
often recommend the use of connectionism as a standard methodology in AI.1
Nevertheless, it is a big step to argue that a major industry/discipline such as AI 
should cleave to a single methodology on the basis of purely philosophical 
arguments. What I wish to suggest in the remainder of this section is that, 
                                                 
1Though not all. Brooks (1991) wants to develop robots which move about in the world without 
necessarily doing any representation of data at all - because this is more physiologically realistic. 
Edelman (1992) agrees with the eliminativists that the brain should be modelled; he, however, 
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methodologically, the idea is a non-starter, on the basis of a brief examination of 
current AI practice. 
The first point to note is that connectionism, despite the many attractive qualities 
of that methodology, will not do the trick. The details of this point need not be 
laboured here. All we need to note is that the architecture of this methodology 
fails to model the brain sufficiently well. For example, the brain consists of some 
1011 neurons, each with approximately 1,000 meaningful connections with other 
neurons, making for a total complexity of the system of some 1014 connections. 
Connectionist systems, on the other hand, rarely number their connections even 
in the millions. Hence the difference in scale is sufficiently great to cause 
concern. As another example, the brain has relevant features that it is difficult for 
connectionist systems to model, structural features such as synapse-on-synapse 
connections, and features relevant to the characterization of the computation of 
the brain, such as the flooding of contiguous neurons with neurotransmitters, 
thereby affecting neurons that are close together in space (such contiguity is not 
necessarily associated with the patterns of connectivity of the brain). Conversely, 
many important techniques associated with connectionist computing have no 
obvious neural analogue (e.g. back propagation). 
Now, connectionist systems have a number of interesting features, and are able 
to perform tasks in real time that standard symbolic systems are unable to 
perform, so it should not be deduced from this that connectionism should be 
abandoned as an AI methodology. However, it does seem to follow that, if the 
argument is that only a brain-like computational architecture will do for AI, 
more work needs to be done to establish that connectionism is such an 
architecture; at present, both connectionist systems and symbolic systems should 
equally be rejected on these principles. There is no gain to be made by insisting 
that a search begin for computational techniques that can operate on a genuinely 
brainlike architecture, either; the interesting systems that have explored this path 
still have very primitive computational abilities (Scutt 1994). 
The second point to note is that the big advantage of symbolic systems is that 
they can be manipulated using languages that are sufficiently like natural 
languages to make the following of their semantics tractable. For instance, take 
the ability to program computers to do arithmetic. The semantics of the 
computational output are not isomorphic to the abstract structure that we 
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the addition operator over the real numbers '+', then we can see that there are 
large numbers of cases where Η and + coincide. Obvious examples are simple 
sums:  2 + 2 = 4  and  2 Η  2  =  4. However, there are important differences. A 
computer is a finite machine, and so it can only represent finitely many numbers. 
Hence its data class real is finite, and will contain no transcendental numbers (it 
will, for example, contain approximations, to, say, 15 decimal places, of such 
numbers as π and e). Also, because the computer reals are finite in number, there 
is a largest and a smallest; this, of course, is not true of the real numbers. 
Furthermore, a computer can only represent numbers to some specified number 
of significant figures. Hence some problems will receive the wrong answer on 
that account: for example 
1,000,000,000 + 0.000,000,001 = 1,000,000,000.000,000,001 
 
but 
1,000,000,000 Η 0.000,000,001 = 1,000,000,000 (a so-called 'rounding 
error) 
 
Finally, there is one symbol in the semantics of computer arithmetic that has no 
analogue in the real numbers, and that is ⊥ (pronounced 'bottom'). ⊥ is the result 
of any problem that is impossible to compute, either because the program goes 
into an infinite loop, or because the result is impossible to represent. So, for 
example, if L is the largest number that can be represented by a computer, 
L Η 1 = ⊥ (whereas in ordinary arithmetic, L + 1 is the successor of L). Another 
example: 1/0 is undefined in ordinary arithmetic, while 1/0 = ⊥ for the machine. 
The purpose of this digression is to show that, although all computers will depart 
from the desired arithmetic performance in some respects, the fact that we can 
give computer arithmetic a semantics is helpful. And we can generalize this 
result to any symbolic manipulations performed by machines. The ability to give 
a semantics to computational systems is useful in two ways. Firstly, of course, 
the semantics can be checked to make sure that the machine will give the output 
that is desired. This task, of course, gets increasingly difficult as the program 
gets complex, but the roughly familiar structure of most symbolic programming 
languages means that the task is generally not impossible (Gries 1981). And the 
second way in which having a semantics is useful is that the points where 
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computer arithmetic, we could see where the computer would simply fail to get 
the right answers (at least beyond some rigorous degree of approximation). This, 
as can be imagined, is very useful indeed. However, whereas symbolic systems 
have a relatively simple semantics, the same is not true of connectionist systems. 
Virtually the only way to work out what even a moderately complex system will 
do it to run it on some data. Of course, the advantage of this is that, in many 
cases, novel solutions can be found for problems (often problems which seem 
intractable symbolically). But the flip side is that, if we wish to program a 
computer to do some task, if we can program it symbolically, we know exactly 
how close to the desired performance we will get, whereas setting up a 
connectionist network may well result in good performance in tests with no 
guarantee that that standard of performance will continue (or no indication of 
which areas are likely to produce unhappy results). 
The third point that we should make against those who insist on a monolithic 
approach to AI and cognitive science is that there is a deep assumption being 
made by those who say that only structures sufficiently brainlike can be truly 
explanatory psychologically. We shall discuss psychological explanation in 
much more detail in Chapter Four; for now we just need to note that, for a 
number of purposes, it might well be the case that a symbolic program could 
provide an account at an interesting level of detail. It may not be 'the whole 
story', but to say that a standard symbolic AI program can never be of 
psychological interest seems extremely premature. 
1.3  The Philosophy of AI 
These preceding three examples are intended to show how a study of the 
practices of AI can lead to some philosophical insights. To reiterate, this is not to 
say that the philosophical discussions are wrong, or misguided, only that 
interesting input to the debates can be found in a discipline which has always had 
philosophical roots. The first example, of the Turing test, shows the relevance of 
the fact that it is essential that an AI system work; if it did not, then, no matter 
how philosophically kosher it was with respect to some doctrine, it would be 
completely useless. Because AI systems have to work, philosophical corners 
inevitably have to be cut. But this does not invalidate such systems 
philosophically; on the contrary, usually the result is a demonstration of the 
practical import (or otherwise) of the philosophical doctrine. Only by studying 
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rule out AI systems; AI systems, since they are intended to complement human 
intelligence, will always fail a test for intelligence that is built around 
duplicating human intelligence. This suggests that the Turing test cannot be a 
general (i.e. neutral on the question of machine intelligence) test of intelligence 
(as Turing himself understood). Our second example, a look at machine learning, 
shows that the a priori considerations characteristic of philosophy can 
sometimes overlook important practical realities. The attempt to build machines 
which can automatically induce indicates an undiscovered problem of induction; 
the problem of hypothesis generation is the 'real' problem, while the problem of 
justification can, to an extent, take care of itself. Thirdly, our example of narrow 
content shows that some philosophical distinctions, useful in fictional settings 
for the purpose of thought experiments, need not translate particularly well into 
methodological considerations. 
In the remainder of this chapter, we shall briefly consider some deeper, more 
foundational problems than have been discussed above. In particular, since our 
top-level argument in this thesis is the value of AI to philosophy, we need a 
characterization of AI, which shall be the business of this section. In the final 
section, we shall introduce the philosophical problems to be tackled in the 
remainder of the thesis. 
1.3.1  AI and Intentionality 
So, what might be a first shot at a definition of AI? It has been described as a 
collection of various projects which attempt to use computers to produce output 
that, if produced by a human, would be assumed to have required intelligence. 
This is a useful short characterization, but not an adequate one for two reasons. 
Being closely related to the Turing test definition of intelligence, it will fall foul 
of the two arguments produced in §1.2.1 above. Arithmetic calculations would 
certainly require intelligence if performed by a human, yet the simple hard-wired 
arithmetic circuits described in §1.2.1 stretch even sympathetic intuitions a long 
way. And conversely, much AI deals with rather boring and mundane (to an 
unreflecting human) abilities; as Margaret Boden puts it: 
[AI] is sometimes described as the study of how to build and/or 
program computers to enable them to do the sorts of things that minds 
can do. Some of these things are commonly regarded as requiring 
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legal or scientific advice, proving theorems in logic or mathematics. 
Others are not, because they can be done by all normal adults 
irrespective of educational background (and sometimes by non-
human animals too), and typically involve no conscious control: 
seeing things in sunlight and shadows, finding a path through 
cluttered terrain, fitting pegs into holes, speaking one's native tongue, 
and using one's common sense. 
(Boden 1990b, p.1) 
 
Note the jarring (though not contradictory) nature of the two arguments against 
this first characterization. The first seems to rule out the effects of simple hard-
wired computer circuits; the second seems to rule in the effects of what we might 
call hard-wired capabilities in humans, those over which we have no conscious 
control. This clash is, I think, indicative of the many problems that exist in the 
characterization of intelligence, and similar relevant notions in the philosophy of 
mind and AI, such as intentionality, cognition, symbol grounding, etc. etc..  
What we would like to do is to discuss AI without entering into this area of 
confusion, both quagmire and minefield! In particular, there is no need to enter 
into questions of which faculties are 'caused' or 'premised upon' intentionality. 
Intentionality is the notion of being 'directed towards' events or things in the 
world. We uncontroversially 'have' intentionality, since we uncontroversially can 
think 'about' birds, bees or whatever. Arguments can ensue about dogs and cats; 
do they think 'about' things? There appears to be a majority in favour of at least a 
qualified 'yes' to that question. No such consensus can be determined about 
machines.  
But the existence of the notion of intentionality does seem to some to offer a nice 
short cut to the establishment of certain philosophical truths about machines and 
minds. If we knew whether or not machines 'had' intentionality, then we could 
settle many of the philosophical questions that our developing technology seems 
to be posing. Hence all we need to do is look for intentionality, right? 
Wrong! In what sense do computers do arithmetic? In the sense that they 
produce output that can be interpreted as arithmetic. This notion of being 
interpreted as arithmetic is crucial here. In fact, humans do arithmetic in the 
same sense — we do arithmetic because of the way that our output can be 
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1, for example — while others — apparently random guessing, say — are not. 
And this is a result we should expect. Intentionality, the sense of being 'directed 
towards', is a semantic notion, as is interpretation. But this should lead us to 
suspect that intentionality is not at all a property of a system, in the way that, 
say, height is a property of a man. Intentionality, being a semantic notion, is at 
least in part imposed from without. The question should now become: under 
what circumstances should we regard a system's output to be directed towards 
some external thing? But note that this is not necessarily going to be decidable 
simply by examining the system itself. In particular, the question may at least 
partly rest upon the way in which we make fresh decisions in the fresh situations 
envisaged by the thought experimenters. In this context, we can see that the 
novelty of Searle's classic 'Minds, Brains and Programs' (1980) is not its 
discovery that syntax does not determine semantics, but in its assumption that 
this is news. 
1.3.2  Two Views of AI 
So, let us ignore the question of the relationship between human and animal or 
artificial intelligence, conceived of as a question of determining which systems' 
outputs have semantics and which don't (intrinsically), since phrased this way, 
the question is practically impossible to answer, though easy to prejudge. If we 
look instead at current AI practice, what we will see will be two discernibly 
different forms of AI, which we might term the official version and the unofficial 
version. The official version is promoted by Margaret Boden, seeing AI 
... as the science of intelligence in general — or, more accurately, as 
the intellectual core of cognitive science. As such, its goal is to 
provide a systematic theory that can explain (and perhaps enable us to 
replicate) both the general categories of intentionality and the diverse 
psychological capacities grounded in them. It must encompass not 
only the psychology of terrestrial creatures, but the entire range of 
possible minds. It must tell us whether intelligence can be embodied 
only in systems whose basic architecture is brainlike (involving 
parallel-processing within networks of associated cells), or whether it 
can be implemented in some other manner. And, 'computers' having 
dropped A Metathesis Concerning the Philosophy of AI    50 
out of the definition, their especial relevance to such a science must 
be proven. 
(Boden 1990b, p.1) 
 
This, though it may be a unified project in its own right, cuts across the field of 
AI as it sees itself. For example, most philosophy of AI would fall under this 
rubric, of course. But I wish to maintain that the philosophy of AI is philosophy, 
not AI (as the philosophy of logic is not logic, and aesthetics is not art). On the 
other hand, the type of AI system that I intend to focus on in this thesis, the 
knowledge-based system, would probably fall outside the definition. Most 
knowledge-based systems add little to current knowledge, or theory, of 
intelligence in general, tending instead to be used to solve hard problems in 
small, well structured (typically terrestrial) domains.1
Another problem with the official definition is that it does, as Boden says, write 
computers out of it. Whereas AI, however it is conceived, is certainly a science 
to do with the application of computers to problems. Even those approaches that, 
for example, look toward the brain as the embodier of the important properties 
that lead to human intelligence (McCulloch and Pitts 1965; Churchland 1986; 
Rumelhart et al 1986; McClelland et al 1986; Clark 1989) abstract the brain's 
computational properties from its many others. Searle's point against the 'many 
mansions reply' to his Chinese Room experiment (1980, pp.80-1), that 'the 
interest of the original claim made on behalf of artificial intelligence is that it 
was a precise, well-defined thesis: mental processes are computational processes 
over formally defined elements', is well made. 
On the other hand, there is the unofficial view, which is based more on a census 
of what AI researchers actually do. This view will maintain, pragmatically, that 
AI is basically a loose collection of research projects, the general focus of which 
is problem-solving using computers. An added dimension to this is that certain 
computational methods have proved useful in these projects; further work goes 
on to examine the possibilities of using these methods in novel situations. On 
this view, philosophical interest in AI should focus on the significance of these 
                                                 
1However, it could be the case that even KBSs could be viewed as small experimental, empirical 
studies into the ability of artificial systems (specifically: computer programs) to produce the sort 
of 'intelligent' output that we are interested in. But even if they are so viewed, this is a very small 
role to play. If we are to take current practice seriously, we should note that a definition which 
entails that KBSs have such a small role belies the fact that they are easily the most common 
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pieces of research, conceived both individually, and as part of a global AI 
research programme. 
However, few philosophers have bothered to investigate particular research 
projects. On the contrary, the philosophy of AI all too often focuses on either 
science fiction thought experiments such as the Chinese Room, or other, more 
low-level, discussions of the neo-Wittgensteinian kind, designed to bring out the 
'logical grammar' of mind, thereby discovering the philosophical significance of 
AI without necessarily having to know anything about it! In other words, the 
starting point of most philosophical discussion of AI is the work of other 
philosophers. Nothing wrong with that, of course, except that people in AI who 
wish to see what they have done in philosophical (as opposed to computational 
or managerial) terms are usually obliged to do that philosophical research as 
well. There is nothing particularly wrong with this either, except that the 
opportunity to cross-fertilize in the two disciplines is lost. 
I wish to contribute to the redirection of the philosophy of AI towards the 
problems that are set by AI as actually performed, as opposed to problems to do 
with, for example, perfect artificial replicas of people. These problems are just 
too remote from those confronted by AI in the unofficial sense. When 
practitioners of AI meet a philosophical problem, it is usually much more 
specific — for example, someone may wish to discover what the epistemological 
or psychological status of a new taxonomy of supposedly generic problem-
solving 'types' is (Chandrasekaran and Johnson 1993). For such practitioners, the 
question is: which philosophical theories/arguments will be valuable in that 
restricted context? What is certain is that no-one who did not know about that 
restricted context would be able to answer the question. 
For example, take a typical question in the philosophy of AI: Can machines 
think? I don't want to worry now about the meaningfulness of the question, 
particularly. What I want to highlight is the way that it is impossible for AI in the 
unofficial sense to provide any input to that question. If I went out tomorrow and 
built a machine that was up to the standard suggested in the various thought 
experiments or science fiction films, then that would still have no effect on the 
philosophy of mind.1 The existence of the machine used in the various thought 
experiments is conceived to be irrelevant to those thought experiments. Those 
                                                 
1Conceptually at least. Technology often changes cultures (and therefore the nature and focus of 
philosophical arguments) in dramatic ways, and I certainly think that a machine of that capability 
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that wish to show that machines might be able to think tend to have an argument 
of this sort: 
If a machine had property P then it would be able to think (for reasons r, 
s, ...); 
It is possible that a machine might have property P; 
Hence it is possible that a machine could think. 
On the other hand, those who wish to show that machines couldn't think tend to 
have a counterargument of this sort: 
(Even) if a machine had property P, it would not be able to think (for 
reasons t, u, ...); 
Allowing the possibility of a machine's having property P is maximally 
generous to the 'machines-can-think' brigade; 
Hence it is indeed the case that it is impossible that machines could think. 
Either way, my building a machine with property P does not affect the argument. 
But, as we have outlined above, there is always the bottom up way of 
approaching the philosophy of AI. If one approaches from the top down, then 
one tends to get argumentation that never intersects with the concerns of AI in 
the unofficial sense, that is simply too abstract to have any effect in the field of 
AI itself. This cannot be right — the philosophy of X should, one hopes, have 
(beneficial) effects on X. The alternative approach is to enter the philosophy of 
AI by way of AI. We should be examining developments in unofficial AI, and 
pronouncing on the philosophical importance of these developments. We would 
not be dealing, at least initially, with such highly abstract questions as whether, 
in principle, machines could ever think. Instead we would focus on such 
questions as: if a machine had property P, could it produce moderately complex 
output in real time? or how would, or could, property P be instantiated in a 
machine? We would, by this process, be discovering a little more about what the 
abstract philosophical questions could mean, on the one hand, and on the other, 
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1.4  Example: Modelling Expertise 
In the light of that, in the remainder of this thesis I would like to examine the 
contribution that unofficial (= as it is practiced) AI can make to Boden's project 
of official AI (i.e. the study of intelligence). In particular, I should like to look at 
the ways in which technologically and commercially based AI modelling theory 
can contribute towards psychological explanation. I shall take the notion of a 
knowledge-based system, a type of AI system which attempts to mimic or 
simulate expertise in various more or less well-structured contexts, and try to 
show how some recent developments in knowledge-based system development 
methodologies are in fact more informative about the psychology of expertise 
than many (including some workers in the field) have supposed. I introduce 
knowledge-based system development theory in the following chapter. Chapters 
Three and Four set out a philosophy of explanation; Chapter Three discusses 
scientific explanation in general, while Chapter Four is concerned with the 
particular case of psychological explanation. Chapter Five will bring together all 
the threads for the main argument.  54 
                                                
Chapter Two: Of MYCIN Men: Knowledge-
Based System Development Methodologies 
"What about the secret weapon? From the 
way you behaved when you took off to 
intercept the Jap formation I gathered you 
had an idea about it." 
"I've more than an idea," answered 
Biggles. "I know what it is. Only it isn't a 
weapon. I'd call it a trick." 
Capt. W.E. Johns Biggles in the Orient 
2.1  What Knowledge-Based Systems Are 
Knowledge-based systems (KBS or expert systems) are computer systems that 
attempt to store large amounts of data (or knowledge1) about a particular 
domain, organized in such a way as to enable them to solve problems and make 
inferences in that domain.2 As such, a KBS can be divided into two separate 
components: the knowledge base (KB), which contains the pieces of knowledge 
that the system uses, organized and represented in a knowledge representation 
language; and the inference engine, which is the part of the program which 
manipulates the pieces of knowledge in order to produce new pieces of 
knowledge. The person responsible for the construction of a KBS is called a 
knowledge engineer, and the process of KBS development is often called 
knowledge engineering. 
This section will introduce the ideas in and behind KBS technology, to provide 
background for the reader who is not versed in the field. In our opening 
quotation, Biggles has just discovered how the enemy are bringing down the 
Allied aircraft. Once the mechanism was uncovered, its simplicity led Biggles to 
 
1In the field of knowledge-based systems, the term knowledge is not used as it is in philosophy. 
In particular, that p is a piece of knowledge does not imply that p is true! For example, a KBS 
may contain a rule 'if p then q'. This may then be treated as a material conditional, even though it 
may be consistent to assert 'p and not q'. The justification for this is that 'p and not q' may be true 
only in very rare or extreme conditions, and so little harm is likely to be done to the safety of the 
KBS by the inclusion of 'if p then q'. As another example, a KBS might suggest a proposition p 
as a hypothesis (e.g. in a medical system, p might be 'x has pneumonia'). Even though the 
hypothesis is not being asserted, it still counts as a piece of knowledge in this sense. 
For an overview of the issues surrounding the use and organization of knowledge in AI see 
(Reichgelt 1991), and, for more technical discussion, see (Ramsay 1988) and especially 
(Genesereth and Nilsson 1987). Throughout this thesis, I shall use the term 'knowledge' in the AI 
sense, as opposed to the philosophical sense, unless otherwise flagged. 
2For an historical review of KBS research see (Shadbolt 1989). For discussions on the 
techniques used in KBSs (and their theoretical foundations) see (Jackson 1986; Giarratano and 
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denounce it as a trick. The operation of KBSs is so apparently simple that many 
(e.g. Dreyfus et al 1986) are drawn to a similar denunciation. Here's how the 
trick is done. 
2.1.1  Brief Historical Notes1
Expert systems first appeared as a distinct field of AI research round about the 
late seventies, after AI itself had been around for perhaps twenty years. Which 
project produced the first KBS is, as is usually the case with technological 
innovation, a matter of some dispute. Contenders include MYCIN (Shortliffe et 
al 1973; Shortliffe 1976), a system to assist doctors in the selection of 
appropriate courses of treatment for patients with bacteremia, meningitis and 
cystitis, and which is still highly influential, DENDRAL (Buchanan and 
Feigenbaum 1978), which inferred the molecular structure of various substances 
on the basis of the results of mass spectrometry, and MACSYMA (Martin and 
Fateman 1971), which selects techniques of analysis for mathematical problems 
(and which is still in widespread use today). 
By the 1980s, KBSs were becoming commercially viable, as opposed to being 
large, academically-based systems, and their output was being acted upon, rather 
than being tested against actually prevailing conditions and decisions. In 1987, 
Alan Bundy was able to remark that 
the U.K. expert system community has been very successful in the 
development of small scale, commercial, rule-based, expert systems. 
A typical example is a fault diagnosis system for a piece of 
specialised hardware, consisting of a set of less than 100 rules, 
running on a P.C., in one of the many commercial shells. Part of the 
success consists in the unexpected (to me anyway) discovery of a 
large number of commercially interesting problems which yield to 
such a simple mechanism. 
(Bundy 1987, p.3) 
 
while in the States, a year earlier,  
                                                 
1This section is deeply indebted to (Shadbolt 1989). For a history with special reference to the 
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we are beginning to see the development of systems designed ... for 
sale as finished products, at times allowing an organization to move 
into a new line of business. ... 
 
We're going to see many "mundane" applications. Despite the image 
of AI as high technology, it may be that the most commercially 
significant applications are hardly the stuff of science fiction. 
Campbell's Soup, for example, was faced recently with the imminent 
retirement of someone with 44 years of experience in running one of 
its soup production lines. Rather than lose that body of skill, they 
worked with the expert to capture what he knew about that specific 
task and embodied it in a rule-based system. Running a soup cooker 
well is far from dazzling high technology, but it does save significant 
time and money. I think we're going to see many more of these 
apparently mundane but in fact quite important applications. 
(Davis 1987, pp.27-8) 
 
And now KBS technology is firmly established commercially, performing 
mundane tasks as predicted.1  
A KBS contains a great deal of knowledge about a small domain (and virtually 
nothing else2). When that knowledge is manipulated successfully, then the 
problem-solving behaviour of an expert in that domain can be mimicked by the 
machine. Compared to the experts, KBSs do surprisingly well (though see 
Dreyfus and Dreyfus for the opposite view (Dreyfus et al 1986; Dreyfus 1987)3). 
Obviously, in other domains (even related domains), a KBS will be worse than 
useless (although the problem-solving strategies of the KBS may be reusable — 
see §2.2.2).  
                                                 
1They don't come any more mundane than controlling the activated sludge process in sewage 
management (Williams et al 1989)! Research and Development in Expert Systems VI contains a 
number of other examples of papers describing commercial expert systems; see in particular 
(Bolger et al 1989; Chierici et al 1989; Vadhwana 1989). 
2Doug Lenat's CYC system is intended to provide a KB which will hold other sorts of 'common 
sense' knowledge for KBSs (Guha and Lenat 1990). 
3Dreyfus and Dreyfus do not help their case, however, by concentrating on computer chess; the 
field of computer chess is not usually thought of as being in the realm of AI. Furthermore, after 
coming out in favour of neural nets in (Dreyfus 1987), they decided that neural net technology 
was just as hopeless as standard symbolic AI (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1988). The suspicion is that 
they are opposed to any technology as it becomes feasible; they are subscribers to the doctrine 
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We should just make a terminological point here. The terms knowledge-based 
system and expert system are used more or less interchangeably. However, to call 
a system an 'expert system' does imply that the system is equivalent to, or can do 
the job of, an expert in the domain, in some sense. In actual practice, though, the 
performance of such a system is often not up to that standard, and, more to the 
point, the envisaged role of such a system is usually much less ambitious. The 
term 'KBS', on the other hand, conveys the governing principle of such a system, 
which is that the inferential power of the system is based not so much on the 
techniques used to perform inferences, but on the large amount of knowledge 
stored in the KB. The term gives no false hints about performance and role; in 
fact, such systems are often used as assistants, or teaching aids, embedded in 
human and corporate contexts, rather than as decision makers or substitute 
experts. Hence we shall use the term KBS from now on. 
Having established what KBSs are historically, in the rest of §2.1 we shall look 
at some of the relevant issues in KBS development. We begin by looking at the 
representation of knowledge in the system. Then we will look at some 
requirements of standard KBSs; the requirement that the system be verified, and 
the requirement that the system explain its own output. Finally, we look at how 
knowledge is acquired for KBSs bearing in mind these requirements. 
2.1.2 Knowledge  Representation 
Knowledge Representation is the study if ways of storing and organizing 
knowledge in a computer for use in a KBS; representation is usually done 
through the medium of a knowledge representation language (KRL). In this 
section, we discuss two views of representation (two types of KRL) only; logic-
based representation, and frame-based representation. This ignores the field of 
connectionist, or PDP systems which put forward an alternative view of 
information storage. The use of connectionist principles in KBSs is a burgeoning 
area of research at the moment (Lacher 1993), but in this thesis we restrict our 
attention to more mainstream KBS paradigms. 
Logic-based knowledge representation languages (KRL) are what one would 
expect — languages that are based around logic. Hence, the language will have 
something like the expressive power of the language of first order logic.1 Then, 
                                                 
1And indeed of other logics than FOPC. There are a number of systems that use the languages of 
modal logic for, e.g. temporal reasoning, or of dynamic logic, or equational logic.  Of MYCIN Men: Knowledge-Based System Development Methodologies  58 
for example, the expert knowledge can be encoded as a number of if ... then ... 
rules, and the data upon which the KBS is to make its inferences can be matched 
against and unified with1 the antecedents of those conditionals — when they 
match, the consequents of the conditionals can be concluded. This mode of 
inference is called forward chaining. Alternatively, if the KBS needs some 
particular piece of information, that piece of information can act as a goal to be 
proven, and be matched against the consequents of the conditionals in the KB; 
the antecedents of the conditionals that match can then be set up as intermediate 
goals, and so on until a goal is reached which the system knows is satisfied. This 
mode of inference is called backward chaining. 
Logical propositions are generally represented and stored independently of each 
other. However, inferential demands are often made in KBSs that need 
knowledge to be arranged in 'chunks' (Minsky 1975). One common type of 
chunk in use is the frame, and frame-based representation and reasoning is now 
well-established and widespread. Each frame has a number of slots, each of 
which is filled with the value of the parameter symbolized by the slot-name. 
Frames can be hierarchically ordered into structures, so that frames lower down 
the hierarchy can inherit values and slots from frames above. For example, we 
might have the following frame declaration. I have invented a little standard 
language for this declaration, where slot names are underlined and to the left of a 
colon, with the values given to the right of the colon. 
frame: car 
  no-of-wheels: 4 
  size: small 
  subframes: beetle ferrari 
  superframes: 
 
frame: beetle 
  speed: slow 
  nationality: germany 
  subframes: my-beetle 
  superframes: car 
 
frame: ferrari 
  speed: fast 
  nationality: italy 
  subframes: 
  superframes: car 
 
                                                 
1Unification is the process of checking that the variables, constants, and function terms in a pair 
of wffs can be substituted consistently. For example, if we had a rule FOR ALL X,Y,Z, IF P(X,Y) 
THEN S(X,Y,Z), and we knew that P(0,1), then we say that P(0,1) unifies against the antecedent 
of the conditional by the substitution {X/0, Y/1}, and therefore that we can deduce FOR ALL Z, 
S(0,1,Z). However, if the rule was FOR ALL X,Y,Z, IF P(X,X) THEN S(X,Y,Z), then the 
antecedent of this would not unify against P(0,1), because there is no substitution for X that 
would produce the latter proposition. Producing a unification algorithm for a computer is non-
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frame: my-beetle 
  colour: green 
  year: 1974 
  subframes: 
  superframes: beetle 
 
which would give us the structure shown in Figure 2.1. Then from this hierarchy, 
we can deduce about my-beetle, not only that it is green, but also, for 
example, that it is German, and that it has four wheels — it inherits this 
information from the hierarchy of superframes above it. 
CAR
BEETLE
MY-BEETLE
FERRARI
 
Figure 2.1: A Frame Hierarchy 
So basically, we have two types of representation, and they correspond to two 
types of inference. Logic-based KRLs use logical inference; they try to deduce a 
desired conclusion from premisses. On the other hand, frame-based KRLs use 
inheritance as their mode of inference; here an individual is placed in a class 
from which it inherits properties that can be asserted of it. 
Logic has two main advantages over frames. Firstly, logic has a semantics, 
whereas frames do not. That is to exaggerate the difference between them; since 
logic-based theorem provers generally have restrictions on how long they will 
search for a proof, some valid deductions cannot be performed. Nevertheless, the 
existence even of a partial semantics for logic means that one is relatively clear 
what can be deduced from what, and what the truth conditions of anything in the 
KB are. Whereas frame-based semantics are notoriously difficult to pin down. A 
famous, or infamous example, is the Nixon diamond, shown in Figure 2.2. The 
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when faced with an object Nixon, which is both a Republican and a Quaker, and 
which therefore inherits the bellicosity slot, we do not know what to say. 
Because Nixon is a Republican, he should be bellicose, yet because he is a 
Quaker, he shouldn't. This type of problem is called an inheritance conflict. Of 
course, computers are machines whose behaviour is determinate, and hence in 
any implementation of this frame structure, there will be a determinate answer to 
inheritance conflicts such as Nixon's bellicosity; however, these answers will 
depend on irrelevant factors, such as which of the two frames Republican and 
Quaker was declared first, and whether new frame declarations override older 
ones. The frame structure itself will not provide the answers. 
REPUBLICAN QUAKER
NIXON
bellicosity = yes bellicosity = no
bellicosity = ???
 
Figure 2.2: The Nixon Diamond1
The second advantage of logic is that logical languages are very expressive. 
Logics exist for a number of areas of discourse, for example, modal logic, 
temporal logic, epistemic logic (though the usual logic used by KRLs is first 
order predicate logic). And also logics can express information that is partial or 
incomplete, by using disjunctions and the existential quantifier. Frame-based 
languages have difficulty in expressing this sort of information. It is not clear, 
for example, how to express the information that there is at least one 
Republican, if there are no known examples of particular Republicans.  
                                                 
1Called the Nixon Diamond because the Republican and Quaker frames are each subframes of a 
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On the other hand, frame-based languages have two advantages over logic. 
Logical systems (theorem provers) are very inefficient and slow. Frame systems, 
on the other hand, have the effect of grouping related knowledge, which cuts 
down the search space for relevant information. If a logic system needed to 
discover the value of X in (bellicosity Nixon X), it would have to search through 
the KB in order to match the form of the query against the propositions held in 
the KB, whereas the frame system can go straight to the Nixon frame and read 
the answer off, either from the frame itself, or from the frame hierarchy above it 
(assuming the inheritance conflict has some resolution). So frames can be seen 
as useful ways of organizing knowledge taking the context of that knowledge 
seriously.1
Furthermore, frames are better able to express the type of knowledge that is not 
logically valid, but enables us to make defeasible deductions. For example, given 
that x is a car, we can deduce that x has four wheels. But this is not logically 
true; it is not even accidentally true, since some cars have three. Hence the 
material implication symbol will not do, to express this sort of rule of thumb. If 
we did try to use material implication, we would end up with the following KB. 
∀x.car(x) ∅ no-of-wheels(x) = 4 
car(reliant-robin) 
no-of-wheels(reliant-robin) = 3 
 
This KB is inconsistent. However, a frame structure enables a local value to 
override the more general value (the default value). Hence, if we added the 
following two frames to our frame-based KB above 
                                                 
1Actually, logic-based languages and frame-based languages perform pretty much the same 
when the answer is given in the frame. Where frames come into their own is when inferences 
have to be made using inheritance. For example, suppose we wanted to know how many wheels 
my-beetle has. In the frame system given above, the inferences would go like this: look for no-of-
wheels slot in my-beetle. There isn't one; look for superframes slot. Go to the superframe; look 
for no-of-wheels slot; there isn't one. Look for next superframe; look for no-of-wheels slot; the 
answer is 4. In an equivalent logic-based KB, the inference would go: look for any unquantified 
statements in KB that have my-beetle as a term; then look for those in which the predicate is no-
of-wheels. There aren't any. Now go through all statements that assert that my-beetle is an 
instance of something. We find beetle(my-beetle). Now go through all universally quantified 
statements with beetle as antecedent; then go though all the consequents of those statements 
looking for one with no-of-wheels in the consequent. There aren't any. Now go through all those 
consequents again. Each time there is a predicate in the consequent, look for all quantified 
statements which have that particular predicate in the antecedent; then look for no-of-wheels in 
the consequents of those statements. Hence eventually we find that all beetles are cars and then 
that all cars have four wheels (and hence that my-beetle has four wheels). But in a complex 
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frame: reliant-robin 
  no-of-wheels: 3 
  subframes: not-my-car 
  superframes: car 
 
frame: not-my-car 
  subframes: 
  superframes: reliant-robin 
 
and we wanted to know (no-of-wheels not-my-car), the inference 
engine would first look for the no-of-wheels slot in not-my-car, fail to 
find it, move up the hierarchy to the next superframe, reliant-robin, where 
it would discover that the number of wheels of not-my-car was 3. If, 
however, we wanted to know (no-of-wheels my-beetle), the inference 
engine would have had to go up as far as car to find the governing 
no-of-wheels slot, and would then give the answer that my-beetle has 
four wheels, the default value. Various logics of default reasoning have been 
proposed (Reiter 1980; McCarthy 1980), but none are entirely satisfactory. The 
reason is pretty obvious; the standard semantics of logic simply won't cover 
defeasible reasoning. After all, for all x, if x is a car then x has four wheels taken 
as a universally quantified material implication is simply false. 
Current research into knowledge representation formats is beginning to indicate 
that a suitable compromise is to have a hybrid KRL that will include both logic 
and frames, and possibly special purpose modules to carry out specialized 
inferences. That way, the efficient frame-based module can be used to deal with 
whatever inferences it can deal with, and then pass anything that it can't deal 
with over to the theorem prover, thus retaining most of the advantages of each, 
while minimizing (though not eradicating) the effects of the disadvantages. One 
example, VITAL-KRL, is reported in (Domingue et al 1993). 
2.1.3  Verification and Validation 
KBSs are now used very frequently indeed, often in circumstances where lives or 
money are at risk. Hence, an important research issue is the verification and 
validation (V&V) of KBSs. Many techniques are used for V&V, often having 
been invented for a single application. Generic tools, approaches and languages 
for V&V are only now just being brought out (Benbasat and Dhaliwal 1989; 
Dhaliwal and Benbasat 1990). 
Validation is the process of determining the degree to which some artefact 
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KBS, there will be some requirements specification, and the validity of the KBS 
will be the degree of homomorphism between that KBS and the specification of 
the target system (Vandierendonck 1975; Adrion et al 1982). Verification is the 
demonstration of the consistency and completeness of the software, i.e. the fact 
(if it is a fact) that the KBS can compute all that it is supposed to compute, that it 
can't compute anything else (if it can, then memory is being wasted), and that 
what it computes is indeed correct (Adrion et al 1982). The difference between 
verification and validation is, intuitively, that verification shows that the program 
actually fulfills its internal requirements — i.e. that the software is 
computationally capable of performing the low-level tasks that are intended — 
while validation shows that the program as specified solves the customer's 
problem. If we imagine a project with a problem to be solved (written in 
English), a specification of a program (in some algebraic language such as Z) 
and a program (in some implementable programming language such as Lisp), 
then validation will show that anything conforming to the Z specification will 
solve the English problem, while verification shows that the Lisp program 
indeed conforms to the Z specification. A final process, evaluation is the process 
of determining whether or not the system is actually of any use. Obviously this is 
related to the outcomes of verification and validation, but also will involve 
investigating whether the KBS's user interface is any good, or whether the KBS 
will take forever to make its inferences, or whether the system explains its 
decisions sufficiently clearly, or whether the output is understandable by 
someone who is not computer literate (Gaschnig et al 1983; Gaines 1988). 
Hence, when discussing KBSs, we should remember that these are the 
dimensions along which they are meant to be measured. The standard 
philosophical thought experiments of perfect robots á la Blade Runner, not even 
aware themselves that they are not human, or of molecule-for-molecule replicas, 
perhaps had better remain science fiction, as least until we have developed a way 
of measuring real systems such as KBSs against them. Obviously, a KBS will 
fall well short of the android in many things, but not (necessarily) in the one 
thing that it was designed to do — infer and communicate knowledge about a 
domain. 
2.1.4  Explaining KBS Output 
There is another way in which the knowledge a KBS contains has to be 
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available for the purposes of verifying and validating the system, but the 
decisions that the system makes must be open to scrutiny. After all, if the KBS 
outputs a decision that the patient's leg be sawn off, a properly prudent doctor 
would wish to know the reason why. The explanatory knowledge is important for 
the understanding of the system's decision, and is also useful in debugging. 
The first serious explanation system was developed as part of the MYCIN 
programme (Davis 1982). The idea behind this development was to give a trace 
of problem-solving at the implementation level. In other words, if the system had 
fired rules R1, R2, ... Rn at runtime in drawing its conclusion, these rules would 
be presented to the user in a chain to show how the system reached the 
conclusions it did. Hence the question "why?" was interpreted automatically as 
"which rules need this datum, and what are their consequents?" 
When a rule trace is given as an explanation, the result is that there is no 
particular difference between V&V and explanation — both will involve the 
production of an implementation level account of the problem-solving processes 
coded up in the machine, and the comparison of that implementational account 
with some sort of ideal or model account. But explanation and V&V have very 
different requirements. In V&V, the knowledge engineer has to make sure that 
the particular implementation of the system can meet the user's requirements, 
whereas what an explanation has to do is to justify the KBS's output for its 
intended audience. However, most of the uninitiated find KRLs extremely 
unfamiliar and unintuitive, and therefore when rule traces are presented 
(especially if this is done in the KRL directly) they find the output difficult to 
understand and correspondingly difficult to critique. 
Hence, the explanation facilities of KBSs must go beyond rule traces. Swartout's 
Xplain system (1983) associates deeper justifications with the rules that it uses. 
In particular, underlying the top-level knowledge, compiled knowledge in the 
jargon, are two types of deep knowledge: a domain model, and 'domain 
principles', which are representations of problem-solving control strategies. 
Hence the content of each rule can be explained in terms of the deep domain 
model, while the domain principles can explain why the system behaved as it 
did. 
For example, suppose a macroeconomic policy KBS outputs that a tax cut is 
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might then reproduce the rules it used to come to that decision. So, in this 
example, the KBS might say that a tax cut's preconditions are high inflation and 
trade deficits, and current conditions include those factors. This is an explanation 
of the first type, such as might be found in MYCIN. However, the user might not 
be interested in that sort of explanation. Although he will be interested in the 
trigger conditions for an assertion, he may feel that such an explanation is not 
very deep (and therefore that his scepticism remains with respect to the output), 
or that the policy is unsound in the particular conditions that obtain, or even that 
the apparent input-output relation is ill-founded. Hence he might want to ask 
why a tax cut is a good idea for shrinking trade deficits. But a system whose 
explanatory powers were only of the first type would be stymied by this 
question.  
What should be possible for explanatory systems is that they can derive 
explanations from a deeper domain understanding. This was Swartout's aim in 
producing Xplain. So, in our small example, when asked why the tax cut is 
recommended for shrinking trade deficits, it might answer that tax cuts can be 
expected to encourage savings, stimulate investment, and increase production, 
which will then decrease prices, increase exports, make domestic goods 
relatively more attractive to foreigners, and thereby tend to reduce the trade 
deficit. With all this knowledge, it could have derived the tax cut policy directly 
(as we say, from 'first principles'). However, the computation is quicker if the 
short cut, from high inflation and trade deficit to tax cut, is simply given as a rule 
for the system. But even so, although the long form of the reasoning is slow and 
therefore inappropriate, it can be used to generate explanations for the system's 
user. 
A third innovation in explanation came when William Clancey noted that KBSs 
generally perform tasks that are describable at a higher level of abstraction than 
the rule-based goal-subgoal level. In other words, the "why?" question which 
prompts justification of KBS output is often to be interpreted strategically, as 
opposed to the more nuts-and-bolts level at which MYCIN takes it. NEOMYCIN 
(Clancey 1983) works in the same domain as MYCIN, but represents its 
diagnostic task explicitly. Its operators include such items as establish hypothesis 
and explore and refine, and thanks to that extension of the expressive powers of 
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This means that the system can reason about its own goals and strategies, as well 
as about the relationships in the domain. So, to continue the tax cutting example, 
if the user of the system wanted to know, not just why a certain aim was being 
pursued, but what is the reasoning behind the adoption of the aims, he might ask 
why increased tariffs are not considered as a way of reducing trade deficits, and 
receive the answer that tariffs have associated with them political costs, and the 
strategy is to consider politically easier plans first. 
Hence we note that, because of the importance of the requirement that KBSs 
give good explanations of their reasoning, KBSs will tend to have to contain 
much more knowledge than is required simply to produce reasonable output. 
Furthermore, KBSs will tend to have very deep knowledge encoded within them 
about the domain, and also about useful problem-solving strategies in that 
domain (Chandrasekaran et al 1989). 
2.1.5 Knowledge  Acquisition 
And so we see that, for various reasons, what goes into a KBS might be more 
than would normally be expected. The knowledge representation languages and 
techniques that we discussed in §2.1.2 are contrived for the purpose of encoding 
information into a machine; hence they are not particularly natural formalisms 
for an expert to express her expertise. Furthermore, the requirements of V&V 
(§2.1.3) and explanation (§2.1.4) mean that a very complete picture of the 
domain, and of the way that the KBS will manipulate objects in the domain, 
must be elicited and put into the KB. Hence, it is not sufficient merely to interact 
with an expert, interrogate her, and fill the KBS with the elicited information. 
Getting information out of an expert and into a machine is a long and arduous 
process, called knowledge acquisition (KA). Indeed, the process can be so 
arduous that the knowledge acquisition bottleneck is often referred to, since the 
important business of coding up the KBS cannot get going properly until the 
knowledge that will fill the KB has been elicited. The problems that the KA 
process have to overcome include the following. 
• The representations that are adequate for the machine (e.g. logic-based 
languages, frame-based languages) are usually not familiar to an expert. For 
example, when an expert uses an 'if  ...  then  ...' construction, it is not usually 
material implication that she is using. More frequently, she won't use 
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she generally cannot express her expertise in a particularly congenial way. With 
the help of the knowledge engineer, she has to 'translate' her expertise into a 
machine-friendly language. The problem there is that the translation itself has to 
be verified, which is no easy task, since there is no-one with the overarching 
expertise in both the domain itself and knowledge engineering to do that. 
• Experts are generally quite poor at explaining their own problem-solving. This 
is not too surprising; experts need to explain their results largely for the purpose 
of justification, for example in a court of law. Hence they need to show that 
hypotheses are useful and fruitful in their explanations; this usually involves a 
fair bit of post hoc rationalization, cutting out the dead ends and useless 
hypotheses generated along the way, which, of course, are completely 
uninteresting for any justificatory explanation. However, for the purposes of 
knowledge engineering, the process of hypothesis generation is itself highly 
interesting and important, so the knowledge engineer needs to know which 
hypotheses get generated and why, even if in an individual case the hypotheses 
generated are useless; this is the very knowledge that the expert has been taught 
to suppress! 
• There needs to be a way of allowing V&V of the knowledge acquired to take 
place. If the target system goes wrong, there are a number of ways in which this 
might happen. The fault may simply be a programming error (e.g. something as 
simple as a typographical error), or a more substantial design fault, where the 
programming is a perfectly correct encoding of a faulty design. But the fault may 
also be in the knowledge acquired during the KA process. Since KBSs may deal 
with life or death situations, it is essential that errors of this sort should be 
isolable and curable. 
• Much KA is done using a number of experts, rather than a single one. It could 
be the case that no one available person has all the necessary expertise to cover 
the requirements of the system, or that the top expert in the domain is too 
expensive for much use during KA, and therefore that assistants have to fill in 
the gaps, or simply that the target KBS is specifically intended to synthesise the 
expertise of a number of experts. This situation raises a number of problems. The 
knowledge engineer has to make sure that the various experts are using terms in 
the same way. Often in the case of disagreement, it is not clear whether experts 
agree on the usage of terms and disagree on the properties of the associated 
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In order to tackle these problems, there is a field of software development and 
psychological research which we discuss below in §§2.2.4-2.2.5. Various 
software tools are designed with interfaces that are supposed to allow and 
encourage the expert to express her knowledge in a more or less familiar way, 
while underlying the interface a special purpose KRL will encode that 
knowledge in a suitably machine-oriented formalism. §§2.2.1-2.2.2 set out the 
knowledge modelling methodologies that tackle the problems of V&V and of 
multiple expert testimony. 
2.2  Model-Based Knowledge Acquisition and KBS 
Development 
In this subsection, we examine a research programme in AI that is very current 
and controversial indeed, the idea of model-based KBS development. The work 
here is, I think, of philosophical as well as engineering interest, but the main 
reason for including it here is that we should have a firm grasp of the principles 
underlying conceptual modelling and knowledge acquisition in the field of KBS 
development. §2.2.1 will describe (in general terms) the model-based approach 
to KBS development. §2.2.2 will describe one particular model of expertise 
called the conceptual model, with examples of what a conceptual model might 
look like, together with discussion of the generic portions of these conceptual 
models which are supposed to hold across various problem-solving domains. 
§2.2.3 discusses two ways in which modelling can be utilized as a KBS 
development methodology; §2.2.4 will examine the KA techniques used in 
constructing a conceptual model, to indicate the sort of knowledge they can 
uncover, while §2.2.5 discusses some psychological research that has been 
performed on these KA techniques. Ultimately, it will be our contention that the 
conceptual model of the expert might be termed a competence model of the 
expert. That, together with our contention that a competence model can function 
as a psychological explanation of the behaviour it models will then imply that 
the conceptual model can function as a psychological explanation of the expert's 
(or experts') problem-solving behaviour. Then, to the extent that the various 
stages of model refinement preserve the structure and content of the conceptual 
model, it should be possible to assert that the implementation (the system) also 
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2.2.1  KBS Development as Model Refinement 
The development of KBSs is increasingly coming to be seen as an incremental 
process, with an associated 'life cycle'. This life cycle will be made up of various 
stages, each of which results in a 'deliverable' — either a document (e.g. 
requirements specification) or a piece of software (e.g. prototype) — that can be 
evaluated. A related view is that KBS development should be seen as a process 
of model refinement, as shown in Figure 2.3. 
The process begins with the expert, or experts. These are generally the people 
who actually perform the real-world task to be modelled. Suitable areas for KBS 
development include areas where expertise is scarce, or not distributed evenly 
(for example, most AIDS cases occur in Africa, while most AIDS experts are in 
America), areas where human experts would be at risk or where the need for 
their expertise would be possible but unlikely (for example, a respiratory disease 
diagnostician on a space shuttle would be expensive to employ and insure, while 
her expertise might well never get used at all), or areas where the expertise could 
be put to better use (for example, a KBS could be used for training novices, to 
free the expert to perform the task as opposed to teaching it). The area in which 
the expert's expertise is operative is the domain. Common types of domain in 
commercial KBS development include medical domains (e.g. lung disease 
diagnosis is the domain of PUFF, the monitoring of intensive care patients is the 
domain of VM, while anaesthetic management instruction is the domain of 
ATTENDING), electronics domains (e.g. PALLADIO's domain is the design 
and testing of new VLSI circuits while IN-ATE's domain is the diagnosis of 
oscilloscope faults), and chemistry domains (TQMSTUNE keeps triple 
quadruple mass spectrometers tuned, and CRYSALIS interprets the 3-D 
structure of proteins). Giarratano and Riley (1989) discuss useful guidelines for 
selecting a domain for KBS development. Of MYCIN Men: Knowledge-Based System Development Methodologies  70 
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Figure 2.3: KBS Development as Model Refinement 
The developer of the KBS, the knowledge engineer, interacts with the expert(s), 
on the basis of the content of a document called the user requirements 
specification,1 to produce a model of the expertise that would be needed to 
perform the tasks specified in the user requirements. This model is called the 
conceptual model, and is intended to be a model of expertise only. This will also, 
in some sense, be a model of the domain, but will not be dictated by the domain 
structure. So, for example, it might be the case that there is some particular 
hierarchy of diseases in some medical domain. However, the structure of domain 
objects in the conceptual model is more likely to respect the similarity with 
respect to the observable characteristics of those objects rather than the scientific 
classification. Hence, if two diseases, aetiologically very distinct, have very 
similar symptoms, then they are likely to be grouped together (although, as the 
discussion of explanation above implies, the system may have to store the 
aetiological structure as well for the purposes of deep explanation of its output). 
                                                 
1I.e. a specification of the requirements that the person/corporation that will ultimately use the 
system have for the system. He who pays the piper calls the tune! This document will basically 
be a guide for the knowledge engineer, specifying which problems are to be solved, by whom, 
and what role the target KBS will play in the solution of those problems (e.g. will the KBS solve 
the problems on its own, advise an expert, advise a novice, or simply 'walk through' training 
examples with a class of trainees?), together with other stuff about the type of machine the KBS 
will run on, the computer language(s) preferred for the implementation, maximum cost of the 
project, and so on. Of MYCIN Men: Knowledge-Based System Development Methodologies  71 
This conceptual model is then transformed into a design model, which is a model 
of the final system. The aim of this transformation is to preserve as much as 
possible of the content of the conceptual model, while introducing new 
constraints on the model determined by the constraints on the target KBS (e.g. 
constraints on the efficiency of the algorithms used in the computation, 
constraints on the amount of memory available, and so on). The design model is 
then transformed into the final implementation. 
This is a very rough description of a complex process, upon which there are 
several views, constituting a research programme that is very much current. 
There are various views on how abstract the various notions of models are. For 
example, the KADS methodology (Wielinga et al 1992) divides the conceptual 
model into two: a model of expertise, which is a statement of the knowledge 
required to solve the various problems, and a model of cooperation, which 
specifies which agent (e.g. the user, the KBS) will perform which task. On the 
other hand, the VITAL methodology (Shadbolt et al 1993) has a single 
conceptual model, but specifies that what we call here the design model should 
be divided into the functional design model and the technical design model, 
where the functional design specifies the functionality that the machine must 
have available to it to solve the problems that it will need to solve, and the 
technical design model describes the architecture of the machine and specifies 
how the functionality specified in the functional design model can be achieved. 
Further, the arrows in Figure 2.3 might be seen as implying some sort of 
temporal ordering between construction of the models. Indeed, they do 
correspond to some rough temporal ordering, but there may be feedback loops if, 
for example, the design model turns out to need more expertise than was initially 
gathered in the conceptual modelling stage (Motta et al 1994). More drastically, 
if the aim of the KBS development project was to rationalize some area of 
problem-solving in a corporation, then the very process of development itself can 
often result in a restructuring of a corporation or revision of its aims. The result 
of that can be that a model in the later stages of development can cause a 
revision of the original requirements specification! 
A first key question is the methodology for the move from expert to conceptual 
model. This is the process called knowledge acquisition (KA). How does the 
knowledge engineer get the knowledge out of the expert and into the model? The 
first thing to note is that the question, phrased thus, is rather misleading. The KA 
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of information from an expert and transferral of those nuggets into the KBS. The 
task of the knowledge engineer then would be to ask the expert which rules were 
applicable in various circumstances, and then translate the natural language 
answer that he receives into an appropriate formalism. However, it was pointed 
out by several authors (Hayward et al 1987; Wielinga and Schreiber 1989; Morik 
1989) that that was not really good enough. For instance, it is essential, if that 
extraction process is to preserve the expert's problem-solving behaviour, that the 
expert and the knowledge engineer must agree on the meanings of the terms used 
by the expert, and that that agreement must also be in accordance with (i.e. 
representable in) the formalism used in the encoding process. Hence the KA 
process must at least include a period in which the knowledge engineer comes to 
share the viewpoint of the expert (and possibly change the expert's view as well 
— see §2.2.5 below). 
A further point is that building a KBS is obviously a practical project, not 
generally intended to demonstrate psychological points. Hence, the conceptual 
model that results from the KA process does not always respect the expert's view 
of her own problem-solving. The expert's behaviour is always a good starting 
point for the construction of models, but there will be many reasons for departing 
from that paradigm. Firstly, the expert's own behaviour may well be flawed in 
some respect, of course. This possibility is discussed below in §2.2.5. But even if 
the expert's behaviour is ideal for the problem-solving she is employed to do, 
there are still factors that typically result in the conceptual model (or models at a 
later stage of KBS development) departing from her practice. For example, there 
are inherent differences between the capabilities of machines and people. A 
diagnostician may well be able to tell what is wrong merely by looking at her 
patient — clearly a machine cannot reproduce this sort of diagnostic acumen 
(and will not in the foreseeable future). On the other hand, a machine is capable 
of feats of memory storage and calculation speed that most people can only 
dream of. Barthélemy et al (1988) describe an experiment for the KADS project 
where a small KBS was being developed to configure moulds. The experts only 
generated a small set of possible solutions; however, the KBS was able to 
generate all possible solutions to the problem, and search through that enlarged 
set while remaining well within the memory parameters set at the beginning of 
the experiment. Hence the aspect of the expertise that enabled the search space to 
be pruned without compromising the final solution could simply be ignored. 
Furthermore, most KBSs are quite small scale projects, and would not attempt to 
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scale psychological model is rarely required. The moral is clearly that we need to 
be clear about the extent to which such systems and models are psychologically 
explanatory. 
2.2.2 Conceptual  Models 
A conceptual model is a set of sentences (often in a formalized language) 
describing expert problem-solving. But a conceptual model need not be simply a 
model of an expert. The knowledge engineer has his requirements specification 
to satisfy, and will therefore take knowledge from whatever source he can in 
order to fulfill his own task. Typically, there will be a number of experts with 
whom he can build a model (another source of information will be articles and 
textbooks where appropriate). But great care has to be taken with, for example, a 
pair of experts who use the same term in differing ways (or who use different 
terms for the same object). The conceptual model, then, will be something like a 
description of the knowledge that an expert may require in order to solve 
problems in the domain. Hence, to an extent, the conceptual model is to be seen 
as a model of the expert (or the expert's expertise), but this story needs to be 
augmented. The 'expert' in question is often an abstraction from the several 
experts employed in the KA process, or sometimes an abstraction from the 
various (perhaps idiosyncratic) capabilities of a single expert. Equally, it is 
possible to view the conceptual model as 'abstract descriptions of the objects and 
operations that a system should know about' (Wielinga et al 1992, p.12). 
However, this will not quite do, since the structure of the model will depend to 
some extent at least (and, typically, to quite a large extent) on the expert's 
problem-solving structures uncovered in the KA process. After all, the expert's 
problem-solving behaviour is likely to represent the state of the art with respect 
to knowledge about the domain. Human problem-solving behaviour is generally 
respected in the conceptual modelling phase of KBS development.  
In order to minimize the problems associated with the identification of the 'same' 
piece of knowledge over the testimony of several experts, not only does the 
knowledge engineer try to elicit knowledge, but also he will attempt to establish 
the role or roles that that knowledge can play at various stages in the problem-
solving process. This leads to a separation in the components of a conceptual 
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The basic epistemic division in the field is that between domain knowledge and 
control knowledge. Domain knowledge is simply knowledge about the objects 
(which may, of course, be abstract) in the domain, and their properties and 
relations. Control knowledge is knowledge about how to get things done. 
However, there are complications and simplifications that can be made to this 
type of epistemic hierarchy. One well-known example of such an epistemic 
hierarchy is the KADS four-layer conceptual model (Wielinga et al 1992). This 
is rapidly becoming a standard, so we will use this as a brief example of the sorts 
of distinction and division that are available. Karbach et al (1990) show that 
most types of conceptual model can be reconfigured into these four layers. 
Hence we will not lose generality if we take the KADS four-layer model as 
representative. 
The KADS four-layer model respects the domain knowledge/control knowledge 
distinction, but effectively 'divides' the control knowledge into three. Hence the 
first layer, the domain layer, simply is the domain knowledge, and 'embodies the 
conceptualization  of a domain for a particular application in the form of a 
domain theory' (Wielinga et al 1992, p.15). The second, third and fourth layers 
are all aspects of the control knowledge, the knowledge about what to do when. 
The second layer is the inference layer, and describes the inferences that can be 
made in the domain in terms of classes of sentences expressing domain 
knowledge. These sentence classes are developed according to the roles that 
various pieces of knowledge play in the problem-solving (for example, the same 
piece of domain layer information, say, X has influenza, might at different times 
and in different contexts function in the problem-solving as an observation, a 
hypothesis, a diagnosis, etc.). In theory, when one is possessed of a model of 
expertise consisting solely of a domain layer and an inference layer, one would 
then have enough knowledge to derive (extremely inefficiently) every possible 
piece of information in the domain. However, one would have no means of 
making the right inferences in the appropriate places. For this, the other two 
layers are required. The task layer is the third layer, and this contains 
information about how to combine elementary inferences to achieve goals; the 
fourth layer, the strategy layer takes this process further, containing knowledge 
about how goals are put together to solve global problems in the domain (it is 
doubtful whether there is a highly principled distinction between the task layer 
and the strategy layer). See the discussion of Figure 2.4 below for a brief 
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This epistemological layering of models has enabled knowledge engineering to 
adopt a key idea in software engineering, that of the reuse of software where 
possible. The central suggestion here is that (portions of) the control layers of 
models can be reused across domains and applications.1 The suggestion is made 
partly as a response to an imperative, and partly as a means of cashing in upon a 
genuine discovery. The imperative is that the effort of creating a new model of 
every domain is great; the KA bottleneck would remain and possibly even be 
exacerbated (even if modelling methodologies would make knowledge 
representation or V&V easier). However, if libraries of models with wide 
application were available, then the knowledge engineering task would be made 
that much simpler; an off-the-shelf model could be selected which conceivably 
applied to the problem-solving in the domain (and indeed Chandrasekaran et al 
(1989) make the claim that such models can be used in explanation). Even if the 
model had to be altered slightly, the effort would be very much reduced. The 
discovery was that it was indeed possible to talk about problem-solving in these 
terms (Clancey 1985), and it was not at all implausible to suggest that certain 
problem-solving structures could be discerned across domains. 
So, libraries of models began to appear. KADS produced an influential library of 
interpretation models, which were skeletal models of common types of problem-
solving, containing an inference layer, together with a default task layer control 
structure (Breuker et al 1987). An example of the inference layer of such a 
model, systematic diagnosis, is given in Figure 2.4. The model can be seen in the 
following way. It represents the flow of data or knowledge. Each rectangle 
stands for a metaclass of domain knowledge, indexed according to the role the 
knowledge plays in the diagnosis (in the later KADS-II project, metaclasses are 
in fact called roles). So, for example, we have a complaint, a model of the 
system, a norm, a variable value, a hypothesis, etc.. The ovals stand for basic 
inferential steps (knowledge sources in KADS-I, inference steps in KADS-II). So 
in systematic diagnosis, we have such inferences as the selection of a system 
model on the basis of a complaint, the selection of a variable from a universum 
of observables, etc.. The arrows show the direction of dataflow.  
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Figure 2.4: The KADS-I Model of Systematic Diagnosis 
So the diagram of the inference layer of systematic diagnosis says that, first, the 
diagnostician receives a complaint — an indication of a dysfunctioning system. 
Such a system might be an economy, a human body, a piece of machinery, etc.. 
Let us use the example of a human body. So there is a complaint, or symptom. 
On the basis of this the diagnostician selects a system model. This is a model of 
how a subsystem of the whole would function normally. So, in our example, if 
the complaint were persistent wheezing on the part of the patient, the system 
model might be a model of the respiratory system. The system model is then 
decomposed; this produces a number of hypotheses. Each hypothesis will 
therefore be some subsystem of the system model. Hence if the system model is 
the respiratory system, one hypothesis might be that the lungs are 
malfunctioning, another might be that the system transferring oxygen from the 
inhaled air to the blood is faulty, and so on. Each hypothesis is then tested. The 
system model is used to specify norms, which are expected values of parameters. 
In parallel, an observable (test) is selected from the possible observables, such 
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parameter. The comparison is made and the difference established. Then on the 
basis of this difference, the hypothesis is tested. If the difference is small or non-
existent, then the hypothesis that the particular part of the system is responsible 
for the complaint is rejected. The system (the body in our example) is generally 
allowed to deviate to a small degree from the perfect functioning of the abstract 
system model. But if the difference is large, then the hypothesis becomes the 
conclusion. 
Because this is the inference layer of the model of systematic diagnosis, it 
contains all the inferences that can be performed during systematic diagnosis, but 
it does not say when and why to perform them. The dataflow diagram can be 
navigated in various ways. For example, the direction of inference could be as 
described in the previous paragraph. This would correspond to the diagnostician 
diagnosing the problem with a faulty system. Or we could start with the 
conclusion and work backwards, to see what symptoms can be expected. For 
example, if it were known that there were a trade deficit in the economy, an 
economist might want to know what trouble that would cause in the economy as 
a whole, in order to decide whether or not it were worth the effort and political 
fallout of attempting to rectify the deficit. Or, the systematic diagnostician might 
test all hypotheses, or just test them until he finds one with a sufficiently large 
difference from the norm. All these ways of navigating through the dataflow 
diagram would be performed using the same knowledge, which would be 
'contained in' (i.e. indexed by) the various boxes and ovals in the diagram (so, for 
example, the system model box would contain all the knowledge pertaining to 
the ideally functioning system, the compare oval would contain all the 
knowledge required to compare a norm with an observable, and so on). 
So task layer knowledge is required actually to solve any problem (in real time) 
that the inference layer knowledge might be used for. Task layer knowledge will 
be used to structure the navigation of the dataflow diagram in order to achieve 
some particular goal. This task layer structure is called the control structure of 
the model, and is designed to tell you which inferences to perform when. A 
KADS-I interpretation model is made up of an inference structure such as that 
shown in Figure 2.4, and also a default control structure. The default control 
structure can be disregarded if it is inappropriate, and replaced with another 
structure. If no control structure is supplied, the model will not specify a way of 
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The default control structure that comes with the KADS systematic diagnosis 
inference structure is the following. 
find (diagnosis) 
 select  (system-model) 
  WHILE  (no  conclusion) 
    decompose  (system-model) 
      WHILE ((number hypothesis) > 1) 
      select  (variable-value) 
      specify  (norm) 
      compare  (variable-value  norm) 
 
The control structure is written in pseudocode, a sort of cod programming 
language. The goal is to find a diagnosis. Hence a system model is selected, and 
while there is no conclusion, the following is done: decompose the system 
model, and then, while there is more than one hypothesis, select a variable value, 
specify a norm and compare them. Other control structures could be dreamed up 
to navigate round the inference structure to perform different goals. 
The interpretation model, having being selected according to various criteria, 
would then be instantiated by having the inference layer classes filled with 
domain layer knowledge (this is really two knowledge engineering tasks in one: 
the addition of the domain layer and the connection of the domain layer with the 
inference layer), and the task layer control structures customized to fit the actual 
problem-solving. In complex models, a strategy layer could be added as well. 
This is the basic method of performing model-based knowledge acquisition. A 
skeletal model is selected from a library, and this model can be used to structure 
both the knowledge acquired, and the target KBS. Furthermore, the model can 
aid KA by telling the knowledge engineer what (types of) knowledge to look for. 
Note also that the high level descriptions of problem solving practice such as 
were required for the complex goal-based types of explanation discussed in 
§2.1.4 above, can be provided using the terms of such models as guidance. 
Although KADS is in many ways an archetype, there are other methodologies in 
this field. A second example, which is becoming increasingly standard in the 
U.S.A., is the generic task methodology of B. Chandrasekaran, which identified 
a number of task/subtask structures on the basis of examination both of actual 
tasks (Brown and Chandrasekaran 1989), and of the problem-solving structures 
ideal for KBSs to embody (Chandrasekaran 1990). These task/subtask structures, 
together with their knowledge representation implications, are laid out in a task 
analysis. A third example is the approach of Mark Musen's Medical Computer 
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abstract models of problem-solving, called problem-solving methods 
(McDermott 1988). Based on these methods, knowledge engineers can build 
computer architectures that are oriented specially towards the method that they 
are built to carry out (Musen 1989ab; Marcus and McDermott 1989). Methods 
are AI-oriented ways of carrying out tasks, and themselves are composed of 
mechanisms that are close to computational primitives (a mechanism is described 
as 'a method that does not decompose a task into subtasks' (Puerta et al 1992, 
pp.2-3)). A fourth approach to reusable modelling structures takes this 
decompositionality further, and argues that models not unlike KADS 
interpretation models (minus the default control structures) can be developed 
using a library of the components of KADS models, linked with a grammar 
which allows the building of many (indeed, since some rules are recursive, 
infinitely many) non-standard models (O'Hara 1993). Therefore the generalised 
directive models (GDMs) built using this approach can avoid the charge that the 
finite libraries of KADS models often underestimate the sui generis nature of 
much problem-solving (O'Hara and Shadbolt forthcoming), and can make the 
indexing and organization of libraries of models more sound as well (O'Hara 
1993). 
The notion of a conceptual model will be very important in Chapter Five, when 
we begin to draw the various threads of this thesis together. So it will be 
worthwhile summarizing the important ideas behind conceptual modelling, to 
make matters clearer when the time comes to consider them as psychological 
explanations. A conceptual model is a model of the expertise required to solve a 
particular problem. It will not always be a model of a single expert. The 
knowledge acquired and put in the model can be typed epistemologically, 
resulting in a four-layer structure. The domain layer contains the static 
knowledge of the domain objects and their interrelations. The inference layer is a 
specification of the basic inferences made by the experts in problem-solving; 
these inferences can be grouped together in an inference structure. The task layer 
contains the knowledge about how these basic inferences are grouped together to 
achieve goals. This knowledge controls the inferences. Finally, the strategic 
layer contains the knowledge about how to configure a set of goals to solve a 
large scale problem. It is arguable that there is no principled distinction between 
the task and strategic layers, and many models will not have a strategic layer at 
all. Karbach et al have shown that the four-layer model can be seen as 
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(containing inference and task layer knowledge) can be put together as model 
libraries, to ease the modelling task for knowledge engineers. 
2.2.3  Two Philosophies of Modelling 
One point that was hinted at in the previous section is that there are two different 
philosophies of modelling that we can discern in model-based AI. On the one 
hand, there is the type of modelling that seeks for well-known structures in the 
problem-solving that goes on in the domain, and then attempts to match those 
structures with model components that are stored in a library of model 
components (such as interpretation models, generic tasks, problem-solving 
methods and GDMs, introduced in the previous section). And on the other hand, 
there is the view that emphasizes the uniqueness of any problem-solving 
practice, and maintains that modelling should respect this fact (Clancey 1991). 
This second view points out that any domain independent structure (such as a 
generic task or a KADS model or a GDM) will be a generalized structure that 
will not respect the actual problem solving practices in a domain — these 
structures will tend to cut corners and potentially miss out important domain 
dependent practices. On this second view, the process of KA should preferably 
be a process of model construction produced by interaction and negotiation 
between knowledge engineer and expert. Ready made structures such as the 
KADS model we saw in Figure 2.4 should be treated with scepticism. 
Of course, for the purposes of a knowledge engineer, this philosophical question 
— top-down or bottom-up — is not particularly pressing, since he is not going to 
be interested in preserving exactly the expert's problem-solving practices. 
However, the question will be important for us. Most conceptual models are 
going to use generic languages (even if only first order logic). If the extent to 
which a conceptual model can stand as an explanation of the expert's problem-
solving practices is going to be determined by the extent of the use of generic 
model components used in the model, then the position advocated by this thesis 
will be weakened considerably (although the main philosophical point will 
stand). We want to claim that the models developed during the KBS 
development process, almost as a by-product, give us psychological explanations 
of the expertise; hence we will need to argue that generic problem-solving 
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To put the point more explicitly, it happens to be the case that such are the 
considerations of time (both time allowed for modelling and KA to be 
performed, and the time for which an expert is available), that ready made 
structures such as generic tasks or KADS models are essential for model-based 
KA. Models cannot be constructed from scratch unless either an expensive state-
of-the-art KBS is required for which the commissioners of the project are 
prepared to pay, or the project is an academic project where time is not money. 
Hence virtually all model-based KBSs will be built using generic structures from 
model libraries. For our thesis to apply to more than a vanishingly small set of 
systems, therefore, we will need to argue that the use of such library-based 
generic structures will not compromise our main claim that models associated 
with KBSs can be psychologically explanatory of an expert's expertise. We shall 
produce this argument in §5.2.3. 
2.2.4  Knowledge Acquisition Techniques 
We now examine the techniques used by knowledge engineers to create the 
conceptual models that result from the knowledge acquisition (KA) process. This 
will give us a greater idea of the types of knowledge that go into a conceptual 
model, and also a better idea of the modelling process in general. The way that 
knowledge engineering works is to apply knowledge acquisition techniques, 
usually embodied in software tools, to the expert. If the techniques are embodied 
in tools, then the result will be a set of knowledge bases all of which are 
represented in standard formalisms (i.e. the KRLs of the various KA tools). If the 
tools are embedded in 'workbenches', suites of tools designed to be used in a 
complementary way, often within a methodology such as KADS or GDMs, then 
there will be the hope that redundancies of knowledge will be avoided, while 
covering all the knowledge required for problem-solving in the particular 
domain. Examples of such workbenches are the Shelley workbench, which 
accompanies KADS (Anjewierden et al 1992), the VITAL workbench, which is 
GDM-based (Domingue et al 1993), and the KEW workbench, which was 
developed in the ACKnowledge project (Shadbolt and Wielinga 1990). 
Some techniques1 are more or less obvious. For example, there is interviewing. 
Interviews can be structured or unstructured. An unstructured interview involves 
the knowledge engineer and expert discussing the problem-solving practices 
                                                 
1See (Shaw and Woodward 1990) for a lengthy comparative discussion of various KA 
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under review with no set agenda, whereas in a structured interview, the 
knowledge engineer will have a series of questions that he will wish to ask, or a 
series of topics for discussion, planned in advance. Similarly, an expert can 
produce a report on an episode of problem-solving, either a report on her own 
solution to a problem (and this can be produced simultaneously with the 
problem-solving, or post hoc as she views a video of her own performance) or a 
commentary on the problem-solving of another expert. These reports (which are 
usually verbal) can then be analysed by their being transcribed to produce a 
protocol, which can then undergo protocol analysis. Protocol analysis is 
intended to bring out such things as domain ontologies; the expert will go 
through the transcript, highlighting pieces of text, connecting them, pointing out 
synonyms and antonyms, etc.. A hypertext system can usually keep track of all 
the manifold connections. Another technique is card sorting, which involves 
transferring the names of the domain objects onto cards (which may be 'cards' on 
a computer terminal screen), which are then sorted into 'piles' by the expert. This 
will produce a classification of the domain objects into groupings. Laddering is a 
technique whereby the expert creates and groups domain objects into a 
hierarchy, under the knowledge engineer's supervision. So, for example, the 
laddering tool may produce a laddered grid such as the one shown in Figure 2.5. 
This grid will also be a frame structure; i.e. each node in the tree will be a frame, 
with slots, values, default values and inheritance, as discussed in §2.1.2. 
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Figure 2.5: A Laddered Grid of Symptoms and Signs in the Respiratory Disease 
Domain 
Another method is the repertory grid method, which is a method based upon 
Kelly's personal construct theory (Kelly 1955). Personal construct theory views 
the individual as a system that anticipates the future on the basis of hypotheses 
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which causes the individual's constructs to change. A construct is a dichotomous 
distinction which the individual tries to fit over the world. 
Constructs are used for predictions of things to come, and the world 
keeps rolling on and revealing these predictions to be either correct or 
misleading. This fact provides a basis for the revision of constructs 
and, eventually, of whole construct systems. 
(Kelly 1955) 
 
Personal construct theory can be used as a logic for describing agents' cognitive 
processes. A repertory grid (Shaw 1980) is a KA technique based on Kelly's 
theory. It is a  
two-way classification of data in which events are interlaced with 
abstractions in such a way as to express part of a person's system of 
cross-references between his personal observations or experience of 
the world (elements or entities), and his personal constructs or 
classifications of that experience (attributes). ... In the development of 
expert systems the entities might be key elements in the problem 
domain such as oil-well sites or business transactions, and the 
attributes express what the particular expert sees as the crucial 
distinctions between the entities in the context of the problem. 
(Shaw and Woodward 1990, p.201) 
 
The main point about a repertory grid is that it reveals some ways in which the 
expert unconsciously parcels out the domain. The expert is not usually aware of 
the constructs that will be elicited. Nevertheless, it is difficult to explain the 
problem-solving without citing those constructs. 
2.2.5  The Psychology of Knowledge Acquisition 
This leads us to the question of the psychological basis for applying KA 
techniques. This question has a number of aspects. We want to know that the KA 
tools mentioned above are able to produce a knowledge base of sufficient power 
to perform the task. We want to know that the knowledge bases produced are 
accurate, and reflect the experts' problem-solving knowledge. We want to know 
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that enough knowledge gets through, even knowledge that is very rarely used in 
day-to-day practice. 
In a series of papers, Mike Burton et al (1987, 1988, 1990; Shadbolt and Burton 
1990) experimentally investigated the efficacy of KA techniques. Techniques 
were divided into two sorts, 'natural' and 'contrived' — natural in the sense that it 
is more or less natural to sit and chat about one's work; contrived in the sense 
that it is contrived, for example, to sort one's domain into abstract hierarchies. 
Obviously, 'natural' and 'contrived' define opposite ends of a continuum, with 
perhaps unstructured interviewing on one end, and repertory grid analysis on the 
other. On the basis of some (rough) metrics, it was discovered that natural 
techniques tend to produce more information, yet take considerably more time 
than the contrived techniques (i.e. considerably more time per piece of 
knowledge elicited). Contrived techniques were more efficient than the natural 
ones. Interestingly, in some of the real-world experiments, there was little or no 
overlap between the knowledge elicited using the natural techniques and the 
knowledge elicited using the contrived techniques — the two groups of 
techniques appeared to be tapping different types of knowledge, at least in some 
cases. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the experts appeared to be 'using' 
knowledge that they did not know they had! In other words, the lesson we take 
from Burton et al is that a model built using contrived KA techniques may be 
more complete, but certainly not a model of the expert's conscious problem-
solving procedures. 
Using contrived techniques can also lead to other interesting, perhaps surprising, 
results. Barry Silverman has made a study of common biases in human judgment 
(1990); table 2.1 gives some examples 
BIAS NAME  DEFINITION 
Adjustment and Anchoring  Using of heuristics which may reduce the mental efforts 
required to arrive at a solution at the cost of using the full 
amount of information. 
Base Rate  Ignoring abstract information at the expense of concrete 
information. 
Data Preservation Context  Being more influenced by summarized data rather than 
the same data presented in detail. 
Illusion of Control  Assuming a feeling of control over events that is not 
reasonable. 
Law of Small Numbers  Expressing greater confidence in predictions based on 
small samples of data with nondisconfirming evidence 
than in much larger samples with minor disconfirming 
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Order Effects  Placing undue importance on the first and last pieces of 
information provided. 
Table 2.1: Common Biases in Human Judgment 
Most knowledge engineering practice initially ran counter to the discoveries of 
these biases. It was generally assumed that the expert was generally right. 
However, Silverman, in a series of exercises, investigated a number of serious 
(human) expert failures by using standard KA techniques, building a conceptual 
model of the problem-solving in  the domain. These models were not used to 
build KBSs, but instead were scrutinized to reveal the causes of the failures. As a 
result, Silverman was able to produce his typology of biases. He advocates 
criticism-based knowledge acquisition (CBKA), where the knowledge engineer 
uses the KA phase, not simply to formalize the expert practice, but to critique it. 
In other words, the result of the KA phase will be some conceptual model of the 
desired expertise, but this model will have been developed critically by the 
knowledge engineer, who will have attempted to weed out biases from the 
expert's own account, biases both in the expert's original problem-solving 
behaviour, and also in any post hoc rationalizations of his problem-solving 
behaviour that the expert may have performed as part of the KA process. So an 
ideal conceptual model will not necessarily be a perfect model of the expert, 
because the expert may well have some undesirable qualities!1
                                                 
1Silverman has pointed out to me that his techniques are only really useful in spotting biases 
after they reveal themselves in corporate disasters (in Silverman's own work, the Shuttle disaster, 
the Bhopal chemical leak and the Five Mile Island nuclear disaster, for example). Weeding out a 
bias in advance is very difficult indeed. For example, what looks like a bias in one context might 
actually be a useful corner cutting hint in another, even if incorrect performance results 
occasionally. However, it is as well to realise that knowledge engineering involves attempting, 
not to model an expert warts and all, but to model some problem-solving practice in such a way 
as to enable a functioning system to be built on that basis. This may well involve the 
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Chapter Three: Scientific Explanation 
DR HERDER: Lady Claire, don't come to 
me for the truth, only explanations. 
Peter Barnes The Ruling Class 
To review our position so far: we have formed the intention of investigating AI 
philosophically by adopting the 'bottom up' manner of approach, i.e. developing 
a grasp of, and analysing the actual practice of, the first-order discipline. In 
Chapter Two, therefore, we set out a view of the current state of play in the field 
of KBS development methodology; our ultimate aim is to examine the 
philosophical significance of technological developments in this field. In 
particular, we will examine the claim that the models used in model-based KBS 
development can be seen as explanatory of the expertise which they model. 
However, even bottom up philosophy cannot be performed in a theoretical 
vacuum, and so we have one further preparatory task. We need to set out the 
philosophical background to the discussions we will be having in the final 
chapters of this thesis. Since we will be looking at the explanatory power of a 
particular set of models, we need to find or develop a philosophy of explanation; 
we need to know what it means to say that a conceptual model is explanatory of 
the expertise it models. 
The task is a slightly tricky one, in that we have to avoid two difficulties that 
inevitably suggest themselves. On the one hand, we have to make sure that we 
are sufficiently critical of any philosophical orthodoxy. Since we have adopted 
the bottom up approach to philosophy, we should be certain that the philosophy 
of explanation that we endorse is maximally congenial to current scientific 
practice. It is no good using a highly idealistic philosophy of explanation, which 
pays little heed to the actual practice of explanation either in psychology or AI, 
as a means of navigating through the pragmatic issues raised by a performance-
based technology such as AI. On the other hand, we must not develop a 
philosophy of explanation which is simply designed to give the OK to KBS 
development models as explanations of the modelled expertise; the philosophy 
of explanation that we endorse must be independently convincing. 
We shall begin to outline what we mean by 'explanation' in §3.1. We shall then 
attempt to deal with the general issues concerning current philosophical accounts 
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of the chapter will introduce the distinction between causal and non-causal 
explanation; this distinction will be of relevance to some subsidiary results of 
Chapters Five and Six. 
3.1  What We Are Talking About 
We shall delimit explanations by a functional role that they play in scientific 
practice: explanations confer understanding. If someone understands a pro-
cess/event/practice/regularity after being given an account of it, then, if he didn't 
understand it before, we can say that the account was an explanation, that the 
account explained the process/event/practice/regularity for him. Explanations are 
intended to confer understanding in this way. Note that the above condition is 
not necessary; explanations need not succeed in conferring understanding. I can 
explain Nottingham's one way system to a visitor, only to discover that his 
English was not sufficient for him to understand. Nevertheless, it does seem 
clear that my account could be an explanation. The account of explanation that 
we shall give in this chapter is not intended to be more than a beginning; hence 
we shall not attempt to define exactly the relationship between the intentions 
behind the presentation of an explanation, and the actual results of such a 
presentation. 
Our account of explanation is so far in terms of the unanalysed concept of 
'understanding'. We do not have sufficient space to explore this concept in detail. 
However, in this section, we shall explore a few distinctions, which should give 
us some hints as to how to understand understanding in the context of our 
explanation of explanation. 
3.1.1 Scientific  Explanation  and Scientific Understanding 
To begin with, one obvious distinction is that between explanation generally, and 
scientific explanation. In this thesis, we are interested in scientific explanation; 
does this mean that we can ignore ordinary explanation? Or is our account going 
to be a general account that includes within it scientific explanation? David-
Hillel Ruben draws a distinction between two ways of drawing the distinction. 
There are at least two possible senses of 'scientific explanation'. In the 
first sense, it refers to explanations which are actually given in 
science. ... In the second sense, the meaning of 'scientific explanation' Scientific Explanation    88 
is commendatory, or honorific, in some way. In any event, in this 
second sense, it is an open question whether any of the explanations 
actually given in science are scientific explanations at all. 
(Ruben 1990, p.16) 
 
This clearly chimes in with a major theme in this thesis, which is the distinction 
between top down and bottom up philosophy. Hence it is no surprise that we are 
going to be interested in the first sense of 'scientific explanation', the bottom up 
sense, keyed to actual scientific practice. As we noted in §1.1, the top 
down/bottom up distinction is not as clear cut as it might be. We certainly need 
to approach scientific explanation with a critical eye, and general philosophical 
accounts of explanation will provide important and interesting input to that 
exercise. But we also need to root the discussion in actual practice. 
Since we are interested in the science of psychology, we shall restrict our 
comments to scientific explanation, in Ruben's first sense. This entails a simple 
distinction between ordinary explanation and scientific explanation, because 
some explanations are made in the ordinary course of events, and others are 
made by scientists in scientific situations. But we will not place much weight on 
this distinction. In particular, we shall not explore the question of whether 
scientific explanations can actually be subsumed by the class of ordinary 
explanations. For the remainder of this thesis, we shall use the term 'explanation' 
to refer to scientific explanation, and we will not attempt to evaluate how far our 
comments will apply to explanation generally. 
But as a result of making this distinction, we can sketch a brief account of 
understanding that makes sense in this context. Since the scientific explanations 
we will be exploring are to be linked with the actual practice of scientists, then 
clearly so must our account of understanding. A successful explanation must be 
successful by scientific criteria. Hence we can say, roughly, that an explanation 
must confer scientific understanding on the receiver. Again, we won't try to 
define the notion of scientific understanding, but we can provide some examples 
of the sort of understanding that we might expect to find in a scientific context.  
One example might be a scientist's coming to understand a phenomenon of an 
unknown type by discovering that the phenomenon falls under a well-known 
description, and hence being able to apply a set of laws to that phenomenon. So, 
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explained as an instance of osmosis, as the axon walls become semi-permeable, 
allowing charged ions to flow through them. Another example of understanding 
might be a scientist's coming to understand two or more apparently disparate sets 
of phenomena by discovering that they can be covered by a single set of laws 
(and hence that, relative to the new theory, the phenomena are of the same type). 
Here, one might cite the search for Great Unified Theories of force. A set of laws 
covering atomic forces and a set of laws covering electromagnetic forces might 
be unified into a single set of laws. In that case, atomic forces and 
electromagnetic forces would be explained in terms of the G.U.T.. A third 
example might be a scientist's coming to understand some process in terms of 
previously well-understood processes. A case of this might be a discovery of a 
mechanism within a bird that explains its navigation during migration. A fourth 
example might be a scientist's coming to understand phenomena sufficiently to 
exploit them technologically. A case of this might be an explanation of the 
stresses in various materials that enables structures such as bridges to be built 
more cheaply and more safely. It will be noted that these examples are all 
relatively instrumental; the explanations enable the scientist to achieve various 
goals. Wesley Salmon gives a similar set of considerations that might lead an 
applied scientist to ask for explanations in (Salmon 1988b, pp.120-2). 
I don't wish to go into detail about understanding here. Suffice it to say that this 
mild instrumentalist account is meant to chime in with, say, Neil Cooper's recent 
discussion of the spatial and geographical metaphors governing understanding. 
The person who understands an event or phenomenon is somebody 
who can find his way about the mental environment in which his 
knowledge of it figures. The attempt to understand is like exploration. 
One can explore an area more or less adequately, it is a matter of 
degree. Once we have done this, knowing our way about is more than 
knowing where our destination is or knowing where particular places 
or objects are, it is knowing how to get from one part to another, how 
to connect them, and how to distinguish them. 
(Cooper 1994, p.4) 
 
This is a more or less delphic characterization, but basically it allows us to make 
a few points without going deeply into the question of understanding. Firstly, we 
can make a distinction between understanding and knowledge. Understanding is 
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whereas understanding is more like a capacity to generate knowledge, to see 
connections between propositions instead of merely being passively informed. 
Indeed, knowledge and understanding can even be mutually exclusive in some 
contexts (Cooper 1994, pp.5-8). We can also distinguish between the general 
instrumental view of understanding and the rigidly defined types of 
'understanding-why' which some philosophers of science use (van Fraassen 
1980; Achinstein 1983), and which we shall discuss en passant below. These 
narrow conceptions of understanding are connected with particular views of 
explanation, and are therefore not independently motivated; it is likely that as 
accounts of understanding they are not rich enough to do justice to the concept. 
Finally, we should just note that, because we are talking of scientific 
explanation, when we go on to discuss psychological explanation in Chapter 
Four, our remarks will not be intended to apply to common, 'folk-psychological' 
explanations of human action, necessarily1 (although it would be a nice bonus if 
they did). Our aim is simply to look at explanations in scientific psychology. 
3.1.2  Explanation as a Process and Explanation as a Product 
A second distinction we might discuss briefly is that between explanation as a 
process and explanation as a product (Bromberger 1965). An explanation can be 
seen as a process, or an act; you can sit in a lecture hall watching a physics 
lecturer take half an hour to tell his first year students why clocks on aeroplanes 
run slow in comparison to clocks on the ground. In that event, it makes sense to 
say that the explanation ran for thirty minutes, that it was interrupted by the bulb 
going on the overhead projector, that it took place in temperatures in the nineties, 
etc.. On the other hand, you can point to the text which the lecturer used, and 
discuss the man who discovered the explanation, or how complicated it is. In that 
case, you would be discussing the explanation as a product. Most philosophers of 
science take the product as prior to the process (i.e. the process must be 
explained in terms of the product); Peter Achinstein (1983) is the notable 
exception. 
What we should note here is that, in the bottom up context, the priority of 
product over process is not uncontroversial. Explanations need to confer 
understanding (or be capable of conferring understanding), and our instrumental 
                                                 
1Although if the arguments of Churchland (1970), for example, hold, so that folk psychology is a 
kind of scientific theory, then our remarks should apply. I won't evaluate Churchland's thesis, 
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notion of understanding does seem to entail that we need explanations that are 
capable of being used in scientific research. This in turn seems to imply that an 
unusable explanation in the product sense (e.g. an unknown or unsurveyable 
explanation) should not be seen as a good explanation. If we view the core of an 
explanation, in the product sense, as equivalent to its content (Ruben 1990, p.7), 
then it is not obvious that a useful philosophy of explanation can rest entirely on 
that notion, since actual scientific practice requires more in terms of 
communicability. Hence attention to the process is essential for a correct account 
of explanation in science. 
Interestingly, this does seem to be a neglected possibility for the philosophy of 
explanation. There are only four possible relationships between explanation as 
process and explanation as product. 
1. Process and product are independent. 
2. Product is prior to process. 
3. Process is prior to product. 
4. Process and product are mutually dependent. 
 
Since most philosophers of science cleave to the relative importance of product, 
they must choose either option 1 or option 2. Achinstein stands more or less 
alone by choosing option 3. However, our brief discussion suggests that the 
neglected option 4 is at least worth considering. 
In fact, though it is important to clear up any troublemaking ambiguity, it is 
interesting to note that the conceptual models which are the focus of this thesis 
can actually be seen as either process or product, as the reader thinks fit. 
Conceptual models can be stated, and written down, in English, Dutch, in some 
KRL; in that sense they can be seen as products. Perhaps they are most naturally 
seen that way. However, each model comes associated with a methodology, 
which in turn suggests a life cycle for KBS development (recall §2.2.1, and 
especially Figure 2.3). Models are intended to be used in a very particular way, 
in very particular circumstances. They inform the KBS development process in 
specific ways; this is not surprising, of course, since they were developed 
precisely for that reason. Hence the context of conceptual model use certainly 
suggests a process; a KADS model, for example, is intended for use within an 
application of the KADS method. So any model will carry with it specifications 
of admissible processes in which it can be deployed. In the light of our bottom Scientific Explanation    92 
up characterization of the philosophy of explanation, it is interesting to see this 
intertwining of process and product.  
The upshot is that we need not be drawn on the question of whether we are 
dealing with process or product. If the reader prefers a product account, then 
what we say will apply to a conceptual model as a product. If the process 
account is preferred, then the following chapters can be taken as talking of 
conceptual models in their KBS development contexts. Either way, we should 
not fall foul of any arguments that purport to show that the product account is 
prior to the process account or vice versa. 
3.1.3  Full and Partial Explanations 
A third distinction we might make is between a full and a partial explanation. A 
full explanation need not be supplemented in any way; a partial explanation 
needs some additional information. Most philosophers of explanation are 
interested in full explanations; it is expected that partial explanations can be 
'filled out' into full explanations, and therefore can be taken as shorthand for a 
particular full explanation. Some philosophers see the full explanation as 
something that is rarely, if ever, given, and therefore that all (most) actual 
explanations are partial (Railton 1981; Lewis 1986). Of course, what is a partial 
explanation will depend strongly on what a full explanation is, so this distinction 
cannot be characterized neutrally. However, in our bottom up context, we clearly 
will require an account that deals with explanations as they stand. This does not 
mean that the full/partial distinction cannot be drawn as Railton and Lewis 
would recommend, as long as actual explanations can be clearly and fairly 
measured against it. But it does mean that there has to be some pretty strong 
reason to postulate an unrealizable ideal explanation-form. 
There are a few ways in which the distinction can be drawn relative to the 
account of explanation above. Firstly, given our linkage between explanation and 
understanding, one could say that a partial explanation is one which conferred 
partial scientific understanding. Since scientists are clearly neither omniscient 
nor omnipotent, one might then have grounds for saying, with Lewis and 
Railton, that all actual explanations are partial. On the other hand, one could 
argue as follows: understanding enables something to be done; an explanation 
either does or does not enable that thing to be done; hence, in that context, an 
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ways of drawing the distinction consistently with our bottom up principles which 
place all explanations on the same side of the line. A third way in which the 
distinction can be drawn is to utilize the notion of a scientist's goal. A scientist 
wishes to achieve goal G; an explanation might give him sufficient 
understanding to achieve G, in which case it is a full explanation; or it might get 
him closer to the target without actually getting him there, in which case it is 
partial. 
On this third construal of the distinction, we can see conceptual models as being 
either full or partial explanations, depending on the way in which we 
characterize the scientist's goal. Let us first assume that conceptual models are 
explanatory (we will attempt to prove this in Chapter Five). If the scientist's goal 
is to understand how an expert solves a particular problem P, and the conceptual 
model is the model of the expertise required to solve P, then the model is a full 
explanation, in that it gets the scientist to his goal. If the scientist's goal is to 
build a system which solves P itself, then, because the conceptual model still 
needs to be transformed into a design model, which in turn needs to be 
implemented (recall Figure 2.3), the conceptual model has to be seen as a partial 
explanation. 
My own view is that this third way of drawing the distinction is the interesting 
way. One reason for this is that it is the only way of drawing the distinction 
which leaves actual explanations on one side, and actual explanations on the 
other. Secondly, it is tied in quite nicely with the instrumental notion of scientific 
understanding. In so far as the distinction matters, we shall be concerned in this 
thesis with full explanation. This means that, in particular, we shall be concerned 
with conceptual models as explanations of the expertise required to solve 
problems. 
We should note that we should not take the full/partial distinction and the 
ordinary/scientific distinction to be the same. Ruben (1990) claims that if 
'scientific' is meant in his second sense, that of an honorific commendation of an 
explanation, then all non-scientific explanations must be partial versions of this 
type. The scientific explanation is the only full explanation. 
In my view, the only distinction that can usefully be drawn is that 
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scientific (in the [honorific] sense) and ordinary explanations is either 
that distinction or no distinction at all. 
(Ruben 1990, p.17) 
 
I think this must be false. In the first place, surely a scientific explanation can be 
partial. One could imagine the honorific sense of scientific being applied to 
explanations which were incomplete in some way. For instance, one could 
imagine the honorific sense of 'scientific' given as follows: an explanation is 
scientific if it gives the causal history of an event (cf. Lewis 1986). Then there is 
room for saying that the full explanation is the complete causal history, while a 
partial scientific explanation gives selected highlights of the history. This surely 
must be a case of a partial scientific (honorific sense) explanation. In the second 
place, there could be a full explanation which was not scientific. My recent large 
water bill could be explained astrologically by showing that the configuration of 
the stars meant that I would have trouble with money this month; the explanation 
could then be filled out by an account of how the stars affect our lives (there are 
many such accounts available in occult bookshops). The result would surely be a 
full explanation (not a good explanation, but an explanation nonetheless). And 
on any account of 'scientific', it shouldn't be a scientific explanation. 
Earlier, we decided that the correct, useful, definition of 'scientific' should be 
given by observing what goes on in science (rejecting the honorific title view). It 
is therefore important to show that, by drawing the full/partial distinction as we 
did, we have not allowed an honorific notion to creep in by the back door. By 
rejecting Ruben's view, we should have prevented that possibility. 
3.1.4 Good  Explanation  and Bad Explanation 
Mention of a bad astrological argument brings us onto yet another distinction: 
that between good and bad explanations. When we talk about explanations, we 
will be concerned with explanations both good and bad; a conceptual model can 
be a bad explanation as well as a good one. Hence it should not be thought that 
conceptual models are always guaranteed to be good explanations. In general, in 
keeping with our instrumental notion of understanding, an explanation is good 
when it is not misleading. So, for example, an explanation of a phenomenon of 
an unknown type will claim that it falls under some well-known description; it 
will be a good explanation if the phenomenon actually does fall under that 
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phenomena will claim that they both fall under some single set of laws; it will be 
a good explanation if the phenomena actually do fall under those laws, a bad one 
otherwise. And so on. 
Further, the good/bad distinction is not the same as the true/false distinction. A 
counterexample would be a true explanation of some process which could not be 
used to get nearer a scientific goal (perhaps because it was too complex, or not 
detailed enough, or unsurveyable). 
Note also here that a conceptual model can be seen as both good and bad in 
different contexts (just as it could be seen as both full and partial in different 
contexts). Assume again that conceptual models are explanatory. If we want to 
understand how an expert solves a particular problem P, and the conceptual 
model is the model of the expertise required to solve P, then the model could be 
a bad explanation, in that the expert actually solves P in a different way (the 
model could divert from the expertise in important ways, perhaps because some 
computational algorithm is known which makes the task easier). However, if we 
want to build a system which solves P itself, then the model, if it helps us to do 
that, is (part of) a good explanation (of how to solve P by computer).  
We have now specified what concept we are looking at when we look at 
explanation. Now it is time to evaluate critically some recent and well-known 
accounts. 
3.2  Top Down Accounts of Explanation 
3.2.1  Review of Some Top Down Accounts 
We now come to top down accounts of explanation, accounts which attempt to 
set out the concept, without necessarily regarding actual explanatory practice in 
science. Most philosophers of science have a top down view of explanation; 
Hempel may fairly be regarded as the major modern figure in the field (1965). 
His view is that a good explanation takes the form of a deductive argument, 
whose conclusion (the explanandum) is a sentence expressing that which is to be 
explained. Some of the premises are lawlike sentences which are actually used in 
the deduction of the conclusion, and all of the premises are true. Together, the 
premises form a minimal set with respect to the explanandum (in other words, all 
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premises being added to and then removed from the proof by &-introduction and 
&-elimination). This is the deductive-nomological model; the premises can also 
be statistical in form, which leads to an alternative model to the simple 
argumentative view (Hempel 1962a). In each case, Hempel draws up a relatively 
simple form as an epistemological standard to which all actual explanations must 
be compared. Most other major work in the philosophy of explanation has tended 
toward this line of providing an ideal form for an explanation. 
For example, Wesley Salmon (1984) has developed the idea of a statistical 
relevance model of explanation. This model claims that explanations consist of 
sets of empirical probabilities of various possible outcomes. Whereas Hempel's 
statistical model tries to show how the explanandum was probable, Salmon 
merely wants to set out the probabilities of the various possibilities. 
An explanation does not show that the event was to be expected; it 
shows what sorts of expectations would have been reasonable and 
under what circumstances it was to be expected. 
(Salmon et al 1971, p.79) 
 
Baruch Brody has attempted to synthesize Hempel's work with Aristotle's 
account of explanation (1972). His account supplements Hempel's deductivist 
account with further specification of necessary conditions for the premises. So, 
for example, Brody's causal model dictates that an explanation, as well as being 
a deductive argument with one or more laws in the premises, must contain a 
description of the event which caused the explanandum (1972, p.23). His 
essential property model insists that the premises contain a statement attributing 
an essential property to objects of a certain class (1972, p.26). 
David Lewis's view (1986) is that the complete explanation of an event is its 
complete causal history (back to Big Bang); the business of the explanations that 
we are likely to encounter is to give some insight into selected parts of that 
causal history. Therefore, according to Lewis, in practical terms every 
explanation is going to be incomplete. Peter Railton (1981) goes further, 
claiming that the ideal explanation for anything is likely to be infinite. 
For example, an ideal text for the explanation of the outcome of a 
causal process would look something like this: an inter-connected 
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network culminating in the explanandum, complete with a fully 
detailed description of the causal mechanisms involved and 
theoretical derivations of all the covering laws involved. This full-
blown causal account would extend, via various relations of reduction 
and supervenience, to all levels of analysis, i.e. the ideal text would 
be closed under relations of causal dependence, reduction and 
supervenience. It would be the whole story concerning why the 
explanandum occurred, relative to a correct theory of the lawful 
dependencies of the world. Such an ideal causal D-N text would be 
infinite if time were without beginning or infinitely divisible, and 
plainly there is no question of ever setting such an ideal text down on 
paper. ... But it is clear that a whole range of less-than-ideal proffered 
explanations could more or less successfully convey information 
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such an ideal text and so be more or less successful explanations, 
even if not in D-N form. 
(Railton 1981, p.174) 
 
It is essential that such an account, so clearly the account of a man who will not 
be called upon actually to give a scientific explanation, should not be seen as 
being at all descriptive of current practice. Railton is alive to this fact. 
Is it preposterous to suggest that any such ideal could exist for 
scientific explanation and understanding? Has anyone ever attempted 
or even wanted to construct an ideal causal or probabilistic text? It is 
not preposterous if we recognize that the actual ideal is not to 
produce such texts, but to have the ability (in principle) to produce 
arbitrary parts of them. It is thus irrelevant whether individual 
scientists ever set out to fill in ideal texts as wholes, since within the 
division of labour among scientists it is possible to find someone (or, 
more precisely, some group) interested in developing the ability to fill 
in virtually any particular aspect of ideal texts — macro or micro, 
fundamental or 'phenomenological', stretching over experimental or 
historical or geological or cosmological time. 
(Railton 1981, p.174) 
 
This notion of an ideal explanatory text is an important part of the general 
project of providing top down accounts of explanation (Salmon 1989, pp.159-
61). 
David-Hillel Ruben (1990) proposes a dependency model of explanation, where 
facts are explained by the facts upon which they depend, in a metaphysical sense. 
Causation is the most obvious metaphysical dependency relation; were this the 
only admissible dependency relation, Ruben's account would more or less 
collapse into Lewis's. However, Ruben is alive to the possibility of non-causal 
explanation (1990, pp.211-18; cf. §3.4 below), and is prepared to countenance 
alternative metaphysical dependency relations, such as part/whole relations and 
structure/disposition relations. 
The aim of this top down sort of account of explanation is explicitly not to 
describe the sorts of explanation generally found; neither is the aim to describe 
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stream of the philosophy of explanation is more concerned with setting a 
standard. For example, Hempel is very clear that most explanations which we 
will actually encounter will not meet the standard. One such class of 
explanations are explanations in which it is not the case that each essential 
element of a classical Hempelian deductive-nomological explanation is present. 
When a mathematician proves a theorem, he will often omit ... certain 
propositions which he presupposes in his argument ... . If judged by 
ideal standards, the given formulation of the proof is elliptic or 
incomplete; but the departure from the ideal is harmless: the gaps can 
readily be filled in. Similarly, explanations put forward in everyday 
discourse and also in scientific contexts are often elliptically 
formulated. When we explain, for example, that a lump of butter 
melted because it was put into a hot frying pan [etc.] ... we may be 
said to offer elliptic formulations of deductive-nomological 
explanations ... . 
(Hempel 1962b, p.25) 
 
The other case where explanations might fall short of the ideal is the case where 
an explanation only partially explains the explanandum. We discussed our own 
interpretation of partial explanation above. On Hempel's characterization, we 
would be using a partial explanation if, when trying to explain why x was in G 
(when we might expect that x was not in G), we argued that x had to be in F (of 
which G is a subclass). This is only a partial explanation, in the sense that it does 
not explain why x is in G (as opposed to the complement of G in F). Hempel 
seems pretty clear that most scientific explanations will fall into one or other of 
these two classes. 'We have found ... that the explanatory accounts actually 
formulated in science and in everyday contexts ... diverge more or less markedly 
from the idealized and schematized covering-law models' (Hempel 1965, p.424). 
So, there is a tendency in the philosophy of explanation to regard actual existing 
examples of explanations as being good in so far as they approach the ideal form 
which it is the business of philosophy (or epistemology) to divine. This can 
clearly be recognised as an example of top down philosophy as discussed in 
Chapter One. Hempel (perhaps Popper) can be regarded as the modern founder 
of this field. Hempel's original paper (Hempel and Oppenheim 1948) has been 
described as epoch-making, and was the foundation for a consensus that lasted 
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increasingly under pressure. Most alternatives to Hempel have been equally top 
down; nevertheless, sociological and epistemological studies of science have 
increasingly made their mark as bottom up accounts begin to gain footholds. In 
the remainder of this section, we shall flesh out three reasons to reject the top 
down approach to explanation; then in §3.3, we shall sketch our positive, bottom 
up, view. 
3.2.2  The Lack of Top Down Consensus 
The first reason to reject top down accounts of explanation is simply the plethora 
of incompatible accounts. The consensus around the Hempelian model that 
existed in the sixties has decayed. In a recent survey, Wesley Salmon detects no 
emerging consensus in modern philosophy of explanation, save for general 
agreement on a few basic propositions. 
Is there a new consensus in philosophy of science regarding the 
nature of scientific explanation? Not to any noticeable extent. There 
are, however, a few basic points on which there seems to be 
widespread agreement among those who are contributing actively to 
the philosophical discussion of the subject. 
 
(1) At the beginning of the four decades [of discussion of 
explanation], the view was rather widely held that it is no part of the 
business of science to provide explanations ... . ... It is now generally 
acknowledged that one of the most important fruits of modern science 
is understanding of the world. We do not have to go outside of 
science to find it. 
 
(2) There seems to be general agreement ... that the 'received 
[Hempelian] view' of the mid-1960s is not viable. ... 
 
(3) ... There is, I think, a general tacit recognition that the kinds of 
tools employed by Hempel and Oppenheim [i.e. the syntax and 
semantics of a formal language with precise logical definitions] are 
not especially fruitful for handling the problems [of scientific 
explanation]. ... 
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(4) There appears to be fairly wide agreement on the importance of 
the pragmatics of explanation, and on the recognition that this aspect 
was not accorded sufficient emphasis in the 'received view'. 
 
Beyond these four points, I cannot think of any other areas in which 
consensus actually obtains. Nevertheless, another question should be 
raised, namely, is a new consensus emerging in philosophy of 
science? This question calls for a risky prediction, but I shall hazard a 
guess. It seems to me that there are at least three powerful schools of 
thought at present — the pragmatists, the deductivists, and the 
mechanists — and that they are not likely to reach substantial 
agreement in the near future. 
(Salmon 1989, pp.180-1) 
 
Admittedly, the opinion of even one of the most distinguished philosophers of 
science probably doesn't count as major evidence, but the fact is that there are 
three apparently incompatible views of explanation being touted, and there is no 
sign of agreement. Pragmatic accounts (van Fraassen 1980; Achinstein 1983) 
focus on the relativity of explanation to context; this will be in partial accord 
with our notion of bottom up accounts of explanation, as can readily be imagined 
(although, just to confuse matters, this is arguable; we discuss this further in 
§3.3). Deductivist accounts follow Hempel in claiming that explanations need to 
be arguments (Watkins 1984). Mechanists, such as Salmon and Ruben, insist that 
explanations need to be couched in terms of some underlying metaphysical 
relation.1
There are a number of arguments and counterarguments flying around in this 
field. Many counterexamples have been developed attacking various positions. 
(Achinstein 1981) is a sustained attack on a number of top down positions, with 
counterexamples against all of them. There is no need to go into these examples 
in detail;2 the main point is that we must suspect that top down accounts 
                                                 
1To confuse matters further, Salmon calls the deductivists 'top down' and the mechanists 'bottom 
up' (1989, p.183)! This is, of course, a very different distinction to the one we drew in Chapter 
One. Our distinction can be roughly mapped onto Salmon's three way distinction between the 
philosophies of explanation by saying that the pragmaticists could be bottom up, while the 
deductivists and the mechanists are both likely to be top down. This mapping is, however, a 
rough one indeed, as discussed in §3.3. 
2For the record, Achinstein's arguments are aimed at the basic deductive-nomological model 
(Hempel and Oppenheim 1948), the dispositional deductive-nomological model (Hempel 1965, 
p.462), the motivational deductive-nomological model (Hempel and Oppenheim 1948, p.254), 
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(particularly deductivist and mechanist accounts) will be susceptible to the 
discovery of counterexamples. This is because they privilege one or more types 
of explanation over others that have at least seemed plausible to scientists in 
their everyday practice. Scientists have developed very different practices in 
various different fields, in response to the peculiar requirements of the individual 
contexts; hence it is plausible that (a)  a type of 'explanation' that seems 
reasonable in some previously uninvestigated context may just be overlooked by 
the top down view, and (b) the explanation privileged by the top down view may 
well not transport easily to uninvestigated contexts. Point (a) can be answered in 
any typical case by saying that the top down account only described and 
legitimized a circumscribed area of explanatory practice (e.g. in theoretical 
physics) — in effect by weakening the position, which is unsatisfactory but not 
necessarily fatal to the top down theory. However, the effect of point (b) is to 
leave it open that non-explanatory texts  (i.e. texts sanctioned by the out-of-
context top down theory) get read as explanations; this is much more damaging. 
A type of explanation that was clearly of use in one context might well turn out 
to be totally useless in another (uninvestigated) context. For example, there are 
contexts in which teleological explanations make sense, and contexts in which 
they don't. 
In general, we can anticipate what sort of counterargument could be developed 
against each of the three positions. The deductivists are vulnerable to 
explanatory asymmetries, cases where the explanandum can clearly be deduced, 
but not necessarily in an explanatory way. An example here is the explanation of 
the height of a flagpole, where a set of trigonometrical relations connect the 
angle of the sun in the sky, the height of a flagpole and the length of the 
flagpole's shadow. Each can be deduced from the other two, but whereas the 
length of the shadow is explained by the angle of the sun and the height of the 
flagpole, it is not clear that the height of the flagpole is explained by the angle of 
the sun and the length of the shadow (Bromberger 1966). Mechanists typically 
privilege a particular mechanism; they therefore run the risk that they will be 
faced with putative situations where their privileged mechanisms will not appear 
to be explanatorily relevant. For example, someone such as Lewis who thinks 
that all explanation elucidates the causal relations of the explanandum is likely to 
be faced with apparent counterexamples of non-causal explanation (we discuss 
non-causal explanation in §3.4.1). For example, if all explanations are causal, 
                                                                                                                                    
et al 1971), the Aristotelian essential property model and causal model (Brody 1972), and the 
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what are we to say about an 'explanation' of why the square on the hypotenuse is 
equal to the sum of the squares on the other two sides? Finally, pragmaticists 
will be faced with attempts to reduce their pragmatic accounts to 'anything goes' 
relativism (Kitcher and Salmon 1987). If there are no restrictions on what is 
pragmatically acceptable, then it is unclear how to prevent people from saying 
that everything is pragmatically acceptable. On the other hand, if there are such 
restrictions, then what is pragmatically acceptable — which is determined by the 
pragmatic theory, which is supposedly applicable to all contexts — will not be a 
function solely of context. For example, van Fraassen (1980, pp.132-4) gives an 
example of a context where the height of a tower is supposedly explained by the 
length of its shadow.1 The reasons why the length is explanatory in this case are 
highly dependent on the details of the story van Fraassen tells; it is not clear how 
a theory of explanation could possibly legislate for such an outlandish possibility 
in advance. 
But whatever the details of any particular refutation of any particular top down 
theory, what I am urging is that the very diversity of views of explanation is 
circumstantial evidence that there is no common type of explanation that should 
be privileged above the others. The incompatibility of the various views is 
important. Deductivists are all agreed that explanations should be arguments; 
however, of course they disagree among themselves as to what properties these 
arguments should have. Mechanists agree that explanations should be based on 
metaphysical relations, but disagree among themselves as to which relations are 
important. Further, deductivism and mechanism turn out to be incompatible, 
because the mechanist view sees induction as an important method of scientific 
progress and explanation, whereas deductivists do not (Popper 1972; Salmon 
1988a; Kyburg 1988), and because deductivists are generally more at home in a 
deterministic world, whereas mechanists — following results in twentieth 
century physics — are happy for the world to be nondeterministic (Salmon 
1988b). The pragmaticists are obviously incompatible with both mechanists and 
deductivists, because they would want the context to determine both which 
mechanism, and which explanatory form, is appropriate. Hence choosing a top 
down view will involve choosing a position which is guaranteed to be under 
attack.  
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On the other hand, the bottom up view bases its account on actual explanatory 
practice. This is obviously incompatible with the top down views in one sense; it 
holds that a number of explanatory practices might be legitimate, which the top 
down views all agree is false. However, in another sense, the bottom up view has 
the advantage that it is compatible with the accidental truth of any top down 
view — it might actually turn out to be the case that only one (or a few) kind(s) 
of explanation work. Hence the bottom up view is in an important sense rather 
more general than the top down views; less prescriptive, more descriptive, but 
still critical. 
To summarize this first reason: most, if not all, top down views, have 
experienced a measure of criticism based on counterexamples to their accounts. 
No consensus has emerged. This does not of course prove that all top down 
views are false (although necessarily at least all but one of them is false). But the 
absence of consensus is at least circumstantial evidence for competing intuitions, 
which perhaps may be treated in a less question-begging way with a bottom up 
view rather than a top down view. 
3.2.3  Ideals of Explanation Do Not Explain Alternative 
Explanatory Practices 
The second reason to reject top down accounts is that the ideal forms against 
which all explanation should be measured abstract away from pragmatics; the 
top down claim is that explanation can be analysed in the absence of a pragmatic 
account of explanation-giving (cf. Lewis 1986, pp.193-5; Ruben 1990, pp.21-3). 
For example, when Hempel talks about partial explanation, what he is really 
concerned about are the situations where what seem to be perfectly good 
explanations fail to meet his model. But this will always happen, since the 
Hempelian type of model takes no pragmatic or practical considerations to have 
any bearing on the explanatory project. 
Nevertheless, sometimes what appear to be pragmatic principles can impinge on 
the analysis of explanation. For instance, Peter Lipton (1990) develops a view of 
explanation as contrastive; what a good explanation will do is distinguish 
between two or more possibilities. These possibilities will vary from 
circumstance to circumstance, and therefore simple models will find it 
problematic to take such variation into account. For example, the form of an 
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questioner wants to know why X's behaviour is paranoiac as opposed to 
schizophrenic, or why X's behaviour is paranoiac as opposed to Y's behaviour 
being paranoiac, etc.. 
The obvious claim to make is that top down accounts actually entail that the 
ideal explanatory text would contain every bit of information that the contrastive 
explanation would contain, and hence that the scientist could still be seen as 
'filling in' slots in a skeletal ideal text. This is arguable; nevertheless, we have 
then only accounted for the reproduction of arbitrary parts of the ideal text. What 
is not explained is why particular scientists select particular contrasts, or 
particular parts of the ideal text, as being of special interest at any particular 
juncture of science. Explanation of this will be an explanation of the pragmatic 
element in the scientist's practice. But note that that explanation will be sufficient 
to account for the scientist's explanatory practice in toto. Hence work has to be 
done to show that an ideal account adds anything to the account of explanation. 
We should expand on the claim that the explanatory ideal is redundant. If an 
account of explanation is based on actual explanatory practice, then that account 
can claim to be explanatory of that practice, even if the actual practice departs 
from the theoretical account. As an analogy, consider a physical account of the 
mechanics of ordinary medium sized objects such as billiard balls. That account 
is an attempt to model the actual interactions of such objects; yet the behaviour 
of those objects will differ from the model. The model will include such 
impossible phenomena as frictionless planes, and will ignore the effects of other 
phenomena such as air resistance. Now, when this account is used to explain the 
movements of actual objects, it will need to be supplemented by accounts of 
friction, etc., for the explanation to be accurate in sufficient detail. But the 
supplement is a genuine supplement — the original theoretical mechanical 
account is still an important part of the explanation. 
We can see this supplementation of explanation in our own discussion of model-
based KBS development methodologies in §2.2.1. We explained the activities of 
knowledge engineers by a model of KBS development that involved the drafting 
of user requirements, the development of a conceptual model on the basis of 
those requirements, the transformation of that conceptual model into a design 
model, and the implementation of that design. This was a bottom up explanation 
of KBS development practice. A knowledge engineer may well depart from that 
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implemented immediately. (Motta et al 1994) gives an example of this. Hence, in 
such cases, the 'ideal' explanation needs to be supplemented by an account of the 
departure of the knowledge engineer's practice from that ideal. In the case of 
Motta et al, the account would discuss the reasons for interpolating a design 
model between the conceptual model and the implementation, and would then 
show that such reasons did not in fact obtain in that particular case. So the 
original 'ideal' explanation, plus the supplement, would together provide a fine-
grained explanation of the knowledge engineer's behaviour, and each of the two 
components would be required for the explanation to stand up. 
Contrast that case with the top down case, where the actual explanatory practice 
does not figure as a datum. Top down accounts of explanation are based on 
other, generally epistemological, considerations. They make claims such as: the 
understanding of facts E in the context of facts C could only be produced by 
procedure P. Now suppose that a scientist departs from the ideal, and follows 
procedure P'. Since P' differs from P, it follows, on the top down account, that 
the scientist does not understand facts E in the context of facts C. Then the top 
down account is incomplete, and has to be supplemented. The supplement will 
consist in a discussion of why the scientist followed procedure P', and a 
discussion of why P' was followed at all (e.g. to gain technological mastery, or 
partial understanding). But surely, here, the supplement — the account of the 
procedure the scientist used, plus the account of the gain the scientist made (or 
thought he would make) from the use of that procedure — is by itself sufficient 
for us to understand the scientist's actions. The supplement, by itself, explains 
the scientist's practice. It is not clear why the ideal procedure, P, and the 
scientist's target, understanding, need be mentioned at all.1  
The difference, then, between top down and bottom up accounts of explanation 
is that the former relies on epistemological considerations, while the latter takes 
note of actual practice. So, in the bottom up case, what we are postulating is that 
the ability to achieve goal G in the context of facts C is typically produced by 
following procedure P. Here, when the scientist departs from P, and follows P' 
(because this is a bottom up account, we can assume that P' does not differ 
radically from P2), the supplement will be concerned with showing how to 
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in the explanation of the scientist's practice. 
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achieve G' in context C' by following P', where G' and C' are specific instances 
of G and C. The supplement will consist in showing how G' and C' are not 
typical, and therefore why P' is preferable to P this time; the supplement will 
have no general significance, however. In the top down case, what is being 
claimed is that a particular epistemological state cannot be achieved because of a 
departure from the ideal; the departure is explained by showing which 
epistemological state has been achieved. But this can be discussed without 
reference to any epistemological states which haven't been achieved (and which 
haven't been aimed at at all), and therefore without reference to any procedures 
that might achieve such unwanted states. 
Hence, in cases where departures from the ideal are the rule rather than the 
exception, the ideal does little or no explanatory work. The case of scientific 
explanation is one such case; there are no models of scientific explanation which 
are such that most scientists' behaviour conforms to them. 
As an example, consider a top down explanation of knowledge engineering 
practice, parallel to our bottom up explanation of that practice in §2.2.1. The 
brief for such an explanation is this: explain how to produce a computer system 
that reproduces expertise. So, for the sake of argument, let us assume that our top 
down account suggests that the knowledge engineer produce a complete domain 
theory, from which the system could derive all the answers (e.g. if the 
knowledge engineer was to develop a KBS that diagnosed respiratory system 
disorders, then build a theory of the respiratory system into the KBS such that 
the KBS could deduce the disorder from the input of patient symptoms). As we 
know, actual practice is different from this; we have the conceptual model and 
design model being built. Therefore the top down explanation needs to be 
supplemented by an account of the differences from theory of the actual practice. 
This supplementary account will be an account of why the knowledge engineer 
built a conceptual model, and why he built a design model,1 and what the system 
will achieve, assuming that the resulting KBS would fall short of some 
epistemological standard that the ideal KBS would have met. But this 
supplementary account by itself explains the knowledge engineering practice — 
the ideal account doesn't seem to add anything at all. Another example: if we 
take Railton's (1981) second order explanation of the practice of giving 
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explanations, what the actual practice of scientific explanation will consist in is 
the 'filling in' of 'arbitrary parts' of the ideal explanatory text. So, in a particular 
case, to explain the practice of scientific explanation, we will need to explain 
why the scientist filled in these parts of the ideal text rather than those, on top of 
the ideal account. But that is just to explain why the scientist filled in the parts of 
the text that she actually filled in, which is an entirely adequate explanation of 
her explanatory practice.1
So, to summarize, top down explanation is only of value in a particular case 
when it coincides with the actual practice. When the particular case departs from 
the top down account, the supplement will be sufficiently explanatory on its 
own. Of course, the issue is not as clear cut as we are pretending here; there will 
be a continuum of usefulness of ideal accounts as they vary from actual practice 
— which is just to say that the closer to actual practice the account is, the better, 
which is just to recommend the bottom up approach. The top down theorists can 
breathe more easily as they take actual practice into account more often, as, for 
example, Ruben (1990) tries to. However, most top down theorists explicitly 
ignore actual practice, and some accounts are even designed so that no actual 
explanation can meet the ideal at all. Hempel is very cavalier about actual 
practice, although a number of scientific endeavours will count as partial 
deductive-nomological explanation. On the other hand, it seems pretty clear that 
the ideal accounts, of, say, Lewis or Railton will never describe ordinary 
practice. 
3.2.4  Actual Explanatory Practice Needs a Philosophical 
Account 
The third reason for rejecting the top down type of account depends on an 
insistence on doing justice to a particular practice of science which is commonly 
called 'explanation'. Scientists produce texts which they call explanations, and 
undoubtedly serve some communicative purpose in their work. This practice 
actually exists — in different forms in different areas of science — and deserves 
some philosophical discussion. This insistence can be recognised as an aspect of 
the bottom up style of philosophy we argued for in Chapter One, and as such the 
evaluation of this reason does depend to an extent on the arguments in that 
chapter in a way that the first two reasons do not. The first reason was that the 
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lack of consensus meant that the top down approach did not actually look very 
attractive in the abstract; the second reason was that, in particular cases at least, 
the top down approach was not doing any explanatory work (except where the 
actual practice closely coincided with the approach). But the third reason for 
rejecting the top down approach is simply that there is a practice in science 
which would effectively be ignored if the top down approach were accepted, and 
if that happened, another opportunity to cross-fertilize disciplines would be 
missed. 
The point is that explanations are developed for purposes within contexts, and 
the quality of an explanation is absolutely tied to the context within which it was 
developed. All top down models have to recognise this contextual relevance, as 
we noted above (recall that this was one of Salmon's 'basic points of agreement' 
quoted in §3.2.2 above). The usual response, we saw, is to say that the context 
twists the explanation out of ideal shape, but its explanatoriness is still dependent 
on the ideal. But what is noticeable when scanning scientific journals (or even 
philosophy journals) is how little explanatory work the ideal itself is doing. 
Explanations just do not tend to follow ideal forms. When scientists argue 
between themselves about whether some account or other is explanatory, they 
simply do not refer to the philosophical literature. Their arguments are context-
based and more or less ad hoc.1 It might be replied that even if they don't refer to 
the philosophical literature, they certainly ought to; this reply is inadequate, of 
course, thanks to the lack of consensus demonstrated in §3.2.2. Because of this 
lack, scientists would have to resolve the philosophical arguments before they 
could resolve the scientific ones. 
We can give an example from AI. If an AI programmer wants an explanation of 
some cognitive capacity in order to be able to reproduce that capacity (or at least 
the overt IO behaviour associated with that capacity) in a machine, then the 
explanation that he will require will be of use only in so far as he is able to 
program the machine accordingly. A Churchlandy explanation in terms of 
neurons and brain structures, for example, would be of no use at all, since we do 
not know how to understand a computer in those terms (even if we so understood 
the brain). Hence the eliminativist 'explanation' is no explanation at all — not 
even an ideal one — in this context, even if it is explanatory in other contexts. I 
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simply cannot progress from brain-descriptions to computer-system-
specifications. In the context of AI, if I can go from the explanation to code, then 
that is all I require. Anything else is a waste of time — and, in the case of 
industrial applications, money. Now, what the AI programmer actually does is 
philosophically interesting (i.e. the provision of accounts of cognitive capacities 
for AI programmers is a legitimate field of philosophical study). So, were it the 
case that these Churchlandy explanations were proven to be ideal on some top 
down account, there would be an 'explanatory' practice (AI programmers asking 
for 'explanations' of cognitive capacities) which was ignored by the philosophy 
of explanation. 
To summarize the third reason, the idea is that there is a scientific practice which 
merits attention, and we have agreed in Chapter One that the philosophy of 
science can plausibly investigate science via a study of science (as opposed to 
investigating it via epistemology, or logic, of the philosophy of language). This 
bottom up style of philosophy is not the only legitimate style, of course, but it is 
a legitimate style. To crystallize the point, imagine a situation where, somehow, 
a top down theorist actually came up with the correct account of explanation. 
We can ignore the question of how we would recognize such an account. If there 
were a sustainable philosophical consensus on the matter, and if scientists 
themselves adopted the practice, then all three of our reasons for rejecting the top 
down route would be undercut — and this would be all well and good; the 
philosophical task would be much easier. However, if there were no 
philosophico-scientific consensus, the last two reasons would stand; the first 
would not, of course (since, although there would still be no consensus, we are 
assuming that there is a correct approach, however we would recognize it). The 
gist of the third reason would be that there is a practice — call it imperfect-
explanation — which clearly differs from explanation proper. That practice still 
needs a philosophical account; the third reason for rejecting top down 
approaches holds that actual practice should be analysed philosophically, even if 
it is imperfect in important ways. The second reason shows that the top down 
account, though it explains explanation, does not explain imperfect-explanation, 
and hence that we must still examine the actual imperfect practice if we are to 
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3.2.5  Two Top Down Responses 
A top down theorist might wish to respond to these three reasons in two ways. 
Firstly, he may wish to make a countercharge against the relevant scientific 
methodology (in our example, AI methodology) in some specific way 
conditional on the actual state of affairs with respect to scientific (psychological) 
explanation. If it turned out that eliminativism was correct and any correct 
explanation of behaviour should simply bypass the propositional attitudes, then 
all the AI complaint shows is that the architectures upon which AI is being 
performed are inappropriate to the task. The proper task of AI, it then turns out, 
is to develop architectures that are compatible with the correct explanations in 
the new vocabulary (e.g. neuronally-based architectures). Then the correct 
explanations would be easily exploitable in the new architecture. It is obviously 
the case that a von Neumann architecture is likely to be inadequate for 
implementing models that don't exploit the propositional attitudes; hence the 
correct response of AI is to develop architectures that aren't inadequate in this 
way. In other words, the correct type of explanation will suggest methodological 
directions. 
This top down theorist, then, would give the following rebuttals to our three 
reasons. Reason 1, the lack of consensus, is simply uninteresting; one account is 
right, and it is your responsibility to find it. Reason 2, the lack of ability to 
explain actual practice if it departs from the ideal, can be dismissed on the 
ground that the ideal is a normative concept. The criticism is, in effect, correct, 
but can be rejected because the purpose of top down explanations of explanation 
is to provide an account of what scientific activity should be performed. 
Scientists may well do all kinds of strange things, but that is their affair. Reason 
3 is rejected on similar grounds. 
The flaw in this response is clear given our discussion in Chapter One. In the 
first place — to continue with the AI example — it is ludicrous to suggest that 
AI projects should wait (a) until the disputes between the various luminaries in 
the philosophy of mind, Dennett, Fodor, Churchland and Churchland, Block, 
Putnam, Dretske, Searle etc. etc. are settled, and (b) given the settlement of that 
dispute, until psychologists have started producing explanations of the requisite 
type. The dispute in the philosophy of mind shows every sign of going on for 
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is not clear how long it will take even for a suitable psychological vocabulary to 
be agreed upon, never mind for an explanation to be produced. 
In the second place, if a new architecture did have to be developed for AI, this 
would delay any current project even further. The discipline, which has had 
some success, is in place. It is all very well to try to persuade AI projects to take 
a more sound line psychologically, but if that entails a total, fundamental rethink, 
then it is unlikely that one would sound very persuasive. The most efficient way 
for philosophers to interact with AI is for philosophers to take note of what AI 
actually does and needs, as we showed in Chapter One. 
In the third place, the top down reply assumes that the purpose of AI is to build 
people. This, as we argued in Chapter One, is false. AI attempts to program 
machines to perform tasks for which intelligence is generally required. Relevant 
parameters for any particular project will include the cheapness and the 
simplicity of the architecture. What any AI project will actually need is a well-
known architecture which can be programmed easily. Hence, if I wish to build, 
say, a KBS for a corporation, then I should be as prepared to run it on a 
Macintosh as I would be to run it on a connectionist architecture. Even if the 
result of the discussion in the philosophy of mind were a clear indication that the 
architecture of the human brain was of a particular type, then all that indicates is 
that the processes and algorithms used in the human brain would fail to run with 
the same efficiency on any different artificial architecture, and hence, that there 
would be no point in using them on such architectures. The context of AI 
provides overriding reasons for requiring accounts of a particular nature, whether 
or not they are ideal in some philosophical sense or not. 
Note also that the discipline of AI1 doesn't really have much of an interest in the 
provision of psychological explanations (if psychological explanation is defined 
in a top down way as some particular practice such as giving neuronally-based 
accounts). AI requires that programs be built that run in real time — there is not 
much point using a computer as an investigative tool if you cannot get such 
programs. If the only way for AI to be of psychological interest entails that 
functioning programs can't be developed, then AI will not be of psychological 
interest. This top down view will tend to make the relationship between AI and 
psychology problematic. On the other hand, the bottom up view is much less 
uptight about what is psychologically explanatory. For instance, the conceptual 
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models we will be discussing in Chapter Five are psychologically explanatory 
(we shall argue) even though their primary purpose is to enable the development 
of a type of industrial technology. 
The second top down response to the arguments in this subsection would be to 
bite the bullet and say simply that AI, if its interests preclude the use of the 
actual, true, correct, ideal explanation of the desired behaviour, is therefore not 
interested in psychological explanations. What the AI community wants is not 
explanation, but description, or specification: it is not an explanatory discipline 
but an engineering discipline. This response is a more realistic one than the first, 
though still not decisive in the top down direction. 
In the first place, note that, as a defence of top down accounts of explanation in 
science as a whole, this response must be generalizable. AI is not the only field 
which has been taken to be explanatory, but which is likely to be dismissed as 
non-explanatory on some top down views; others might include medicine and 
meteorology. All these disciplines have imperatives other than simple 
description. If this response is to succeed as a general defence of top down 
accounts of explanation, the considerations set out in the previous paragraph 
about AI must carry over to all other disciplines which are deemed non-
explanatory counterintuitively. Let us suppose that they do, for the sake of 
argument: does the response succeed? 
What the AI community really wants is answers to questions, and, moreover, 
answers with particular properties. Whether these are called explanations or 
descriptions seems to be unimportant, as far as progress in the discipline itself is 
concerned. However, philosophically, if it turned out that the answers provided 
in AI were acceptable as explanations on the bottom up view, then this top down 
response would fail to establish its claim, though equally this would be no 
particular proof of the falsity of the top down claim. All that would have been 
demonstrated is that the two approaches are incompatible in the absence of a top 
down consensus. We would simply have two differing accounts of explanation, 
under one of which AI dealt in explanations, which it wouldn't under the other. 
But it would also have to be noted that psychology won't necessarily issue the 
ideal explanations on the top down view, whereas the bottom up view at least is 
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What the AI community (or at least that portion of the community with which 
we are concerned) is interested in is a model of the expertise to be used in a 
system, as described in Chapter Two. We will attempt to show that these models, 
on a bottom up view, do function as explanations of the expertise to be modelled 
by a system. In the next section, we shall sketch a bottom up view as an 
indication of the sorts of factor that are of interest in the purpose-relative 
evaluation of an explanation. I do not intend to argue strongly for any detailed 
position; what I want to suggest is that it is at least prima facie possible that an 
account of explanation can be given which respects local practices and is 
sensitive to the requirements of particular disciplines and projects. 
3.3  A Bottom Up Account of Explanation 
The bottom up view of explanation is likely to have a lot in common with 
pragmatic views. However, what constitutes a pragmatic account of explanation 
has been an area of dispute (van Fraassen 1980; Achinstein 1984; Kitcher and 
Salmon 1987; Lipton 1990). For our purposes, we can take Hempel's discussion 
of the pragmatic character of explanation as a pretty straightforward and 
defensible account. 
In a pragmatic context, we might say, for example, that a given 
account A explains fact X to person P1. We will then have to bear in 
mind that the same account may well not constitute an explanation of 
X for another person P2, who might not even regard X as requiring an 
explanation, or who might find the account A unintelligible, or 
unilluminating, or irrelevant to what puzzles him about X. 
 
Explanation in this pragmatic sense is thus a relative notion: 
something can be significantly said to constitute an explanation in 
this sense only for this or that individual. 
(Hempel 1965, p.425) 
 
So a pragmatic account of explanation will need to specify, for a particular 
individual (or group of individuals), what will count as an explanation. This 
specification constitutes the pragmatic element of the account. 
However, note that this does not in itself ensure the equivalence of pragmatic 
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use top down methods to determine the pragmatic element of the account. For 
example, in van Fraassen's account, his relevance relation R does most of the 
pragmatic work (1980, p.143). The relation determines what answers will be 
suitably relevant to the problem to be explained. It is clear that one could, in a 
particular case, decide on a relevance relation by a priori thinking (i.e. top 
down), or by bottom up study of actual explanatory practice. Similarly, 
Achinstein's account relativizes explanations to audiences via the notion of 
appropriate instructions (1983, p.113), and again these could be drafted in a top 
down or a bottom up way. 
Conversely, we note that it is possible — though not likely — that a bottom up 
account might result in, say, the discovery that the deductive-nomological 
account is the correct account of explanation. This could happen if study of all 
areas of explanatory endeavour revealed that they all actually used (successfully 
and exclusively) D-N explanation. Of course, this would still contradict the 
Hempelian account in that it would still be possible for the Hempelian account to 
be false in some unanalysed (or imaginary) areas. A more plausible 'coming 
together' of a bottom up account with a top down account might be some 
discipline-relative discovery such as, for example, explanation in physics is 
deductive-nomological. 
The converse is not really important here; the main lesson is that we cannot 
simply choose an off-the-shelf pragmatic account and apply it, and be sure of 
having respected our bottom up intentions. What we should do is allow the 
account to apply to any putatively explanatory practice. This will have the effect 
of being very inclusive — however, if someone wants to claim that a practice is 
explanatory, the onus is on him to show how the practice is explanatory, and in 
what contexts. We need to know about these contexts, and what the basis for the 
explanation of the explanandum is. Once we know about this sort of item, we are 
able to judge the quality of the explanation. 
Therefore the account of the explanatory practice should include details that 
enable us to make that judgement. The purpose of this thesis is not to deliver an 
account of explanation; hence we will not be supplying an exhaustive list of such 
details. However, details of the following would seem to be important for the 
judgement of the quality of an explanation. When we come to evaluate the 
explanatoriness of conceptual models in Chapter Five, we shall measure them 
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1. The value of the explanation should be relativized to the audience. The 
audience will require the explanation as a basis for scientific understanding, as 
discussed in §3.1.1. Hence the explanation should enable, as far as possible, the 
audience to achieve the type of scientific understanding that is characteristic of 
their particular science. In other words, a characterization of the audience's 
requirements is essential if the value of an explanation is to be assessed. Of 
course, these requirements should be characterized bottom up.  
The articulation of the explanation should, all things being equal, involve a 
change of state for the audience. This requirement might be phrased as the 
audience should come to understand the explanandum, although there may be 
circumstances in which an explanation fails to achieve this goal. Basically, 
though, whatever account of understanding is given, what should generally 
follow is that the audience, after hearing/reading/apprehending the explanation, 
is nearer to being able to perform the action for which the explanation is required 
than it was before. The audience should be interested in an explanation of the 
explanandum in the proffered form, and furthermore the proffered form is a form 
which is appropriate for the audience's interests. 
2. Generally speaking, the explanation should be true. However, this is not 
always the case; what is more important is that a good explanation should 
increase our understanding of the domain. Good approximations could be OK 
(Newtonian mechanics should be OK as a basis for explanations of the medium-
sized physical world, for example, despite their being strictly false). Secondly, 
sometimes even good approximations don't do the trick. It may be the case that 
in some context, only a very crude and obviously false model will enable 
scientists to explain outcomes, either because the modelled system is too 
complex or chaotic to be accurately modelled, or because an accurate model 
would be computationally intractable (Morton 1993). Note how the notion of 
computational intractability automatically relativizes what is explanatory to a 
time — what is computationally tractable will depend on the current state of 
computational technology (e.g. some arithmetic problems would have been 
intractable using Roman numerals or systems without a zero). Thirdly, it might 
be the case that what is genuinely explanatory about an explanation turns out to 
be some fruitful metaphor (Hoffman 1980, 1985). An example here might be the 
explanation of how enzymes work by saying that they are catalysts. This is 
literally false, and not even approximately true. The operation of enzymes is 
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which speeds up a chemical reaction while itself remaining unaffected. Finally, it 
might be that arguments about truth and falsity get bypassed. As an example of 
this we might include psychoanalytic explanations. The basis for these 
explanations has long been disputed, quite rightly in my opinion, but sometimes 
at least the explanations (= diagnoses) do turn out to be helpful for the patient, in 
which case their value ought not to be viewed as somehow dependent on the 
resolution of a century-long philosophical dispute. Setting out precise limits for 
the allowability of literally false explanations is beyond the scope of this thesis, 
but there should be some leeway.  
Basically, what is required in any account of an explanatory practice is that the 
claims made in the practice be evaluated for truth/approximate truth/fruitfulness, 
etc.. In the case where the explanation is not true, what the explanation does (i.e. 
how it provides understanding) needs to be set out very clearly. 
3. It should be clear how the explanans relates to the explanandum. Certain 
minimal claims should be made about how the explanans results in the 
explanandum, and about the responsibility that the explanans has for the 
explanandum. We obviously want to rule out examples like the flagpole and its 
shadow (in the general case, while leaving it open that in some strange context, 
the usual explanatory order may be reversed). What I mean by saying that the 
claims need to be minimal is that it may turn out that a claim about the 
connection is stronger than required for the explanation to succeed for an 
audience; in that case the claim need not be made. For example, suppose United 
lose a football match, and I wish to explain the defeat for the purpose of picking 
next week's team. Then I may claim that Bannister is to blame, because his own 
goal was the single cause of the defeat. However, all I need to claim is that his 
presence was a contributory factor to the defeat. Or, for another example, I may 
explain someone's actions by their beliefs. All I need to show there is that the 
beliefs made a difference to the performance of the actions, not the stronger 
claim that a neural analogue of the belief has some causal connection to some 
appropriate set of macro-events in the real world. The explanation of the action 
by belief should not be dependent on the proof of the more controversial 
philosophical claim. 
4. It should be clear exactly what the import of the explanandum is, i.e. the 
contrastive element (cf. Lipton 1990) should be clear, and furthermore the 
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5. It should be shown how the account might fail to be explanatory (i.e. an 
explanation should be defeasible). We can phrase this condition as the condition 
that the explanation be contentful. For example, it should not be the case that 
everything is an explanation (Kitcher and Salmon 1987). Neither should it be the 
case that the audience can simply decide (in unprincipled fashion) what counts as 
an explanation (Lewis 1986). 
6. Notice should be taken of what is explained in a particular context and why. 
For example, van Fraassen (1980) maintains that every explanation is an answer 
to a why-question. However, this would seem to be clearly false. Answers to 
other questions (e.g. 1, How could this possibly have happened? or 2, How did 
this actually happen?) would seem to be explanatory, but it would be difficult to 
convert these questions into why-questions. Van Fraassen himself has an abstract 
theory of why-questions (1980, pp.141-6), and such questions as (1) and (2) 
could be expressed in his theory. But it is, I think, stretching the point to say that 
his theory is an analysis of why-questions (and not an analysis of how-questions, 
etc.).1 Furthermore, sometimes explanations are required which are not answers 
to questions at all. Physicists may want an explanation of the atom; linguists may 
want an explanation of medieval Spanish; Americans may want an explanation 
of the lbw law. In each case, though the ignorance of those who require the 
explanations may prompt questions, it seems to be clear that something more 
than answers to those questions is required. Recall that explanations should 
supply understanding; recall also that understanding is a relatively rich concept 
which should be distinguished from the narrow concepts of 'understanding-why' 
which some philosophers of science favour (cf Cooper 1994, n.2). 
Point 1 takes on board Achinstein's (1983) point about the importance of an 
audience's understanding of an explanation — though note that we have still 
remained neutral over the process/product distinction here (recall from §3.1.2 
                                                 
1A why-question is defined by van Fraassen as a triple containing the topic (which, if the 
question is "why E?" is E), the contrast class (a set of other possibilities containing E, such that 
only E is true), and the relevance relation R. An answer A is relevant to the question when A 
bears relation R to the topic and the contrast class. So if I want an answer to the question How 
could E possibly have happened? then I am looking for an explanation of the occurrence of a 
freak event, whereas if I ask How did E, as a matter of fact, occur? then I want the actual cause 
of E. I may well want different answers for the two questions, even if E remains constant over 
the two cases. In the first case, what I want is an indication that the probability of E was non-zero 
(even if not very high); in the second case, what I want is the cause of E. Hence in the first case, 
the van Fraassen why-question is as follows. The topic is 'Pr(E) > 0'. The other member of the 
contrast class is 'Pr(E) = 0'. The relevance relation is 'derivable using probability theory'. In the 
second case, the topic is E, the contrast class is {E, not-E}, and the relevance relation is that of 
cause to effect. In other words, the account appears to be an analysis of questions in general, not 
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that Achinstein, unusually, favoured the act of explanation over the product). 
Point 2 directly contradicts the common requirement for explanations to be true 
(e.g. Hempel 1965; Lewis 1986) — although it leaves it open that, accidentally, 
all explanations turn out to be true. Point 3 in effect is asking for a specification 
of something like van Fraassen's relevance relation, although how that relation is 
specified should be a bottom up process. Point 4 is a common requirement (van 
Fraassen 1980; Lipton 1990). Point 5 respects Kitcher and Salmon's point (1987, 
p.314) that, if one is not careful, the relevance relation might turn out to be 
vacuous. We should show how the relevance relation is determined, and how a 
relation determined in that way will tend to bring instrumental scientific 
understanding to the appropriate audience. Point 6 is a requirement for a 
specification of something like van Fraassen's notion of a topic, or Hempel's 
explanandum. However, we remain neutral on the question of whether such 
topics/explananda are necessarily linguistic. 
3.4  Causal and Non-Causal Explanation 
The main task of this chapter is now completed, and a positive view of 
explanation has been sketched. The final issue with which we are concerned with 
respect to scientific explanation is that of causal and non-causal explanation. We 
shall begin by attempting to show that this is a genuine distinction in scientific 
explanation; then we shall look at a particular type of non-causal explanation, 
normative explanation. Thirdly we revisit causal explanation, and close with a 
discussion about program explanation; the idea there being to show various 
different ways in which an explanation can be causal. The ideas in this section 
will become important when we discuss the type of explanation provided by a 
conceptual model in §5.3. 
3.4.1 Non-Causal  Explanation 
It is not uncontroversial to say that it is possible that explanations can be non-
causal. Bas van Fraassen, for one, (1980, p.124) denies it. However, that claim is 
a rather general one, since he spends little time discussing when and how a 
relation can be causal, and seems, in effect, to define causal relations circularly 
as relations invoked in scientific explanation. However, other thinkers do have 
non-trivial accounts of causation on the basis of which they claim that there are 
no non-causal explanations. For example, Lewis's main thesis is that to give an 
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history; he therefore is prepared to spend time reinterpreting apparent cases of 
non-causal explanation as causal (1986, pp.188-92). Salmon too has a non-
circular account of causation, on which he claims that scientific understanding is 
the process of coming to see how an event was produced by the various causal 
mechanisms by which the world works (1984, pp.132, 242-59). 
Naturally, these top down approaches to causal explanation do not sit very well 
with our bottom up premiss. The only ground we will accept for the assertion 
that all explanations are causal will be the empirical discovery that all 
explanations are in fact causal, or that the practice has built into it the 
assumption that the explanations it provides are causal. We will not lightly 
accept an account that insists on a priori grounds alone that scientific 
understanding is identical with appreciation of the causal antecedents of an 
event; recall our instrumental view of understanding from §3.1.1. All the types 
of understanding that we set out in that section need some philosophical 
explanation (cf §3.2.4) and even if we insist that the term 'scientific explanation' 
applies only to the sorts of explanation countenanced by Lewis or Salmon, there 
clearly is some other practice going on that is similar to explanation in the 
restricted sense, and which isn't necessarily concerned with causal relations to 
the exclusion of other types of relation. 
In fact, there is a simple argument that shows that non-causal explanation does 
exist, an argument used by Peter Achinstein (1983, pp.235-7) and David-Hillel 
Ruben (1990, pp.218-22). The basic premiss for the argument is that nothing can 
cause itself (or at least that there are many things such that they do not cause 
themselves, and which are explanatory in the way required for the argument). 
Since the argument is sound, we may as well borrow Ruben's summary of it. 
Causation ... must be a relation between two distinct existences. Since 
there are cases of empirical explanation in which there are not two 
distinct (or even different) existences that figure in the explanans and 
the explanandum, it follows that there are some cases of non-causal 
explanation. ... 
 
In its simplest form, we can sometimes explain why some particular, 
a, has property P by identifying P with a property, Q, which a also 
has. ... Achinstein argues that identity explanations cannot be a 
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property P can't cause the having or acquiring of property Q, if P = Q. 
It makes no difference to my argument whether these identities are 
metaphysically necessary or contingent. 
 
Temperature = mean kinetic energy (for some temperature t and some 
mke m, having temperature t  =  having constituent molecules with 
mke m). I can explain a gas's having a certain temperature t by its 
constituent molecules having mean kinetic energy m, and I can 
explain a change in a gas's temperature by a change in the mean 
kinetic energy of its constituent molecules. We explain in these cases, 
not just by laws of the coexistence of two types of phenomena, but by 
property or type-type identities. This kind of explanation, relying as it 
does on identities, cannot be assimilated to causal explanation. 
(Ruben 1990, pp.218-9) 
 
The existence of identity explanation — and it seems clear that the gas's 
temperature  is scientifically explained as Ruben maintains — means that 
scientific explanation need not be causal. The standard sort of reply to this point 
is that there is a species of causal explanation going on here: the fact that the 
temperature has a certain value will result in various effects and it is these effects 
that are explained causally by the mean kinetic energy of the relevant molecules. 
This can be accepted, without compromising the main thrust of the argument 
which is that mke is explaining temperature, not the effects of temperature. The 
main point stands, which is that inter-theoretic reduction is often explanatory, 
and is itself not a sub-species of causal explanation. Hence non-causal 
explanations are possible. 
3.4.2 Normative  Explanation 
Having established that there are non-causal explanations, the next question is 
what types of non-causal explanation there are. This is not a question that we 
need answer in full in this thesis; all we need to do is to set out the type of non-
causal explanation in which we will be interested. That type is normative 
explanation. 
An explanation is normative when it sets out the norms for performance of a 
particular task. This is clearly a non-causal type of explanation, in that norms do 
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followed or not. Because norms are basically guidelines for action, clearly most 
normative explanation will be psychological (although one could imagine 
normative explanations of animal behaviour). Hence a practice will be defined 
by norms, and actual behaviour explained by showing how it conforms to norms. 
For example, in football, the offside trap is governed by norms of successful 
behaviour. The idea of an offside trap is that, fractionally before a long through 
ball is played from midfield to the strikers, the opposing defenders run away 
from the goal they are defending, thereby leaving the strikers in an offside 
position, which wins the defenders a free kick. At a given signal, then, it is the 
defenders' job to run forward. Hence, the question "why did the defenders run 
from the goal they were defending?" can be answered with reference to the 
norms governing the offside trap. Their apparently strange behaviour (leaving 
the strikers alone in possession of the ball near their goal) can be given a 
normative explanation by giving their tactics. Note that the behaviour is 
explained whether or not it succeeded in conforming to the norms; offside traps 
are often unsuccessful, yet even so, the defenders' moving out is still explained 
by the norms of the offside trap. The normative explanation explains the 
behaviour by telling us what the point of the behaviour was. It provides a 
justification for the behaviour. 
That example was not an example of a scientific explanation, but normative 
explanations can be found in science too. A large part of linguistics is devoted to 
the study of linguistic norms. In anthropology, norms govern a number of 
practices. Economics is largely concerned with the norms governing rational 
behaviour and attempts to increase marginal utility; ditto game theory. 
The basic structure of a normative explanation is that the behaviour to be 
explained, B, whose purpose is the achievement of goal G, is shown to be an 
instance of a practice P. P is described by norms, which are shown to be the (or 
a) way to achieve G. Then B is explained by pointing out that it was performed 
to achieve G, and that it conformed to P, and P is the way to achieve G. So, in 
our example, we say that the defenders wanted to catch the forwards offside, so 
they ran away from their own goal — that's how you catch forwards offside. 
Hence, normative explanation is generally appropriate in a context where it 
makes sense to assume some sort of design or purpose is at work. For example, 
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realistic than the theory of imperfect competition, is argued to be of greater use 
(Friedman 1953). The theory relies on a small number of unlikely assumptions 
about rational individuals and their dealings in a society of like-minded others; it 
sets out norms of rational behaviour (e.g. all things being equal, a consumer will 
consume a good until the marginal utility of consumption of a unit of the good 
falls to zero). It seems pretty clear that such a view is untenable as a causal 
description of individual consumers in a society (Sen 1976-7; Simon 1983). Yet 
these norms do explain certain types of behaviour, both at the macro- and the 
micro-level. At the macro-level, they allow explanations on a national scale to be 
given, since, in theory at least, economies behave as if they are aggregates of 
individual consumers all of whom behave perfectly rationally. At the micro-
level, certain types of behaviour, which conform to the norms of rational 
behaviour, are thereby explained — why did A do X? Because it was the rational 
thing to do. The norms of rational behaviour need not have been followed 
reflectively by A, only that A's behaviour conformed to them. 
Another example of normative explanation might be the explanation of animal 
behaviour as governed by norms. For instance, the flocking behaviour of birds 
might be explained by the role it plays in defence (i.e. birds in a flock are much 
more likely to detect predators — since only one bird out of the whole flock need 
perform the detection — than a single bird), food gathering and possibly 
migration. This is a normative explanation — that is the point of having the 
whole flock move and behave in the way that it does. But these norms need be of 
no relevance to the direct causal explanation of the flocking behaviour. Realistic 
flocking behaviour of birds can be simulated by giving a group of artificial 
agents a small number of local norms and rules. Hence each agent reacts only to 
the behaviour of its near neighbours. Yet highly complex patterns of actual avian 
flock behaviour that seem, to the untutored eye, to involve an extraordinary 
degree of coordination between the individuals concerned, can be produced by 
these small sets of local rules. Clearly, this is not (necessarily) a causal 
explanation of actual avian flocking, since there is no evidence as yet that 
mechanisms of the appropriate type are instantiated in flocking birds. But what it 
does show is that the complex group behaviour can in fact be produced by 
aggregates of agents which only respond to local conditions. And this means 
that, until the causal explanation of avian flocking behaviour is discovered, we 
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A third example comes from linguistics; the linguistic norms appropriate for a 
natural language like English will explain utterances in English. But these clearly 
can't be the (whole) causal story, since relatively few utterances, particularly in 
spoken English, conform wholly to those norms. The norms of English provide a 
'goal' for speakers of English; most utterances will fall short of that goal by not 
being grammatically correct, etc., but the norms are still explanatory in a number 
of circumstances. 
A fourth example might be the use of a normative explanation as justificatory. 
What a normative explanation can do is to set of the (or a) 'right' way of 
performing a task. So, what the explanation might say would look like "given 
input I, you perform subtasks S, T, ..., and then you get output O." This would 
justify someone's actions who had performed the task, having got output O from 
input I, even if that particular series of subtasks had not been followed exactly. 
Note that these examples show that normative explanations need not be causal 
explanations too; in this respect, they are different from Philip Pettit's notion of a 
normalizing explanation (1986). A normalizing explanation, for Pettit, though 
normative — making ineliminable reference to norms — is also causal (1986, 
p.21). The norms are to be taken as providing a hint as to the causal antecedents 
of the behaviour. This is certainly possible (see §5.3 below), but not necessary 
for a normative explanation. For example, if Pettit's normalizing explanation 
were the only type of normative explanation, the 'explanation' of bird flocking 
behaviour would not (as yet) be an explanation, since it has not been proven that 
such norms are causally active in birds. But it seems clear that flocking has been 
explained (i.e. how it is possible in the absence of occult processes has been 
explained) by the computer simulations. 
3.4.3 Causal  Explanation 
Finally, we move on to causal explanation. A causal explanation is quite 
straightforward. We have a causal explanation of the explanandum when the 
explanans is the (a) cause of the explanandum. The explanation must make clear 
which property of the explanans is causally relevant. For example, take two 
billiard balls colliding. The first was motionless before the second hit it. The 
second billiard ball is the cause of the first billiard ball's ending up in the pocket. 
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ball is the causally relevant one.1 After all, the second billiard ball is 93,000,000 
miles from the Sun, yet that is not a causally relevant factor. What is causally 
relevant is the momentum of the second ball. 
Note that this account is independent of which particular account of causation is 
preferred. It will work with van Fraassen's wide notion of cause, or Salmon's 
tightly defined notion, or even an interpretivist view of causation (Child 1994). 
However, there is a problem with causal explanations, which has been set out by 
Jackson and Pettit (1988, 1990, 1992). 
The problem is a simple one; if one is giving a causal explanation of an effect, 
then one way to give it is to give the causally efficacious property of the cause. 
For example, if an explanation is required of why the glass broke, the causally 
efficacious property is that of the glass's having a certain molecular structure. 
Now the problem arises if the further assumption is made that giving a causal 
explanation is to give the causally efficacious property. Because it seems that 
there will be apparent cases of causal explanations which do not give the 
causally efficacious property. For example, one might explain why the glass 
broke by saying that it was fragile. The purported explanation is true; on the 
other hand, the fragility is not the causally efficacious property (Jackson and 
Pettit 1990, pp.108-11). Recall that we have defined a causal explanation as 
giving a causally relevant property of the explanans; the further assumption in 
our terms, then, would involve the assertion that the only way for a property to 
be causally relevant is for it to be causally efficacious. 
It turns out to be too restrictive a notion of causal explanation if causal relevance 
equals causal efficacy. Is there an independently motivated account of causal 
relevance that will get round Jackson and Pettit's problem? Can we have a 
ground for saying that the fragility of the glass is causally relevant to its 
breaking? 
3.4.4 Program  Explanation 
We can have such a ground, with Jackson and Pettit's notion of a program 
explanation. In such explanations, the causally relevant but non-efficacious 
                                                 
1It might, of course, be complete if what is required by the explanation is an indication of which 
body caused the ball to move, as opposed to an indication of how the second ball caused the first 
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property is relevant precisely because it ensures that there will have been one of 
a group of causally efficacious properties realized in the explanans. 
The realization of the property ensures — it would have been enough 
to have made it suitably probable — that a crucial productive 
property is realized and, in the circumstances, that the event, under a 
certain description, occurs. The property-instance does not figure in 
the productive process leading to the event but it more or less ensures 
that a property-instance which is required for the process does figure. 
A useful metaphor for describing the role of the property is to say that 
its realization programs for the appearance of the productive property 
and, under a certain description, for the event produced. The analogy 
is with a computer program which ensures that certain things will 
happen — things satisfying certain descriptions — though all the 
work of producing those things goes on at a lower, mechanical level. 
(Jackson and Pettit 1990, p.114) 
 
Hence the fragility of the glass programs for a molecular structure such that the 
glass will break when struck. Knowing that the glass is fragile does not tell us 
which molecular structure we have — we know that there is a large, probably 
infinite, series of molecular structures which it could have given its fragility, but 
we do not know which one. The fragility is causally relevant, though non-
efficacious, since the glass's being fragile will ensure (make probable) that it has 
a molecular structure which will be causally efficacious in destroying the glass 
when struck. Hence the fragility will causally explain the glass's breakage, 
despite not being causally efficacious. 
Note that we need not know which property is causally efficacious in such cases; 
we need not know even roughly. All we need to know is that the program 
property will make probable the claim that there will be some causally 
efficacious property of the required type. Further, it need not be the case that 
there actually is some causally efficacious property. If there was a downward 
sequence of levels of explanation (e.g. psychological, biochemical, chemical, 
physical, atomic, subatomic, ...), then a program explanation would tell us how 
the explanatory property of the explanans programs for some property at a lower 
level, which would itself program for the explained effect, and so on. Hence, 
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Indeed, since we do have causal explanations, and since we reach causally 
efficacious properties so very rarely (if ever), unless there are other ways to be 
causally relevant to an effect, we must have program explanations extremely 
frequently in science. For example, there will be a number of explanations for 
the various effects of the comet Shoemaker-Levy 9 on Jupiter; it is inconceivable 
that any will be in terms of particular atomic particles (say) of either body. This 
is strong circumstantial evidence for the usefulness of program explanations.  128 
Chapter Four: Psychological Explanation 
In this chapter, we will examine the idea of explanation in psychology. Because 
we have taken the view that the value of an explanation is relative to its context, 
it may well turn out that there will be aspects of psychological explanation which 
depend, not on properties of explanation as such, but on properties of the 
particular types of explanation used in psychology. The explanations in which 
we are interested, conceptual models, are information processing models, and so 
we should examine the general explanatory pedigree of information processing 
models in psychology. In particular, we shall attempt to distinguish a range of 
ways in which such models can be explanatory. This will establish the possibility 
that conceptual models can be explanatory of the expertise they model; we will, 
of course, still have to examine such models and their context of use very 
carefully to establish whether or not they actually are explanatory (this will be 
the business of Chapter Five). 
The first thing we should note about the psychological explanations in which we 
are interested in this thesis is that they are specifically scientific explanations. It 
may be that our general discussion of scientific explanation will generalize to the 
non-scientific case. Or, it may be that scientific psychological explanation and 
non-scientific psychological explanation are continuous with each other. In 
either event, our ruminations may well apply to ordinary, common-sense folk-
psychological explanations (such as he wants South Korea to beat Germany 
because he always goes for the underdog). On the other hand, if there is a 
discontinuity, or if our discussion will not generalize, then our claims will not 
apply to folk psychology. But we will leave that issue unaddressed — when we 
talk of explanations, we shall only be referring explicitly to explanations in 
scientific psychology. 
4.1  Computational Models in Psychology 
What is noticeable in scientific psychology is how often computational models 
get used for explanatory purposes. Our aim in this section is to justify the 
practice of explanation using such models. This will not, of course, entail that 
conceptual models in particular are explanatory in the context in which they are 
typically used. The remainder of this chapter can then be devoted to examining 
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The first question we have to ask is why computational/information processing 
models are used at all. The answer to that is, I think, that computational models 
allow a position that seemed impossible prior to their introduction. Psychology, 
being a science, involves a number a characteristically scientific imperatives: the 
maintenance of objectivity, the repeatability of experiments, the discovery of 
mechanisms. That is not to say that the adoption of these imperatives is either 
necessary or sufficient for a discipline to be given the status of 'scientific', only 
that these are fairly natural imperatives for a putatively scientific discipline to 
adopt. Naturally, such imperatives are selected over time for the successes they 
bring (epistemologically by producing fruitful research programmes; 
pragmatically by bringing in research funding). 
Because of these imperatives, the use of folk psychological techniques is 
effectively ruled out. Asking people why they do things, for example, would be 
ruled out by all three imperatives: objectivity would be replaced by subjectivity; 
such questioning would not be strictly repeatable unless performed under 
laboratory conditions; folk psychological questioning does not lead to the 
discovery of mechanism, as we know from millenia of the practice. The obvious 
candidate for a mechanism would be neurophysiological, since we know that 
there are strong and interesting connections between brain and mind. However, it 
has long been clear that, since both brain and mind are fearsomely complex, it 
will be a very long time before a great deal of important psychology can be 
deduced from the study of the brain — after important inroads in the 1960s, with 
the work of Hubel and Wiesel, and Marr, for example, the results have not come 
thick and fast. The only strictly objective psychological alternative seemed to be 
behaviourism, whose vocabulary was too attenuated to provide much of an 
advance. 
Computational models provide a middle way between these alternatives by 
focussing on the structural properties of the mind, abstracting away from the 
details of what the mechanisms actually were in order to concentrate on their 
properties (cf. Deutsch 1962). The idea is that a mechanism can be described 
more or less abstractly. So, for example, some mechanism, horribly complicated 
at the neural level, might be described at a more abstract level as recognizing an 
object as a person by comparing the shape of the object to an archetype, say. 
This, although not absolutely specific, would at least be empirically testable, and 
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What do we get with such an information processing mechanism? Well, if the 
mechanism, described in a model, is consistent with the behaviour, we get 
predictive power. If the terms of the model make sense in the context of 
behaviour, we get ways of talking about the intermediate stages of cognition in 
between stimulus and response. For example, if we had a model that 
decomposed behaviour B into a series of subprocesses B1, ..., Bn, it is legitimate 
to ask about the significance of the B1, ..., Bn. Psychological evidence can be 
adduced to support the postulation of these subprocesses, for example, by 
checking the decomposition of the model against psychological indicators such 
as reaction times, characteristic error patterns, etc.. If the evidence suggests that 
these subprocesses also have predictive power (i.e. that the decomposition of the 
model is significant, not merely its input/output structure), then we can say that 
we can understand the global behaviour in terms of the simpler behavioural 
patterns postulated by the decomposition (these simpler patterns may include 
memory recall patterns, face recognition, word identification, etc.). 
Note that, in the context of AI, these simpler mechanisms are likely to be easier 
to implement in a machine than a piece of behaviour globally described (e.g. 
identifying computer faults, reading aloud, etc.). If the mechanisms underlying 
the decomposed parts of the model are understood, then the model as a whole 
will suggest to the psychologist how the mechanism underlying the global 
behaviour might be instantiated. If psychologists can agree about a certain set of 
components (i.e. simple behaviour patterns, construed either as unanalysed IO 
patterns or as actual mechanisms) of such models, then those components might 
constitute a set of psychological primitives, categories of primitive behaviours 
for human psychology. In all these ways scientific purposes will be served, and 
therefore, on our instrumental definition of understanding (§3.1.1), scientific 
understanding achieved. In that sense, then, by providing routes to such 
understanding, computational/information processing models can be seen as 
explanatory. 
Such models are instances of functional explanations in Robert Cummins' (1975) 
sense, and are associated with the explanatory strategy of analysis. 
... the analytical strategy proceeds by analyzing a disposition d of a 
into a number of other dispositions d1 ... dn had by a or components 
of  a such that programmed manifestation of the di results in or 
amounts to a manifestation of d. Psychological Explanation    131 
(Cummins 1975, p.186) 
 
Here 'programmed' just means organized in a way that can be specified by a 
program. Cummins is clear that this is a common and fruitful strategy in 
psychology. 
Perhaps the most extensive use of the analytical strategy in science 
occurs in psychology, for a large part of the psychologist's job is to 
explain how the complex behavioural capacities of organisms are 
acquired and how they are exercised. Both goals are greatly 
facilitated by analysis of the capacities in question, for then 
acquisition of the analyzed capacity resolves itself into acquisition of 
the analyzing capacities and the requisite organization, and the 
problem of performance resolves itself into the problem of how the 
analyzing capacities are exercised. 
(Cummins 1975, p.187; cf also Cummins 1983, pp.28-51) 
 
Cummins provides a robust defence of the analytical strategy as explanatory in 
general terms (1975; 1983), and says much that is persuasive. However, our 
bottom up view means that we should look at the operation of the particular 
types of model in which we are interested in context, and judge their explanatory 
value finally on that basis (Chapter Five). 
Having established that computational models can be explanatory in psychology, 
in the remainder of this chapter we shall discuss various ways in which such 
models explain. 
4.2  Levels of Explanation 
When a model is being used for explanatory purposes, what will be explanatory 
are various properties of the model. The question now arises: which of the 
properties of the model are explanatorily relevant? A computational 
psychological theory will have a number of elements to it. There will be a set of 
primitive commands, perhaps, together with a conceptualization of the faculty to 
be explained, a conceptualization of the expected IO behaviour, and, if the 
explanation runs, a program, a computer on which it runs and a visualization of 
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elements of the theory are to be counted as having explanatory force and which 
not? 
For example, suppose I have a machine learning (ML) program which examines 
a collection of data and induces rules to connect various data items, associating a 
value with each rule on the basis of how well-confirmed that rule is in terms of 
the number of antecedent/consequent pairs of data which confirm the rule and 
the number of pairs which are anomalous. Suppose too that this program is 
intended to be psychologically explanatory. Then there will be a number of 
aspects which can be taken as explanatory or not, as the case may be. For 
example, the calculation of the confirmation value might involve some relatively 
complex calculation producing a real number between -1 (analytically false) and 
1 (analytically true). Is this calculation part of the explanation? If it is, is it 
intended to correlate closely with some calculation that people actually use in 
induction, or just to correlate very broadly (perhaps the numerical values map 
onto a small set of certainty values, such as {yes, no, maybe}), or is the formula 
just an ad hoc measure that is basically intended to cut out erroneous output. The 
program may use data structures such as lists; is this fact explanatory? A list 
might be used simply because the program is written in Lisp and lists are more 
naturally dealt with in Lisp than in, say, PASCAL. If the use of list structures is 
explanatory, then is the fact that these lists are searched by the program from left 
to right instead of right to left part of the explanation, or just an artefact of the 
program? The lists are ordered before being searched: is this fact part of the 
explanation, or is that just to speed up the search? The program will be being run 
on a certain type of computer; is this fact explanatory? Usually not, but I may be 
claiming that the brain has a certain architecture which can be modelled in some 
way by the computer (e.g. if I were running a connectionist system). 
4.2.1  Marr's Three Levels 
All these possibilities suggest that some scheme could be developed for 
classifying theories by what is explanatory in them and what is not. Marr (1982) 
first addressed this problem by suggesting three levels at which a computational 
psychological explanation could be couched. The three levels are: 
Level 1: An abstract formulation of what function is being computed by 
the explanatory model/system, and why; 
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Level 2: An algorithm for computing such a function; and 
 
Level 3: An architecture for realising such an algorithm. 
 
The level 1 explanation will specify which function is being computed in terms 
of IO relationships, but will contain no detail about how the function is 
computed. So in a functioning program which is intended to be explanatory, 
what is explanatory is the output of the program given the input (i.e. the set of 
input/output pairs). The fact that the program performed the particular set of 
operations that it did in the order in which it did is not intended to be significant. 
Neither is the fact that the program had the particular representational format that 
it had. At level 2, that sort of information (both the operations performed and the 
representation used) is important, but the details of the way that the operations 
are embodied in a functioning machine are not. At level 3, all this information is 
significant. 
So, for example, one might use our ML program as an explanation by saying 
something like: the program models inductive practice by examining a collection 
of data, inducing rules to connect various items of the data, and associating a 
value with each rule based on how well confirmed it is (in terms of the number 
of data items of which the antecedent and the consequent of each rule are both 
true, and the number of anomalies, where the antecedent of the rule is true and 
the consequent false). That would be a level 1 explanation — the explanation 
tells us what the program does without telling us how it does it. There could be 
two different rule induction programs, which, for example, might demand the 
data be given in radically different forms, but which would get the same level 1 
characterization. One might take a symbolic form, statistically inducing 'rules' or 
dependencies between attributes of data objects; the other might be a 
connectionist system which systematically alters the weightings of the 
connections between the nodes to express the likelihood of a dependency. These 
programs would clearly work in different ways; even so, the level 1 explanations 
would remain constant. 
On the other hand, the explanation of the program might go into a little more 
depth, and discuss how the data for our machine learning program have to be 
formalized in a particular way, with, say, a complex datum representing each 
real-world object under study. Each of these data will contain a number of slots, 
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attempt to induce rules about the edibility of mushrooms, it might be given a 
series of objects like 
mushroom-256 
colour: red 
edibility-raw: n 
edibility-cooked: y 
pungent: y 
bole-shape: round 
... 
 
to deal with, and will perhaps be able to induce rules such as 
all x. IF colour(x,red) THEN edibility-raw(x,n) 
 
on the basis of statistical regularities in the data. Then the explanation will go 
into the statistical tests that the program will perform on the data, and into the 
method of calculating the value it associates with each rule. This sort of 
explanation gives the algorithm which the program uses, and is an explanation at 
level 2. With an explanation at this level, it might be the case that I had two 
versions of the program, one written in Lisp, which processes list structures, and 
one written in PASCAL, which does not possess any integral list structures. In 
those circumstances, the calculations — which remain the same — and the 
manipulation of the data might well both have to be done in different ways, 
entailing that the two algorithms used in the Lisp and the PASCAL programs 
would be different. The result here would be that two different level 2 
explanations would have to be given for the same program. Finally, the 
explanation can go into the particular details of the implementation of the 
system, and will discuss how the information is carried around the chips of this 
very machine, so, for example, if I ran the program on my Macintosh IIsi, and 
again on my Sun workstation, there would be different explanations for the same 
algorithm. 
Now, what will have been noticed is that there is a way of describing the model 
— which I have termed the program — which does not seem to be equivalent to 
any of the levels. Recall that we were able to talk of there being different 
programs equivalent at level 1, and of there being two versions of the same 
program at level 2 (and a fortiori at level 3). Furthermore, as we shall discuss in 
§4.2.2, the aspects of the model described at the three levels do not seem to be as 
clearly explanatory, in the context in which we are interested, as we would like. 
Recall from §3.3 that we required of an explanation that it be appropriate for the 
purposes of the audience, among other things. The audience we have in mind in 
this thesis is the developers of KBSs. Can we say that one of the three levels will Psychological Explanation    135 
be appropriate for such an audience? There would seem to be good reasons why 
a KBS developer would not be satisfied with an account of expertise at either 
level 1, 2 or 3. 
Level 1 explanation in the context of KBS development is not likely to be very 
explanatory; a specification of the IO structure would certainly be useful, but 
more information would be required to enable the system actually to be built — 
remember it has to work in real time, and provide explanations for the user, as 
well as compute the right output. The simple IO relation would not give any help 
to the knowledge engineer as to how the output could be computed given the 
input (I am assuming that the domain was sufficiently complex that the inputs 
and outputs could not, for reasons of memory limitations, be represented as a 
look-up table). Further, the user of the system would not be content with the 
system's own explanations of its output if it gave no indication of how the output 
was arrived at. Level 2 might well be adequate — an algorithm would make 
programming comparatively trivial. Here, though, there is the problem of 
knowledge acquisition (KA). There is no known way for extracting the 
algorithms used by experts in their deliberations. Hence, although such an 
explanation could be useful if we had one, there would be extreme difficulty in 
obtaining one in most circumstances. Added to which, it might be the case that 
an algorithm that ran efficiently on a neural architecture was not so useful on an 
artificial computational architecture. The same KA considerations apply to level 
3, of course. For all these reasons, we need to go beyond Marr's analysis and 
discover a new level at which an explanation in this context should be pitched. 
4.2.2  Explanation at Level 1.5 
There certainly seems to be an exploitable gap between levels 1 and 2. Consider 
the example of the ML systems developed above. Let the four systems discussed 
be called CONNECT (the connectionist system), SYMBOLICP (the symbolic 
system programmed in PASCAL), SYMBOLICLM (the symbolic system 
programmed in Lisp and run on the Macintosh) and SYMBOLICLS (the 
symbolic system programmed in Lisp and run on the Sun). There is clearly an 
interesting level of what is going on which I have termed the program, where we 
want to say that CONNECT is one system, while SYMBOLICLM, 
SYMBOLICLS and SYMBOLICP are three aspects of another system. At this 
level, we want to group together systems which use a similar method to get 
results. So, in this example, the three systems all have in common that they Psychological Explanation    136 
describe objects in a slot/filler notation, and then use a particular set of statistical 
formulae, or methods, based on the relative frequencies of covarying data, to 
induce universally quantified rules about the domain. Yet at level 3, all three 
systems are different; at level 2 we have three systems, CONNECT, 
SYMBOLICP and a system of which SYMBOLICLM and SYMBOLICLS are 
aspects; while at level 1, we have that there is only one system, of which they are 
all aspects. How can we define an extra level where we get the desired 
granularity of explanation? 
Connectionist 
system
Symbolic 
system
Lisp  
system
PASCAL 
system
Macintosh Sun
Systems 
inducing rules 
from data LEVEL 1
LEVEL 2
LEVEL 3
Systems running 
on different 
machines
Numerically 
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Systems using 
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Figure 4.1: An Intermediate Level of Explanation 
Let us examine one such candidate for a further explanatory level, one suggested 
by Christopher Peacocke (1986). Peacocke formulates the intermediate level as 
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Consider a subject's ability to pronounce words he sees written on a 
sheet in front of him. We can fix on a given function described at 
Marr's first level, a function from inscription-types — words, say — 
to sequences of phonemes. One can conceive of three quite different 
bodies of information which might be drawn upon by the algorithm 
which computes this function. There might (a)  be a listing which 
specifies for each complete inscription-type the corresponding 
sequence of phonemes. ... There might (b)  be an algorithm which 
draws upon information about the pronunciation of sublexical 
syllables, and computes the sequence of phonemes for the whole 
word from information about phonemes corresponding to its parts. A 
third possibility (c)  is that there is an algorithm which draws on 
information about the pronunciation of a proper subset of the given 
class of whole words, and extrapolates from their pronunciation ... . 
 
These characterizations of the information drawn upon are not 
descriptions at Marr's level 2: they do not specify the particular 
algorithm employed. ... [They] are not at Marr's level 1, either. The 
same function (the 'function-in-extension') ... may be computed in 
cases (a)-(c). ... The pattern of one-many relations between Marr's 
levels is preserved when we insert level 1.5. One and the same 
function may be computed drawing on different bodies of 
information. One and the same body of information may be drawn 
upon by different algorithms. 
(Peacocke 1989, pp.111-2) 
 
So equivalence at Peacocke's new level 1.5 will depend on the two systems 
computing the same function by drawing on the same bodies of information. This 
notion of 'drawing on the same information' is one that will need to be made 
more precise; nevertheless, there is enough there to enable us to see that level 1.5 
is going to be genuinely distinct from Marr's three levels. The level is not 
equivalent to level 1, because more than the mere specification of the function is 
required; neither is it equivalent to level 2, because the explanation will involve a 
class of algorithms. Hence, in terms of our ML example, we may have found a Psychological Explanation    138 
level at which CONNECT and the three symbolic systems may be distinct, 
assuming that the connectionist system did draw on different information.1
The question is, then, is this level the level we need? What sort of information is 
required by KBS developers?2 For example, one might insist in model-based 
KBS development that a theory's ontology correspond to the ontology of the 
object system (i.e. the expert's expertise), for the reason that the target KBS must 
provide comprehensible explanations to the user. Peacocke's own pronunciation 
example implicitly accepts this possibility. The characterizations of the three 
classes of algorithm he mentioned make various assumptions about the speaker's 
phonemic ontology. Clearly it will not be the case, typically, that the speaker will 
have an overt or explicit ontology — most pronouncers of English words do not 
know what the word 'phoneme' means, of course. However, the linguistic 
researcher can home in on the correct ontology via some simple tests — seeing 
which syllables get the same pronunciation and when, for example (Peacocke 
1989, pp.112-3). Another example: in medical diagnosis, the same body of 
information may be used in a number of possible ways of diagnosing some sort 
of disease. This body of information might well be, for example, the information 
available from a series of medical testing instruments. However, a model of a 
doctor's diagnostic expertise would hope to distinguish between the various ways 
in which she uses that body of information. For example, does she abstract from 
the raw data, and, if so, what are the categories available, and what is the 
mapping between raw data and the categories? Hence, a model of medical 
diagnosis could be such that it not only specifies that the doctor uses, say, 
information about the patient's temperature in her attempt to isolate his malady 
(as opposed to, say, information about the species of the microbes in the 
bloodstream); it will also specify "how many" temperatures there are (three: 
{low, normal, high}? five: {very low, low, normal, high, very high}? ten: 
{below 34, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, above 41}?). 
                                                 
1That assumption, of course, need not be made. Peacocke himself is quite clear that level 1.5 is 
likely to group together symbolic and connectionist systems (1989, pp.122-5). However, this is 
not a serious problem — the example was for purposes of illustration. The really serious problem 
would occur if level 1.5 could not be used as a level of explanation for the purposes we are 
interested in. 
2One point that we should note here is that in the context of KBSs, the information drawn upon 
by a program is the knowledge stored in the KB — i.e. a (variable) store of information separate 
from the inference engine. It is not, however, a necessary requirement that the information used 
by any system in the scope of Peacocke's discussion be represented independently by the system. 
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The question is whether Peacocke's level 1.5 covers this sort of information; 
there is, I think, an important ambiguity in his account. Consider his level 1.5 
account of ways of computing the pronunciation of words quoted above. One of 
his level 1.5 characterizations is: 'an algorithm which draws upon information 
about the pronunciation of sublexical syllables, and computes the sequence of 
phonemes for the whole word from information about phonemes corresponding 
to its parts' (Peacocke 1989, p.112). Now, this characterization does not 
distinguish between the following three algorithms. 
[1] An algorithm that goes directly from a syllable, considered as a unit, 
to a sequence of phonemes. This algorithm might contain the 
following mappings: 
cat -> kat 
catt -> kat 
kat -> kat 
katt -> kat 
 
Here, each mapping realises a piece of information about the syllable in 
its left hand side (e.g. that the syllable 'cat' is pronounced kat). 
 
[2] An algorithm that recognized possible intermediate equivalence 
classes of syllables. This algorithm might contain the following 
mappings (where [katt] is the equivalence class of syllables 
pronounced like 'katt': 
cat -> [katt] 
catt -> [katt] 
kat -> [katt] 
katt -> [katt] 
[katt] -> kat 
 
This algorithm draws upon pieces of information such as that the 
syllables in [katt] are pronounced kat. Note that if that one piece of 
information went missing, the system would fail to generate a 
pronunciation for any of the syllables in the equivalence class; this 
gives us a handle on a possible empirical test to decide between [1] 
and [2]. 
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[3] An algorithm that, like [1], goes directly from syllable to phonemes, 
but is selective, excluding rare syllables or syllables which do not 
actually crop up in English. This algorithm might contain the 
following mappings (explicitly excluding the mapping for 'katt'): 
cat -> kat 
catt -> kat 
kat -> kat 
 
Here, given that 'katt' does not appear in English, [1] and [3] would have 
the same IO relations (and therefore would be equivalent at level 1). 
Indeed, for a given IO transition performed by both algorithms, the 
same information would be used. The difference between [1] and [3] 
is that [3] lacks a piece of information that [1] has, since [3]'s input 
domain is smaller than [1]'s. 
 
So whereas [1] and [3] simply store the mapping between syllables and 
phonemes, [2] recognises that generalizations can be made about classes of 
syllables. [2] might therefore be more flexible; it might, for example, facilitate 
the assimilation of new syllables into the scheme. But in each case, we note that 
the algorithms might fairly be described as drawing upon information about the 
pronunciation of sublexical syllables, and (ultimately, although we haven't 
suggested how they do this) computing the sequence of phonemes for the whole 
word from information about phonemes corresponding to its parts.  
Or, as another example, when Peacocke mentions a class of algorithms which 
'draw on information about the pronunciation of a proper subset of the given 
class of whole words, and extrapolate from their pronunciation', he does not 
appear to distinguish between different algorithms which have different subsets 
of canonical words, or different algorithms that use distinct similarity measures 
to make the extrapolation. But one can see that such distinctions (still above 
level 2) might also be explanatorily interesting. 
For Peacocke, the idea of an algorithm drawing upon information  
... requires that a state which carries the information drawn upon is 
causally influential in the operation of the algorithm  ...; indeed it 
requires that the algorithm ... produce states with the content they do 
in part because of the content of the information-carrying state. Psychological Explanation    141 
(Peacocke 1986, p.102) 
 
This is ambiguous as to how to specify the information carried. Peacocke 
appears to be interested in bodies of information rather than states of 
information: information about, in his example, the connection between 
phonemes and syllables, etc.. In the medical example we gave above, what we 
have at level 1.5 is information about temperature, but is discussion allowed 
about how temperature has to be be represented? A level 1.5 explanation of the 
diagnostic process would involve saying that the doctor uses information about 
the patient's temperature, and so on, to make the diagnosis — the relevant 
contrastive class is the class of algorithms where temperature is not necessarily 
used in the diagnosis. But it is clearly relevant for KBS purposes to specify how 
temperature is represented. If the 'correct' representation must be from the class 
{low, medium, high}, then it may be possible to devise a program which goes 
from the numerical representation to the diagnosis; however, if the 'correct' 
representation is numeric, it may be impossible to devise a program which goes 
from the abstracted representation to the diagnosis (i.e. the thermometer 
gradations are too coarse-grained for effective use in problem-solving). Is there a 
level 1.5 distinction between the two ways of representing temperature? 
There is clearly an ambiguity here at the least. The question is whether 
temperature(john,41) and temperature(john,fever) are level 1.5 equivalent or not. 
Clearly, different information is carried by the two expressions (the first is more 
specific than the second). On the other hand, each expression might plausibly be 
seen as conveying information about John's temperature. In that case, two 
algorithms, one of which used expressions of the first form, and the second of 
which used expressions of the second form, could be seen as drawing on the 
same body of information, viz. information about John's temperature. At 
different points in his papers, Peacocke seems to be adopting different points of 
view on this issue. This is understandable, given that his main purpose in the 
papers was to establish a contrast with level 1 and level 2 accounts. However, 
here we have accepted his thesis that there are intermediate levels between 1 and 
2, and therefore we need to resolve the ambiguity. 
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4.2.3  Explanation at Level 1.6 
We will suggest that Peacocke's work has uncovered two distinct levels of 
explanation, which we shall term level 1.5 and level 1.6. Level 1.5 is as defined 
in our long quote from Peacocke above; our interpretation of him is that he does 
not mean to distinguish between accounts with different representational 
formats. Level 1.6 is as level 1.5, with the additional constraint that different 
representations of the same body of information must be distinguished. We know 
that representational format is important at level 2, but since representational 
format is not on its own definitive of level 2, we are free to speculate that there 
are interesting levels above level 2 where we can take representational format 
into account. Hence the two expressions temperature(john,41) and 
temperature(john,fever) would be distinguished at level 1.6 and not at level 1.5. 
Our three pronunciation algorithms [1], [2] and [3] would similarly be 
distinguished at level 1.6 and not at level 1.5. Note that this definition of level 
1.6 preserves the pattern of many-one relations between the levels: a level 1 
explanation subsumes a class of level 1.5 explanations, a level 1.5 explanation 
subsumes a class of level 1.6 explanations, a level 1.6 explanation subsumes a 
class of level 2 explanations, and so on. Note also that we do not commit 
ourselves to the claim that Peacocke in his discussions of (his) level 1.5 is 
necessarily discussing (our) level 1.5 and ignoring level 1.6 — indeed, 
sometimes Peacocke writes as if it is (our) level 1.6 in which he is interested. All 
we claim is that Peacocke can be taken at various times to be writing about each 
of our levels, that the two levels are indeed distinct, and that each of the two 
levels can be explanatory. 
How can we make this definition precise? One way would be to note that what 
makes the difference between the various algorithms (strictly, classes of 
algorithms) is the ontology they use. So, whereas level 1.5 insists that we should 
draw on information about body temperature, level 1.6 adds an account of the 
temperature ontology (i.e. are temperatures real numbers, natural numbers, the 
set {low, medium, high}, etc.?). Level 1.5 insists that we draw on information 
about phonemes associated with particular syllables. Level 1.6 adds a 
specification of which syllables there are, and how various classes of syllables 
which can be treated as equivalent in this context can be isolated. Classes of 
syllables are clearly ontologically distinct from syllables themselves, and 
therefore level 1.6 makes an ontological distinction. However, information about 
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syllables (since this is the basis of the equivalence relation), and therefore level 
1.5 as we have defined it makes no such distinction. Even more clearly, level 1.5 
has no ground for making distinctions between our algorithms [1] and [3], which 
differ only in the syllables that they take as constitutive of the language. 
It will be noted that level 1.5 is rather less precise than level 1.6 — which is not 
a criticism of it, of course, since less precise accounts are often of use. Note that 
this lack of precision is inherent in level 1.5. This is not because the levels get 
less precise as we ascend through them. Level 1 (functional equivalence) is 
precise, since input/output pairs are very precisely specified. On the other hand, 
level 2 is imprecise, because of the complete lack of any agreed identity 
conditions for algorithms. Hence the precision of level 1.6 and the comparative 
lack of precision of level 1.5 follow from their definitions, and not from their 
relationships with the other levels. 
This imprecision suggests another way of resolving the ambiguity, which we can 
call the extensional move. The idea is to make level 1.5 precise. We can 
represent the information that the algorithm draws upon as a set. So the level 1 
account is a relation R, which is a set of input-output pairs. The level in between 
levels 1 and 2 is a pair, whose first element is R, and whose second element is a 
class of expressions which may be drawn upon. Hence algorithm [1] would look 
something like this: 
<{ ... <cat, kat>, <catt, kat>, <kat, kat>, <katt, kat>, ... }, { ... "E contains 
syllable 'cat'", "E contains syllable 'catt'" ... }>1
 
while algorithm [2] would be something like this: 
<{ ... <cat, kat>, <catt, kat>, <kat, kat>, <katt, kat>, ... }, { ... "E contains 
syllable 'cat'", "E contains syllable 'catt'" ... "Syllable 'cat' is in [katt]", 
"Syllable 'catt' is in [katt]" ... }> 
 
The extensional move basically resolves the level 1.5/level 1.6 ambiguity by 
ruling out the non-extensional level 1.5; the account automatically finds itself 
equivalent to what we have called level 1.6. Hence on this view Peacocke, if he 
means anything at all, can only mean level 1.6, and there is no ambiguity; the 
imprecise notion of a body of information which we were using earlier is simply 
                                                 
1Of course, in practice, the specification of one or both of these sets could be recursive. Psychological Explanation    144 
ruled out of court. We shall see how tempting this move really is when we 
produce a more formal discussion in §5.1. 
The extensional move could be made here; certainly, we will be concerned with 
level 1.6, and so it will not affect our point to rule out level 1.5 (as we have 
defined it here). However, the imprecision of level 1.5 might well be 
explanatorily useful, and I will not advocate the extensional move in this thesis. 
In the next subsection, we discuss a practical example of the explanatory 
usefulness of a level 1.6 model. 
4.2.4  Models of Expertise 
In KBS development, the intention is to build programs which simulate expert 
reasoning by formalizing the knowledge that an expert reasons with in the KB, 
and developing an inference engine to manipulate the contents of the KB. In the 
model-based methodologies upon which we are focussing, the aim is often to 
draw up a library of typical problem-solving structures, which a knowledge 
engineer could use to describe (perhaps at a coarse level of detail) the problem-
solving (we saw a model from the KADS library in Chapter Two). One well-
known, and often-used, problem-solving method is heuristic classification 
(Clancey 1985), which we shall use as an illustrative example in this subsection. 
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Figure 4.2: Heuristic Classification 
The diagram has the same semantics as the KADS diagram of systematic 
diagnosis we saw in Chapter Two. The rectangles stand for metaclasses of 
domain information, characterized according to the role the members of that 
class play in the problem-solving process. Take, for instance, the information 
that 'x has pneumonia'. Depending on context, this piece of information can Psychological Explanation    145 
function in a number of different ways: it can be a diagnosis (solution), or an 
hypothesis, or a datum, and so on. There could be a rectangle for each of these 
different ways. The ovals stand for ways of transforming or gaining information, 
specified at a relatively high level (for instance, they are not necessarily to be 
understood as algorithms). The connecting lines stand for data flow (i.e. how the 
information gets used in the problem-solving). Control (i.e. what gets done 
when) is not specified. So, heuristic classification involves three types of 
inference: firstly, observables are transformed into variables or findings — they 
are not used 'raw'; secondly, these findings are matched with abstract diagnoses 
on a heuristic basis (i.e. on an uncertain basis — heuristic associations are based 
on notions of typicality, and might only be poorly understood correlations); 
thirdly, the abstract diagnosis is refined into a more detailed diagnosis. 
One can do these inferences in any order, because there is no specification of 
control at the global level. In other words, the inferences (transform, match, 
specify) are reversible: an abstract solution might be refined by specifying the 
non-abstract solution, while an abstract solution might be derived from the actual 
solution. Replacing the lines by arrows, we can see a number of possible ways of 
navigating through the diagram. Figure 4.3 shows three of these. Number 1 will 
solve a diagnosis task; given some observables, the diagnostician gets variables, 
abstract solutions and finally solutions in that order. Number 2 is a prognosis 
task; given a solution, the prognostician will compute what observables 
(properly, what classes of observable) the system would be expected to show. 
Number 3 is a hypothesis testing task; given the observables of the system, and 
the hypothetical solution, the expert works her way from observables to 
variables, and from solutions to variables, and looks for a match (i.e. are the 
observables of the system consistent with the proposed solution?). Psychological Explanation    146 
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Figure 4.3: Three Ways of Navigating Through the Heuristic Classification 
Inference Structure 
An example of an episode of heuristic classification is given in (Clancey 1985, 
p.295), taken from the inference structure of the KBS MYCIN. An observable 
might be that an adult patient's white blood cell count is under 2,500. This then 
undergoes a series of abstractions: the white blood cell count is low; this 
suggests leukopenia, which in turn suggests immunosuppression, leading to the 
finding that the host is compromised. This finding (with others) is matched 
heuristically onto disease types, for example, gram-negative infection. This 
general diagnosis is then refined to produce the subtype of the disease type 
which is the diagnosis, for instance E.coli infection. This episode is an instance 
of control structure 1 in Figure 4.3. 
Clearly, this is a specification of the expert's problem-solving at a level more 
detailed than level 1.5 as we defined it in §4.2.2. The bodies of information 
drawn upon are the observables for the input, and the theory within which the 
solution refinement takes place — typically a hierarchical theory of solution 
classes — as the output. However, the model of heuristic classification also 
makes reference to some manipulative steps to be performed to those bodies of 
information. The observables are transformed into usable form; a general 
solution heuristically arrived at is refined into a more detailed solution. On the 
other hand, the specification is not detailed enough to be counted as a 
specification at level 2 — there is no algorithmic advice on how to perform the Psychological Explanation    147 
transformation, or the matching, or the refinement. At best, the model specifies a 
class of algorithms. 
What would happen in the event that the problem-solving were specified at level 
1.5? We would have an input metaclass, the observables. We would have an 
output metaclass, the solutions. Note first that there could only be one step — 
because we are at level 1.5, we cannot specify that the input should be 
transformed into usable form, nor that the output should first be specified at a 
high degree of abstraction, and then refined. We make no assumptions about 
ontology, the forms that the bodies of information can take. So, what would the 
single inferential step in the middle be? We cannot assume that it would be a 
step of heuristic matching. If it were, that would in turn involve the assumption 
that the generally observed heuristic correlations between input and output were 
being used, of course, but those correlations may only be visible from the point 
of view of abstracted findings and solutions abstractions. From actual 
observables to solution subtypes there may be no obvious rough correlations to 
make. All one could specify about the inferential step in the middle, at level 1.5, 
is that a classification step is made, without any further information being 
available about the form that that step will take. We get the model shown in 
Figure 4.4. Note that this reflection on the distinction between levels 1.5 and 1.6 
is not specific to this AI sort of problem, and can indeed crop up in Peacocke's 
own examples, as the discussion of the three syllable pronunciation algorithms 
[1], [2] and [3] above shows.1
solutions observables classify
 
Figure 4.4: Simple Classification 
The simple classification model may, of course, be of some use; however, it is 
clearly a model at a very low level of detail, and is unlikely to be of much help in 
KBS development (except in the case where it conveys the simplicity of the 
                                                 
1To give another example, consider Peacocke's example of kind perception by a 3-D model 
description (1986, pp.105-7). That model description 'uses various volumetric primitives and ... a 
coordinate system' (p.106). The level 1.5 account would not distinguish between different sets of 
volumetric primitives and coordinate systems, while the level 1.6 account would. Again it is not 
obvious on Peacocke's account whether he is giving an account at (our) level 1.5 or 1.6. Psychological Explanation    148 
classification step, in contrast to other, more complex, varieties of 
classification).1
To give a small example of the difficulty of conveying the right information at 
level 1.5, consider Clancey's example from MYCIN of the diagnosis of E.coli 
infection from the white blood cell count (and other information). In order to get 
from wbc < 2500 to E.coli, a number of abstractions are performed, and we are 
forced at level 1.6 to give these abstractions. At level 1.5, these abstractions are 
suppressed. Yet the problem-solving process may not be understandable in the 
absence of the abstractions. Recall that KBSs need to give understandable 
explanations. To do that they must adequately represent not only actual problem-
solving but also the vocabulary which the expert uses to justify her reasoning 
(otherwise the explanation will be unrecognizable as such). Further, the problem-
solving itself may become intractable if not represented at the right level. For 
example, if the knowledge engineer reasoned directly from wbc to disease, the 
function could be too complex to compute in real time; on the other hand, if too 
much abstraction was performed on the wbc input, then the resulting classes of 
wbc could be too coarse to be of use in the classification (i.e. too inclusive to 
map onto any useful classes of disease). Similarly on the output side, both gram-
negative infection, the disease type and E.coli infection, the disease itself, are 
equivalent from the level 1.5 perspective (both give information about infection). 
At level 1.6, we can distinguish between the two, and not only that, we can use 
the distinction; if a definitive diagnosis is too hard, we know that we can plump 
for gram-negative infection as a diagnosis, which, although it is not an exact 
diagnosis, will have some use (for instance, all diseases in that class may be 
treatable with antibiotics). Hence the program would be able to use this 
hierarchical disease structure to grade its diagnoses. 
Having established that an important class of AI model is pitched at a level 
between 1.5 and 2, we need to establish now that a model of this class is of 
genuine utility. In other words, we need to show why we need a model at level 
1.6 in KBS development, and not a model at level 1.5, or at level 2. This 
discussion will show that there is a constituency for level 1.6 models, and that 
there is a clear area for the application of such models. It will not show that such 
models are explanatory of expertise in the KBS development context — that is 
                                                 
1And, in fact, there is a further purpose that we can see for such a model, where a simple model 
such as that given in fig.4.4 is contrasted with other high-level models for the purposes of model 
selection; i.e. the model in fig.4.4 could be used to specify a class of classification models as 
distinct, say, from the class of design models. However, in such a case, the model would not be 
used actually to build the system. See (O'Hara 1993) for a discussion of these issues. Psychological Explanation    149 
the business of Chapter Five. It will show that such models are useful. However, 
since to be explanatory is to be (among other things) useful (§§3.1.1, 3.3), it does 
at least show that such models meet a necessary condition for explanatoriness. 
Conversely, since the discussion will also show that models at levels 1.5 and 2 
are not as useful (all things being equal), it will also entail that, if any models are 
explanatory in the KBS development context, level 1.6 models will be 
explanatory in the KBS development context. 
There are (at least) two good pragmatic reasons why a level 1.6 model such as 
the one given in Figure 4.2 would be most likely to be useful. Firstly, recall that 
an important constraint on sensitively situated KBSs is that they provide 
understandable explanations of their output for the KBS user (§2.1.4). Imagine a 
system for medical diagnosis acting as a replacement for an expensive expert in 
some remote location, such as in an Antarctic polar base, or in a space shuttle. A 
patient's symptoms are fed into the computer, which then suggests that the 
patient's leg be amputated. A justification for the suggestion is then essential — 
no-one would sanction such drastic action on the basis of computer output only; 
suppose there were a bug in the code? But a justification in terms of the code 
may well be unsurveyable, especially if time were pressing. However, if the 
system's code and knowledge base were structured according to a level 1.6 
model, then the explanations could also be given at that level of specificity. But 
this level of specificity also accords with the original expert's justifications; the 
reason for this is that the model is a model of the expertise at level 1.6, and 
hence will share the ontology of the expert. The expert will use the same terms 
as the model. Whereas a level 1.5 model would only specify the body of 
information on which the inference should draw, and this might be 
conceptualized very differently in the machine and the expert. Hence it will not 
necessarily be the case that an explanation derived from a model at level 1.5 will 
be sufficiently like the expert's own justifications (which, of course, will be 
based on a practice specifically designed to convince laymen of the expert's 
veracity). On the other hand, a level 2 explanation will probably be too specific 
in most circumstances. What one wants to know in the envisioned situation is the 
basis for the decision, not the detailed steps of the decision making itself 
(although one might well want to know this in some circumstances, the 
algorithms themselves should have been verified during the development of the 
KBS). Chandrasekaran et al (1989) discuss these issues in much more satisfying 
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The second reason for wanting a level 1.6 model is that not all KBSs are there to 
replace experts. If the KBS is simply to perform the task that the original expert 
performs, then plausibly a performative equivalence (i.e. level 1) will suffice 
(qualms about explanations notwithstanding). But many KBSs are used for other 
purposes, e.g. training. If an expert's time is expensive, and in demand, then it 
may pay to employ a KBS in at least the early stages of training others in the 
expertise. Then a system that reasons in similar ways to experts in the field will 
have greater value for that purpose (such a system would also have to produce 
understandable explanations too, of course). Again, level 2 equivalence 
(algorithmic equivalence) is at too high a level of specificity; this would make 
distinctions between very minor variations in computation (e.g. between 
scanning a list from left to right and from right to left). Level 1.5 equivalence, on 
the other hand, would tell the students what information to look for, but would 
provide no guidance as to the most useful form that that information can take 
(i.e. how to conceptualize the information, whether to abstract the information, 
what basic ontology should be used). Level 1.6 equivalence, on the other hand, 
would not make the very fine-grained distinctions of level 2, while being less 
coarse-grained than level 1.5. Such a model would tell the students what 
ontology the experts use, and the most useful form for problem-solving that the 
information can be presented in. 
So, to conclude, a level 3 model will be too detailed for the purposes of building 
KBSs to replicate expert performance. A level 2 model will also be too fine-
grained — algorithmic equivalence will cut across systems that merely use 
different primitive steps for the same ends. On the other hand neither level 1 nor 
level 1.5 models are likely in the general case to specify enough to allow the 
system to be built. This means that level 1.6 looks like a likely resting place for 
the preferred models in KBS development. What this shows is that this particular 
type of account is going to be more useful in that context than other types. In 
Chapter Five, we shall attempt to draw all the threads concerning our discussion 
of explanation generally, explanation in psychology, and models for KBS 
development, together, and try to show that such level 1.6 models are 
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Chapter Five: Conceptual Models, 
Competence Models and Psychological 
Explanation 
So, our preliminary work has been done. To recap, we set out a philosophical 
project we called bottom up philosophy. In this project, the aim is to bring 
philosophical considerations to bear on the actual output of various areas of 
discourse, as opposed to theorising on the ideal output of those areas. In 
particular, in the philosophy of AI, the aim of bottom up philosophy would be to 
try to discern how the actual practice of AI is of philosophical interest — and try 
to discern this with an eye on the essential conceptual and practical limitations of 
AI — as opposed to developing and examining the consequences of various ideal 
thought experiments. In Chapter Two, we reviewed an actual area of AI 
discourse, the field of knowledge-based system development; our aim is 
ultimately to show that the models of experts developed in this field can be seen 
as explanatory of their expertise. Chapter Three looked at the philosophy of 
explanation, in which we brought our bottom up principles to bear. Finally, in 
Chapter Four, we examined a particular type of explanation, computational 
explanation in psychology, and concluded that, to be useful in KBS 
development, the computational models would ideally be explanatory at a level 
which we termed level 1.6, and which makes explicit certain distinctions which 
are rather glossed over in recent work by Christopher Peacocke. 
Having established our basic position on these matters, we can now move on to 
our final task, the establishment of our claim that models of expertise in KBS 
development can be seen as explanatory of the expertise that they model. We 
will argue in three stages. Firstly, in §5.1, we will set out a type of psychological 
model, which we shall call a psychological competence model, and try to show 
that such a model is explanatory. Secondly, in §5.2, we will try to show that the 
conceptual models of expertise from KBS development are instances of such 
models; their explanatoriness will therefore follow. Then, in §5.3, we will go 
further, and try to show not only that such models are explanatory, but also what 
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5.1  Competence Models and Psychological Explanation 
Our aim in this section is to examine models of problem-solving. We shall look 
at ways of solving problems, and ways of representing the problem-solving 
steps. Our claim will be that models of such methods of problem-solving are 
interesting explanations of problem-solving in their own right. Of course, not all 
psychological phenomena or abilities are necessarily related to problem-solving 
— although that will depend on how wide is the interpretation of the term 
'problem-solving'. Nevertheless, expertise, however that is to be defined, will 
surely be based upon the solutions of characteristic problems. Hence 
explanations of expertise will involve explanations of problem-solving 
behaviour, and therefore the concentration on models of problem-solving, which 
might be a handicap in other areas of psychology, is certainly to be welcomed 
here. 
5.1.1  Models of Problem-Solving 
How can we model problem-solving? We can begin by noticing the obvious 
point that what someone does when she solves a problem is to find a solution. 
Her problem-solving activity takes a problem and maps it onto a solution. Hence, 
we can express — at a very high level — what is going on by a two-place 
predicate which contains an expression of the problem in the first argument place 
and a solution in the second place. This assumes that we can express what the 
problem is, and what the solutions are, but this should not be too controversial an 
assumption. This leads us to define a problem domain Ω as follows: 
Ω = <P,S,solution> where: 
•  P is the set of problems 
•  S is the set of solutions 
•  solution is a relation between P and S 
 
A solution for a problem p is any s in S such that solution(p,s) is true. The 
problem p can be said to be solvable if there is an s in S such that solution(p,s) is 
true. 
This, as we have said, is a very high level characterization of problem-solving 
competence. In the terms given in §4.2 above, this is a level 1 characterization, 
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characterization of the solution relation will enable any potential solution to be 
recognized, it does not allow a solution to be generated. An account of this form 
may be explanatory (at level 1) if the solution relation is trivial enough to be 
characterized easily in full. The result of such a characterization would be a 
look-up table. However, because of the size and complexity of most non-trivial 
problem domains, the solution relation would generally have to be expressed by 
some sort of formula, rather than as a list of acceptable pairs. It is the 
development of such formulae that will interest us, for they can be seen as 
expressive of the expertise. If such formulae are well-chosen, they may act as 
explanations at a other levels than level 1 (for instance, if the problem-solver's 
own algorithm is provided, then we would have a level 2 explanation). 
So, to give an example, consider the so-called eight puzzle. This is a problem 
domain where eight tiles are initially arranged randomly on a 3 ∞ 3 matrix, and 
are moved round until the tiles form a pattern. Many children's toys have a 
similar form, with (mn-1) tiles on an m  ∞  n matrix; an example of a start 
position of the Apple Macintosh 4  ∞  4 puzzle (standard issue on Macintosh 
computers) is given in Figure 5.1. When the tiles are moved into the space, they 
should be manipulable into the shape of the Apple Macintosh logo, a rainbow-
coloured apple with a bite out of it. 
 
Figure 5.1: A Puzzle 
The eight puzzle (which is the smallest non-trivial puzzle of this kind) has often 
been used as a sample problem in AI (Nilsson 1980; Van de Velde 1988). We 
can represent the state of the board at any time as a 9-tuple, with an asterisk 
representing the space, and the tiles numbered and represented in order. Figure 
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3 4 8 
1 6 * 
2 5 7
⇒ <3,4,8,1,6,*,2,5,7>
 
Figure 5.2: Representing States in the Eight Puzzle 
Now we can represent the eight puzzle; the set of problems will consist of the set 
of pairs of initial states I and goal states G: 
P = {<I,G> | I,G   States} where States is the set of states of the eight 
puzzle 
 
So, if we wanted to transform the state represented in Figure 5.2 into a state 
where all the tiles were in order with the space in the centre, we should state the 
problem as follows: 
(<3,4,8,1,6,*,2,5,7>,<1,2,3,4,*,5,6,7,8>) 
 
A solution consists of a series of moves. There are only four moves possible: a 
tile can be moved leftwards, rightwards, upwards or downwards into the space. If 
we represent these moves as L, R, U and D, then a potential solution would be an 
n-tuple of these moves (e.g. <L,D,D,R,U,R,D,L,U>). The solution predicate then 
would have the form: 
solution(<I,G>,<Mn>), where Mn represents n moves in order, and I and 
G are initial and goal states 
 
This would be true when and only when the solution in the second argument 
place transformed the stated initial state I into the goal state G. 
This formalism will express problem-solving knowledge at a very high level for 
any problem which can be stated. For example, in diagnosis, problems would be 
tuples of symptoms, and the set of solutions would be the set of recognised 
malfunctions in the diagnostic domain (e.g. the set of diseases in a medical 
domain). The solution predicate would be true when the solutions in the second 
argument place were, or could be, the causes of the symptoms in the first 
argument place. As another example, in design, the problem would be a set of 
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Then the solution predicate would be true when the artefact in the second 
argument place satisfied the specifications in the first argument place. 
However, whether or not such models could ever be explanatory — and in a 
number of circumstances I think they could be — it is clear that, except in very 
simple domains, they could not be explanatory for the purposes of AI. The 
context of AI demands a greater depth of explanation than the simple expression 
of the solution predicate. For example, whoever is building the system will 
require a method of getting from the problem to the solution. It is not enough to 
be able to recognise a solution when it comes along (except in very small 
domains where it is feasible to search through the solution space1). The 
programmer must have a way of generating the solution from the problem, and 
this, of course, is not provided by a simple specification of the predicate. 
Furthermore, the method of getting a solution from the problem must also be as 
efficient as possible, and on top of that it must run in real time — no point 
having the system if it takes days or weeks to produce the answer. Hence the AI 
programmer will require some constructive account of the solution predicate, 
and therefore our account here will need some more detailed way of modelling 
methods of constructing solutions. 
Such a characterization has been suggested by Walter van de Velde (1988), and 
in this subsection, we will present a theory that has been adapted from his. Van 
de Velde's theory is intended to classify AI systems, but we will adapt and 
extend it. Note also that van de Velde has restricted his attention to problem-
solving; since we are only concerned with problem-solving, this is also 
acceptable. 
We begin with some definitions. 
If R is a binary relation, then R-1 is its inverse, and T(R) is its transitive 
closure. We say that (a,b) is in R if and only if R(a,b). R(a,b) if and 
only if R-1(b,a). (a,b) is in T(R) if and only if either R(a,b) or there is 
a c such that (a,c) is in R and (c,b) is in T(R). 
 
                                                 
1And few domains actually come under this rubric. For example, the eight puzzle, which is very 
formal and relatively trivial, has 1,398,101 solutions of ten or fewer moves alone. It would not 
be feasible in terms of time to search even this attenuated space of solutions; neither would it be 
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So, the inverse of a relation R is the relation S such that S(x,y) obtains if and 
only if R(y,x) obtains (so the relation child-of would be the inverse of the 
relation parent-of). T(R), the transitive closure of a relation, holds whenever a 
chain of instances of the relation can be set up (e.g. if we had R(1,2) and R(2,3) 
and R(3,4) and ... and R(n-1,n), then we would have T(R)(1,n)). So the relation 
ancestor-of would be the transitive closure of the relation parent-of. The relation 
greater-than over the natural numbers is the transitive closure of the relation 
immediate-successor-of. 
We now need some intermediate definitions of relations which themselves 
depend on a series of relations. 
If Rj (j = 1,...,m) is a set of binary relations, for each j let Rj+ be the union 
of Rj and Rj-1. Hence (a,b) is in Rk+ if and only if either Rk(a,b) or Rk-
1(a,b). 
 
If Rj (j = 1,...,m) is a set of binary relations, let R+ be the union of all the 
Rj+. Hence (a,b) is in R+ if and only if there is a k (1 ≤ k ≤ m) such 
that (a,b) is in Rk+. 
 
If Rj (j = 1,...,m) is a set of binary relations, let R' be T(R+). Hence (a,b) 
is in R' if and only if either R+(a,b) or there is a c such that R+(a,c) 
and R'(c,b). 
 
We now have sufficient logical apparatus to define the key notion of a 
decomposition of a relation. 
If R is a binary relation on sets A and B, then a decomposition of R is a 
collection of sets Ei (i  =  1,...,n), such that E0 = A  and  En = B,  and 
binary relations Rj (j = 1,...,m), such that R is a subset of R'. The Rj 
are referred to as inferential relations. The Ei are referred to as 
inferential types. For each j (1 ≤ j ≤ m), there exist g (1 ≤ g ≤ n) 
and h (1 ≤ h ≤ n) such that Rj is a relation on Eg ∞ Eh. 
 
The idea of a decomposition of a relation is roughly that, if R(p,s), then it should 
set out a number of intermediate steps between p and s. So, for example, take the 
relation cousin-of: x is the cousin of y if one of x's parents is the sibling of one of 
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relations,  parent-of  (we will need both it and its inverse), and sibling-of. If 
cousin-of(p,s), then there must be q and r such that parent-of-1(p,q),  sibling-
of(q,r) and parent-of(r,s). The inferential relations have decomposed the more 
complex relation cousin-of. 
To encode this example in terms of the more formal definition, R is the relation 
cousin-of. There is only one inferential type, E (the set of people). R1 is the 
relation parent-of; R2 is the relation sibling-of. There are no other inferential 
relations. All the relations (i.e. the inferential relations and R) are relations on 
E ∞ E. We have R1-1(p,q), R2(q,r), and R1(r,s). Therefore, (p,q) and (r,s) are both 
in R1+ while (q,r) is in R2+. Therefore, by definition of R+, (p,q), (q,r) and (r,s) 
are all in R+. Since (r,s) is in R+, it is also in R', by definition. This entails that 
(q,s) is in R', because (q,r) is in R+ while (r,s) is in R'. This in turn entails that 
(p,s) is in R', because (p,q) is in R+ while (q,s) is in R'. But p and s were 
completely general, so it follows that whenever R(p,s), R'(p,s). Hence we have a 
collection of inferential types, a collection of inferential relations, and R is a 
subset of R'. Hence we have a decomposition of the cousin-of relation. 
We have already defined the notion of a problem domain, Ω, which is a triple of 
problems, solutions and the solution relation. The insight that we want now to 
exploit is that, since the solution relation is a binary relation, we can decompose 
it. We can call the decomposition of the solution relation a pattern or structure 
of inferences over Ω. In other words, the structure of inferences should mark off 
a number of intermediate steps between the problem p and the solution s.  
The inferential types (the Ei) in the decomposition are sets of primitive objects; 
we can refer to a member of an inferential type as an inferential primitive. So, as 
another example, consider the relation between a cricketer and his batting 
average. The solution relation average-of is a subset of cricketers ∞ rationals 
(indeed, since it is functional, it maps a cricketer onto a rational number, 
although this account applies to all relations, not just functions). The inferential 
types referred to are therefore cricketers and rational numbers. Inferential 
primitives might include Graham-Gooch, Curtley-Ambrose and Allan-Border on 
the one hand, and any rational number on the other. We can decompose the 
average-of relation into a pair of relations designed to improve the 
comprehensibility of the top-level relation. Firstly, the cricketer is paired with 
his batting figures, which we can store as a lookup table. His figures are a triple 
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out, and the total number of runs he has scored (so, for Gooch, the respective 
numbers for the 1993 season are 35,  3 and 2,023).1 This gives us a new 
inferential relation, which we can call figures-of, and a new inferential type, 
which is a triple of integers. Finally, we can go from a triple of integers to a 
rational, by noting that a cricketer's average is the number of runs he has scored 
divided by the number of times he is out. Hence if (a,b,c) is a suitable set of 
figures, this must be mapped to (c/b-a); in Gooch's case, 63.21875. This is our 
final inferential relation, which we can call (c/b-a). The average-of relation has 
been decomposed. 
We should note here that the inferential types might be characterized either 
intensionally or extensionally. So we could insist that the inferential type which 
provides the domain of the figures-of and the average-of relations should be 
defined as either the set of cricketers, an intensional entity which could be used 
time and again, or as a particular extensional set of individuals which changes 
from year to year (in 1993 according to Wisden  {Yates, Boon, M. Waugh, 
Martyn, S. Waugh, ...}). If the characterization was intensional, then it would be 
possible for two models to agree on their inferential types, but not on the 
inferential primitives. A triple containing Ω, the set of inferential types and the 
set of inferential relations we can call an inference structure. If the 
characterization of the inferential types was extensional, then the inference 
structure would also determine the inferential primitives. 
Roughly speaking, then, what we interested in is a decomposition of the solution 
relation in terms of a set of inferential relations and a set of inferential types. The 
particular form of a competence model that we are seeking is one where all the 
inferential relations are more or less simple and tractable, and together they can 
be put together to construct a solution. The account of how the inferential 
relations relate to the solution relation is the competence theory. 
The inferential relations are 'put together' as follows. We can define an inference 
path for an inference structure, which is a sequence of inferential primitives 
(e0,...,er), such that for each pair (ek,ek+1), there is an inferential relation Rj such 
that either Rj(ek,ek+1) or Rj-1(ek,ek+1). We saw in the cousin-of example how the 
inverse could be employed — a lot of expert problem-solving practice does 
                                                 
1Of course, this is not a great example, since the average could just be added to the lookup table. 
However, the point is still made, because what we really want to do is to show how the 
decomposition can (help to) explain the solution relation. The mere pairing of Gooch with his 
average fails to explain anything. When this decomposition is displayed, the relation of Gooch 
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involve working backwards through an inference. A solution path is an inference 
path such that e0 is the initial state and er is the goal state — i.e. a path from a 
solvable problem to one of its solutions. Hence, the competence theory can be 
seen as decomposing the path from the problem to a solution into a number of 
steps, based on the inferential relations and inferential types of the inference 
structure. If the theory is any good, the steps will all be tractable. 
We can finally define a competence model as an inference structure plus a 
competence theory. Of course, many different competence theories could be 
associated with the same inference structure. 
To illustrate with our example from the eight puzzle, we can imagine one 
possible decomposition being as follows. Take our original starting point, 
<3,4,8,1,6,*,2,5,7>. Our first task is to get the space into the centre of the board, 
which will involve one move (an L), to give <3,4,8,1,*,6,2,5,7>. Having done 
this, one could imagine having a series of routines that would swap round pairs 
of tiles, only temporarily disturbing the others (Korf 1985). These routines could 
be stored in a lookup table, because there will not be that many of them — 56 as 
a maximum, and a large proportion of those would be simple transformations of 
some primitive routines. Hence, the puzzle could be solved simply by swapping 
round appropriate pairs of tiles, to give: <3,4,8,1,*,6,2,5,7>, <1,4,8,3,*,6,2,5,7>, 
and so on down to <1,2,3,4,*,5,8,6,7>, <1,2,3,4,*,5,6,8,7>, <1,2,3,4,*,5,6,7,8>. 
The solution would then consist of the stringing together of all the appropriate 
moves for these transformations, which would be read off the lookup table. This 
would not necessarily result in the most efficient solution, but would, by 
decomposition, render the solution tractable. 
And if such a method described someone's problem-solving practice for the eight 
puzzle (i.e. if she followed the method, by virtue of going through just those 
steps), it could be regarded as a model of her problem-solving. We would need 
to specify which features of the model are taken to correspond to the practice and 
which not. Our next task will be to define the class of competence models which 
have this correspondence. 
To summarize the results of this subsection: we have defined a particular notion 
of competence as a decomposition of the solution relation for the problem at 
hand. A competence model consists of an inference structure (problem domain, 
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consists of an account of how to assemble the inferential relations into a solution 
path (i.e. an inference path which has a problem as its first member and a 
solution to that problem as its last). So a competence model specifies a way or 
ways of solving the problems in the problem domain whose solution relation 
which is decompose by the model. 
5.1.2  Psychological Competence Models 
In this subsection, we will look at the question of whether competence models as 
defined above could be psychologically interesting. What we need to know is 
what such competence models can tell us. We will try to provide a general 
account of the limitations and specialities of models of competence. This will 
prepare us for our examination of the question of whether such models can be 
explanatory in §5.1.3. 
The notion of competence (as a general notion in the psychological literature) 
can be seen as related to the notion of performance. The performance of a system 
is its input/output behaviour, the way it behaves in concrete situations. It is often 
the case with a complex system that that behaviour can be rationalized, or given 
some short functional description. So, for example, we can see the performance 
of an electronic calculator when we press buttons; we see what output follows 
what input. And, given sufficient observations, we can formulate a theory to 
enable us to predict what output will accompany what input. This theory might 
be seen as a competence model of the calculator — very low level, of course, but 
the main point is that it gives us an account of the output that is not entirely 
dependent on observed performance. In such a model, a problem would be 
admissible sets of keys to be pressed before pressing the '=' button; the solutions 
would be the correct answers displayed in the calculator's visual display unit. 
One possible decomposition could be in terms of three inferential relations: one 
which related the buttons pressed to a particular numeric problem; a second 
which related numeric problems to their answers (real numbers); and a third 
which related real numbers to the visual display. Other possible decompositions 
might take into account the structure of the electronic circuits of the calculator. 
We would hope that our miniature competence model would work 
counterfactually, as well as predicting and retrodicting actual performance. The 
competence can be seen as in some sense underlying the performance. In the 
case of the calculator, the competence model describes what the calculator is 
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But, because the calculator is a finite system — though too large to be 
adequately represented in a simple lookup model — the competence model is 
likely to go wrong, by idealising the calculator's output. The calculator would 
only be able to represent numbers of a certain size; hence if standard arithmetic 
were to be used as the model, in extreme situations, the calculator's output would 
diverge from the output of the model. The model, indeed, might be able to flag 
these divergences, and so the model could also act as a warning device, telling us 
when the calculator was reliable and when not. 
In general, a competence model gives a way of inferring a solution to a problem, 
but does not necessarily tell you how any given system actually solves the 
problem. A piece of machinery need only conform to a competence model in one 
respect: the problem-solution relation is the same (modulo idealization) as the 
machinery's IO relation. Traditionally, in psychology, a competence model is 
generally seen as a model of an information processing structure underlying 
some actual regular performance. We can see that our notion of a competence 
model defined above could come under that rubric. The performance (at least 
some of the performance) is described by the solution relation in the problem 
description. In the competence theory, the decomposition of the solution relation 
will exactly preserve the IO relation, by definition of a decomposition and of a 
solution path; however, of course, the solution relation itself might be an 
idealization of the actual problem-solving that goes on. 
We can make the relationship between given systems and their competence 
models closer by placing further requirements on the candidate decompositions 
for competence modelling. Many decompositions of problem-solving are 
possible, and each one of these is a competence model. For many purposes, there 
will be few restrictions on which competence models are interesting. However, 
not all such models will be of value in psychological investigation. Our tactic 
therefore is to consider those competence models as defined in §5.1.1 which are 
also psychological information processing models such as were discussed in 
§4.1. Therefore we need further constraints that can be placed on competence 
models to ensure that they will be interesting as psychological information 
processing models. We can define a psychological  competence model as a 
competence model that meets these conditions.  
Firstly, of course, there will be infinitely (indeed, uncountably) many 
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also to have some predictive value; we need to be able to form reasonable 
expectations of the performance of the modelled system. If there is a requirement 
for prediction, then this will rule out most other candidate decompositions. 
Secondly, as we have already discussed, the competence as defined here need 
not measure up exactly against performance. Of course, the performance should 
be respected most of the time, but it is important for a psychological competence 
model to remain tractable. If the model is to explain the performance, the 
explanation itself should be tractable, by our discussion of explanation in 
Chapter Three. An analogy would be between performance and competence, and 
the scatter of points on a graph and the smooth curve drawn through them. 
Thirdly, a psychological competence model will have to satisfy various further 
constraints on our making sense of the faculty or practice. These will be variable 
with context, but basically, as far as possible, the model should be some sort of 
rationalization of the performance. In some circumstances, there should, 
perhaps, be a sort of (possibly rough) mapping from concepts of which the 
performer is conscious of manipulating during any reasoning process preceding 
the performance, and concepts (i.e the inferential types, primitives and relations) 
in the model. Other circumstances might call for a mapping from interpretations 
of brain states to concepts of the model. Basically, the (deliberately loosely 
phrased) requirement is that the psychological competence model should bring 
some understanding to the outside observer. The components of the model, the 
types, primitives and relations, should carry some wider significance where 
possible. 
Fourthly, the fact that a psychological competence model is an information 
processing model means that various constraints are applied to the competence 
model that apply to information processing models generally: its exercise must 
involve the use of a finite amount of memory; there must be a finite set of 
transformation or rewrite rules to manipulate the data; ambiguities or conflicts 
must be restricted. Further, each inferential relation in the model should be 
computationally tractable where possible; this last is not an absolute 
requirement, but there should be good reasons for neglecting it. 
Fifthly, psychological competence models should describe the production of 
performance; mere prediction is not their game. Hence, there must be some sort 
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levels of explanation in §4.2, the phrase in quotation marks is very ambiguous. 
But the main point is that the manipulable entities postulated by the 
psychological competence model, and the inferences suggested by the 
psychological competence theory, must, where possible, have some sort of 
justification independent of their computational utility in the model itself. This 
justification will depend on the level at which the psychological competence 
model is intended to function: 1, 1.5, 1.6, 2 or 3 (or others). 
Finally, we note that to describe competence, what needs to be given is an 
expression of admissible outputs, not a specification of actual output. At any 
point in the exercise of a more than moderately complex competence, it is likely 
that there will be a number of options available that still conform to the 
competence. For example, faced with a recalcitrant case, a doctor might 
prescribe any one of a number of possible tests/remedies. Some remedies might 
be 'worth trying', since they are unlikely to undermine the patient's health further, 
and may resolve the problem (e.g. a small dose of antibiotics, or a diet of fluids). 
Others might be riskier long shots, which might be attractive in serious cases 
(e.g. exploratory surgery). Given a patient with a particular set of symptoms and 
a particular history, it is implausible that in all cases there is only one possible 
thing to be done. In fact, this condition chimes in nicely with the definition of a 
competence model, since the solution relation and the inferential relations are 
relations, not (necessarily) functions. We can express what we require by saying 
that our psychological competence model should decompose the whole of the 
solution relation, and not just a functional subset of it.1
So, we have defined a psychological competence model as a competence model 
that also meets these six constraints. From now on, we shall only consider 
psychological competence models, not competence models in general.  
5.1.3  The Explanatoriness of Psychological Competence 
Models 
So we come to the real business of §5.1. How can a psychological competence 
model be explanatory when the subject of the model does not possess (at least in 
                                                 
1We can define a functional subset of a relation as follows: any subset of a relation, whose 
domain is the same as that of the relation, and which is a function. So {(a,1), (b,2), (c,4)} and 
{(a,2), (b,3), (c,4)} are functional subsets of {(a,1), (a,2), (b,2), (b,3), (c,4)}. The only functional 
subset of a function is the function itself; hence functional subsets are minimal. A decomposition 
of a functional subset of the solution relation will be guaranteed to find a solution for any 
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any overt, explicit way) the model? To take a simple example, we might wish to 
know why it is that a sheep runs away from a wolf. But it may well be no help to 
be told that  
{Sheep(s), Wolf(w), (∀x,y)(Sheep(x) & Wolf(y) ∅ Eats(y,x)), 
(∀x,y)(Eats(x,y) ∅ RunsAwayFrom(y,x))} 
entails 
'RunsAwayFrom(s,w)'.  
 
The latter is a theory of sheep and wolves, that provides a derivation of the fact 
that s runs away from w from a couple of highly plausible universally quantified 
first principles, lawlike principles which are actually used in a deductive 
derivation of the desired conclusion; hence the argument is a deductive-
nomological explanation according to Hempel's model, for example. But 
whether this is a satisfactory explanation really depends on what we want to 
know. There are many circumstances in which the theory is perfectly 
explanatory (e.g. in explaining what has happened to the sheep to someone who 
was not very conversant with sheep and their behaviour). But if we want to know 
why  this sheep runs away from this wolf —  i . e .  i f  w e  w a n t  s o m e  s o r t  o f  
discussion of the internal sheep processes that lead it to run away from this 
specific object, the wolf, then the theory is next to useless. The Hempelian 
explanation certainly would act as an explanation in the desired sense were we 
able to credit the sheep with being a fellow possessor of that theory. The sheep 
would have to satisfy a number of conditions for this model to work as an 
explanation in this sense: 1) it would have to believe the four propositions (with 
suitable substitutions for the unquantified variables); 2) it would have to possess 
sufficient logical apparatus to derive the conclusion of the argument; 3) it would 
have to accept the theory as having impelling force (in other words, it should 
take the conclusion to mean that it ought to run away from the wolf); and 4) in 
the particular circumstances in question it should be disposed to consult the 
theory in order to determine its future actions, and not to consult any other 
theories. Clearly such support will not be available. 
Psychological competence models operate in a similar sort of way. Possession of 
the model would be sufficient to explain someone's competence; however it is 
never (or rarely, at the very least) the case that someone possesses a model of his 
or her own competence. Hence in this section we will have to show how such a 
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We have discussed the notion of an explanation in Chapter Three above. In §3.3 
of that chapter, we set out a number of conditions which an explanation should 
fulfill. We should make clear how psychological competence models as we have 
defined them meet these conditions. 
The first condition was that the value of an explanation should be 
relativized to an audience. What the psychological competence model 
does is to decompose the solution relation into a number of inferential 
relations. In other words, what seems a complex inference or process 
is broken down in the competence model into a number of component 
parts. We used the example of the eight puzzle and the cricketers' 
averages in §5.1.1. In order for such a model to be explanatory in the 
sense outlined in Chapter Three, therefore, it is necessary that there is 
an audience for which such a decomposition is valuable; the audience 
should desire to perform some action, and the explanation should aid 
in that performance. The obvious audience here is an audience which 
wishes to build some sort of computational system to mimic the 
problem-solving performance. The decomposition of the model 
would have the effect of breaking down the competence into a 
number of tractable steps; this decompositional idea is precisely what 
underlies many influential programming methodologies. Hence there 
is at least one audience for this sort of model, and the condition is 
satisfied. In fact, there are many other audiences. As one example, 
someone interested in making a process more efficient might benefit 
from knowing which sub-processes were involved in the process. As 
a second, an ergonomist might be able to restructure a process in a 
way more suited to those who have to carry out the process (i.e. use a 
decomposition to isolate inappropriate subprocesses and replace them 
with other, more appropriate ones). As a third example, someone who 
wishes to learn the complex process might well benefit from having 
the process decomposed into a number of less complex processes 
which he is already able to carry out. 
 
The second condition is that the model should be true or approximately 
true. The essence of the psychological competence model is the 
relationship borne by the inferential relations to the solution relation, 
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psychological competence models should have.1 We need to check 
that a model which claims to be psychological explanatory satisfies 
these properties. That the model is predictive and idealizes the 
performance can be checked by simple tests. That it rationalizes the 
performance can also be checked, possibly by running through it with 
the subject. The computational context can easily be verified. That 
the model produces the admissible output will also have to be tested. 
The final point is that the model should describe the production of the 
performance at some level. This can also be checked, but we will 
leave the description of this verification for later in this subsection, 
where we discuss the level of explanation we are aiming for. Hence a 
decompositional model can easily be shown to be true (if it is true) in 
all these ways. All the aspects would have to be satisfied in order for 
the model to be true. 
 
The third condition is that the relation of explanans to explanandum 
needs to be clear. Formally, this relation is clear, since we have 
defined what a decomposition is and how it relates to the solution 
relation describing the problem-solving. What may also be required 
to establish this condition in a particular case is that the inferential 
relations, inferential types and inferential primitives had some 
independent justification apart from their value in the decomposition. 
In other words, we would need to understand why the inferential 
relations, types and primitives were chosen independently from their 
role in the model. One way in which this might be done is to show 
that the competence model correctly described the production of the 
problem-solving performance. This option boils down to the 
requirement discussed above that the account of the production of the 
performance be true at some level, and is therefore postponed until 
we discuss levels of explanation below. 
 
The fourth condition is that the contrastive class should be clear. This is 
straightforward enough; the decomposition proposed in the model can 
be seen in opposition to other decompositions that may be available. 
The import of the model is that the problem is solved this way rather 
than that. 
                                                 
1The competence model be predictive, idealize but not neglect the performance, rationalize the 
performance, take place within a computational context, describe the production of the 
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The fifth condition is that the explanation should be shown to be suitably 
contentful; i.e. it must be defeasible. How this is so will depend on 
the methodology underlying the model-building process, and will, of 
course, vary from context to context. Hence we cannot establish this 
point generally. When we discuss conceptual models as psychological 
competence models (§5.2), we will need to show that the 
methodology for conceptual model development is suitably 
restrictive. 
 
Sixthly, we need to know what exactly is explained. Basically, 
psychological competence models explain problem-solving; given a 
solution relation, the model shows how the competent performer can 
go from the domain of the relation to the range. The two most 
obvious questions that a psychological competence model might 
answer, or be used to answer, are: why did X do that? and how did X 
accomplish that? The first question is a request for the reason for an 
action X took. This action should — assuming the model is 
explanatory — either establish that a suitable inferential relation 
holds, or contribute to such an establishment. Then the model 
explains the action by showing how it contributes to the 
establishment that the inferential relation holds between two objects, 
and further by showing how the inferential relation contributes to the 
decomposition of the solution relation. The second question is a 
request for an account of how the expert's actions took her from the 
domain of the solution relation to the range, and can be answered by 
showing that the expert's actions were the establishment that the 
various inferential relations held between the various inferential 
primitives used in the problem-solving. Note that if an action is 
incorrect (the expert makes a mistake) the model need not answer 
such questions (though it might). The model describes competence, 
not necessarily incompetence. If the expert's solution of the problem 
is correct, then it should be the case that her particular solution is 
modelled by a solution path in the model. Of course, by the sixth 
constraint on psychological competence models, there may be many 
admissible solution paths; if the expert's solution was correct, and if 
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the model, and can therefore be shown to have decomposed the 
solution relation as required. 
 
This is enough to suggest that in some circumstances at least psychological 
competence models as defined here are explanatory of the problem-solving 
processes they model.  
So, to illustrate this with an example, we can take the eight puzzle discussed 
above. An action would be a move in the game, taken from the four possibilities 
L, R, U and D. The input would be the current situation, and the competence 
model would suggest goals for the move to achieve. This setting out of goals 
would be part of the model's description of the relationship between the 
inferential relations and the solution relation; recall that the competence theory is 
that part of the competence model which tells how the solution relation is 
decomposed into the inferential relations. The subpart of the competence model 
that suggests the goal would be the competence theory; the subpart that suggests 
the action would be one of the inferential relations. This would answer the 
question why did X make that particular move? The rationalization of the series 
of moves made by X in a solution to the problem would answer the question how 
did X accomplish that? 
So there is no problem finding questions which are answered by (the 
manipulation of) a psychological competence model. Further, as we noted, there 
should be no shortage of audiences interested in such a decomposition. Note also 
that these answers will not necessarily correspond to verbal answers that a 
competent performer produces. If we ask X "Why did you do A?" he may well 
flounder, or suggest some alternative reason. As an example, a cognitive 
psychologist might well be interested in competence models that only used a 
severely restricted set of inferential relations and types: relations that are 
'understood' as being primitive operations (over the inferential types) available to 
the brain. Such operations might include edge detection on a retinal image, or 
filtering a grey level array (Johnson-Laird 1988 sets out the basics of cognitive 
psychology). Clearly there is no implication that the competent performer need 
be conscious of carrying out such operations. 
We can characterize interested audiences, partly by considering the form of the 
psychological competence model, and partly by considering the methodology of 
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an information processing model, and may well be computable in real time. Then 
it is clear that people who are interested in such models are ones who are 
interested in information processing accounts of the competence. There are many 
such people, of course. What we have learned about the brain indicates that 
information processing accounts of human faculties may not be absurdly out of 
place — though such accounts may well need to be supplemented with extra 
stories to describe many interesting phenomena. An account of how some task 
may be performed computationally may well drive neuroscientific investigations 
by suggesting computational structures that may be isolated — for example, we 
might cite the discovery and investigation of cortical maps (Changeux 1985, 
pp.115-24). 
But in particular we are interested in the context of AI, and it is clear how such 
accounts are of interest there. For the purpose of an AI investigation is the 
eventual production of software which will enable a machine to imitate some 
human performance; some examples of domains of KBS research are given in 
Chapter Two. Hence, to take the example of MYCIN, MYCIN was a system that 
assisted doctors in the selection of appropriate courses of treatment for patients 
with bacteremia, meningitis and cystitis. What would have been of use for the 
developers of MYCIN would have been a model of the competences of various 
specialists in the treatment of those diseases. Had such a model — i.e. an 
information processing model — been available, then the task of coding up a 
system that could perform the task would have been made that much easier. For 
any KBS developer, a model of the domain and the likely inferences over the 
domain that are able to suggest a class of information processing structures will 
be of great interest. Recall from Chapter Two that the knowledge engineer will 
require something more than a simple explanation which enables him to program 
the IO relation, because the KBS will need to have explanation facilities built 
into it. 
We now need to discuss the level of explanation provided by a psychological 
competence model. This will tell us what the model claims — and does not 
claim — about the production of the output of the modelled system. Clearly, a 
psychological competence model is explanatory at least at level 1; the solution 
relation itself is a sufficient IO characterization of the problem-solving 
behaviour, and a fortiori the trivial decomposition consisting solely of the 
solution relation is a competence model, and will meet the constraints on 
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Equally clearly, a competence model is not necessarily explanatory at level 2. 
Whether or not it is will depend very much on the nature of the inferential 
relations into which the solution relation is decomposed. If the inferential 
relations are sufficiently low level as to be considered as corresponding to 
primitives in a programming or algorithmic language, then it might be averred 
that the decomposition itself provided an algorithm, and that therefore the model 
was explanatory at level 2. But this cannot be assumed to be the case in general.  
What we do know is that, as well as the inferential relations, the model includes 
inferential types and may include inferential primitives.1 The types are the sets 
related by the inferential relations, and hence they (together with the relations 
used in the decomposition) express the information drawn upon by the problem-
solver; since a condition on a psychological competence model is that the 
decomposition rationalizes or makes sense of the problem-solving behaviour, we 
can assume that the inferential types are not there solely for the convenience of 
the model (we discuss the exact meaning of this phrase below). Therefore, we 
can say that a psychological competence model, by virtue of the specification of 
inferential types and the inferential relations which govern them, is explanatory 
at level 1.5. Recall that level 1.5 is the level of explanation where what is given 
is the input/output relation (in competence-model-speak, the solution relation), 
and the bodies of knowledge drawn on by the algorithm which actually will 
compute that IO relation (which we can take to be analogous to the inferential 
types and relations). 
Furthermore, the inferential primitives are the elements of the inferential types; 
therefore they constitute an ontology of the inferential types. Again because of 
the rationalizing purpose of psychological competence models, we can assume 
that if the model contains inferential primitives, then the inferential primitives 
are not there solely for the convenience of the model. Therefore, we can say that 
a psychological competence model, by virtue of the specification of inferential 
primitives, is explanatory at level 1.6. At this level, recall, a model gives the IO 
relation (the solution relation), the bodies of knowledge or information (the 
inferential types and relations) together with a specification of an ontology of 
these bodies of knowledge (the inferential primitives). Note that, if the 
inferential types are characterized extensionally, then level 1.5 collapses into 
                                                 
1We say "may include" because one could imagine competence models which left the exact 
primitives unspecified. For example, recall our example of the computation of cricketers' batting 
averages. One might give the model of that computation, but abstain from actually specifying 
which cricketers it applied to. The inferential type (cricketers) would, in contrast, have to be 
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level 1.6. However, in the definition of inferential types above, we did allow that 
they could be defined intensionally, which would make a gap possible. If the 
reader is extensionally-minded, and is not happy with any intensional 
characterizations at all, then there is no essential flaw in the position. It is level 
1.5 as we defined it in §4.2 that depends on intensional characterizations; if they 
are ruled out, level 1.5 disappears. However, what we are interested in is level 
1.6, and, since that is extensionally characterized, the definition remains sound 
even if intensional characterizations are ruled out. 
We made use in the previous paragraphs of the assumptions that inferential types 
and inferential primitives are not there solely for the convenience of the model. 
By 'solely for the convenience of the model', I mean that the types and primitives 
are there to enable the model to work, and for no other reason.1 We need just to 
flesh out the implications, for which we can look at the modelling methodology. 
The main point to note here is that psychological investigation can throw up 
facts that are not accounted for in the competent problem-solver's self-
justification. For instance, it might be the case that such a problem-solver 
consciously makes two inferences which he claims are simple in some way, but 
that the time he takes to make the inferences varies wildly. This might be a 
ground for assuming that one inference is more complex than another, 
unbeknownst to the subject of the model. Another example: the time in which a 
subject searches a space may rise linearly with the increase in size of the space, 
which would suggest that the subject performs a simple search, but if the 
subject's search time rises more slowly than the increase in the size of the space, 
this would suggest that beyond a certain threshold the subject employed 
strategies to prune the size of the search space, possibly by not investigating 
implausible areas (such a strategy would not result in success every time). If a 
psychological competence model takes such phenomena into account — as it 
should — then this implies that the questioner is interested in accounting for 
                                                 
1As an example of the sort of thing I mean, suppose a model had two (meaningful) variables a 
and b, and their values needed to be swapped around, so that a takes on the value of b and vice 
versa. One way of writing this would be as follows. 
  a := b;  (a takes the value of b) 
  b := a  (b takes the value of a) 
However, this causes problems. If a has the value 1 and b 20, say, then this program does the 
following: a becomes 20, and then b takes on the value of a, which is 20. Hence a and b have the 
same value, and have not swapped values. This suggests the following program to do the trick. 
  c := a; 
  a := b; 
  b := c 
A new variable c is declared which acts as a scratchpad for the value of a. But c is only there to 
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such phenomena, as well as the 'surface' phenomena that might be dealt with 
satisfactorily by the subject's self-justification. 
In the world of KBS development, one such example is the ontology of the 
explanation. It is often the case that, on the ontology suggested by the expert, the 
reasoning is difficult to perform, whereas supplementing the ontology by the 
output of a repertory grid analysis of the expert makes things easier. The 
repertory grid technique (§2.2.4) is used to discover 'constructs' about the 
domain which the expert uses, possibly unconsciously. The technique is 
basically to ask the expert to distinguish between various elements of the 
domain, and then to question her about the constructs she used to make the 
distinction. So, the expert might be asked to distinguish between X on the one 
hand, and Y and Z on the other. She might say that X had property P, while Y 
and Z do not. Then the expert will be asked about property P: is it 'all or nothing' 
or does it come in degrees? does it take values? can the property be deduced 
from other properties? etc.. Then property P can be added to the model; although 
the expert may not have referred to it in her original account of problem-solving, 
the fact remains that she used it to distinguish between X, Y and Z, and in that 
respect if in no other it will feature in an account of her competence. 
So the information processing methodology of psychological investigation 
suggests experiments to perform — for instance, analysing how an inference was 
performed, rather than taking it 'on trust' — and can account for unexpected 
results of such experiments. If the investigator wishes to take such results into 
account, then the restrictions associated with the production of a psychological 
competence model as an explanation should respect that. Now, a 
straightforwardly psychological investigation is pretty well duty bound to take 
such phenomena into account. If one inference takes five times as long as 
another supposedly similar one, then any psychologist worth her salt should take 
note of that. And it is likely that any KBS or AI related enterprise will want to 
know what 'deep' structures are around, for it will probably be difficult to 
understand how inferences are made if such underlying structures are ignored. 
This completes our account of the level of explanation of psychological 
competence models. Our final task is to relate this account to the promises made 
above with respect to the truthfulness of such models; recall that we said that the 
psychological competence model should describe the production of problem-
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depend on the way that the model is to be understood. If a model functions at, 
say, level 1.6, then it will not answer questions at level 2. So if such a model 
includes an algorithm, then it cannot be claimed that that algorithm is used by 
the competent performer. On the other hand, it should be true to say that the 
problem-solver drew on the information specified by the model's inferential 
types and relations, and furthermore drew on the information conceptualized in 
the same way as the inferential primitives. If such a claim is disputed by the 
problem-solver, the dispute should be settled by an examination of the model 
development methodology. The position should be that the model is the best 
explanation of why the problem-solver gave the output she did when analysed by 
the model development techniques (or KA tools, or whatever), where the 
meaning of 'best' will vary from context to context, relative to the audience's 
requirements. On the other hand, computational 'fixes' will not aid the 
explanation at all — although see (Motta et al 1994) for a discussion on various 
issues associated with this point; it is not always the case that it is easy to tell 
which is a computational fix and which is a principled piece of computing. 
So, now that we know what questions a psychological competence model can 
answer, and what audiences might be interested in such answers, and how far we 
can tell that such answers are correct, then we are entitled to conclude that we 
have given an account of their explanatoriness. Psychological competence 
models are explanatory at level 1.6 (if they specify inferential primitives, and at 
level 1.5 if not). 
5.2  Conceptual Models and Competence Models 
§5.1 established a lemma that we need for our conclusion. We want to show that 
conceptual models are explanatory of expertise. Our lemma showed that 
psychological competence models are explanatory of problem-solving. Given 
our plausible assumption that expertise is a type of problem-solving, this leaves 
one more result to be shown, that conceptual models are psychological 
competence models. Recall from §2.2.2 that a conceptual model is a knowledge-
based model of the expertise required for problem-solving in the object domain. 
A general sort of model-based KBS development methodology will produce first 
of all a conceptual model of the expertise, transform that model into a design 
model of the target KBS, and then transform that design model into an 
implementation. Hence a conceptual model is the first major product of the KBS 
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will remind ourselves in more detail of what conceptual models look like when 
we come to discuss them in relation to psychological competence models in 
§5.2.2. 
We will begin by discussing alternatives to the model-based KBS development 
methodologies — our deliberations will not, of course, apply to KBSs developed 
in such ways, and it important that we are clear about which KBSs are the 
subjects of the argument. Secondly, we will measure conceptual models against 
psychological competence models. Thirdly, we will briefly discuss the special 
types of conceptual models which are library-based. Finally, we will complete 
the inference about the explanatoriness of conceptual models and KBSs 
generally. 
5.2.1 Modelling  Methodologies and the Alternatives 
It is important to realise that we are discussing conceptual models in the context 
of one class only of KBS development methodologies. For example, many 
systems are developed by rapid prototyping (Waterman 1986). Here, a small 
running system is put together as soon as possible on the basis of the first few 
consultations with the expert. This system can then be shown to the expert, and 
the knowledge engineer can re-design the system during further iterations of the 
development process on the basis of the expert's feedback. There are a number of 
advantages of this methodology. Firstly, the expert can see the consequences of 
her input running on the early prototypes — thus avoiding a major problem with 
many KA tools, which is the presentation of the expert's input back to her for 
validation, and the consequent need for sympathetic interfaces between the 
human and the computer. It is not sufficient for the expert simply to provide 
input for the knowledge engineer; the input will typically be given in unfamiliar 
forms (i.e. the expert will usually give the input in a way unfamiliar to the 
knowledge engineer, and the knowledge engineer will then encode that input in a 
way unfamiliar to the expert), and should be validated as soon as possible. The 
obvious way is for the expert to see the results of her small KB in action, and the 
easiest way to manage this is to develop small-scale prototypes of the target 
system as soon as possible into the project. Then the expert can see what output 
follows from her input.  
Secondly, the method can be useful when there is a situation, as often occurs, of 
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expert whose input might be considered, all things being equal, to be the most 
valuable — the 'top man/woman' — is too expensive and precious for him or her 
to give full attention to a KBS development project. A rapid prototype allows a 
system to be built quickly with the minimum of fuss. After the main expert has 
given his or her input at the early stage, the lesser experts can then attend to the 
fine tuning of the system in later iterations of the methodology. Or, alternatively, 
those lower down the hierarchy can supply the basic information and structure, 
while the main expert adds his or her special contribution in fine detail. Further, 
the process of rapid prototyping is simple to execute and understand.  
However, it is the disadvantages of the approach that will make a difference to 
this thesis.1 These all revolve around the lack of models as products of the 
various stages of development.2 Models of the expertise, or of the target system, 
are very useful as evidence during verification and validation. Bugs in a KBS 
which was developed using multiple models can be traced and localized 
relatively easily, since each implementation decision will be traceable to some 
modelling input. In that event, the error can be placed as being in the conceptual 
model (i.e. an error in the conceptualization of the knowledge required to 
perform the task), in the design model (i.e. the design of the system itself was 
flawed), or in the implementation (i.e. the design was correct but not adhered to 
in the code). 
Further, there will be an interesting trade-off when considering the important 
issue of efficiency. A rapid prototyping methodology gets a system running, and, 
if that system is a good one, can be the quickest way to an efficient system. 
However, with a model-based development methodology, greater efficiency can 
                                                 
1In fact, model-based methodologies generally help themselves (at least partially) to the 
advantages of rapid prototyping by including prototyping stages in their life cycles. The 
development of prototypes is an important part of virtually all large-scale computing projects, 
although there is a school of thought that says that programmers are generally too reliant on an 
intrinsically flawed method of testing output (Gries 1981; Hoare 1984). The difference between 
rapid prototyping and model-based methodologies is that rapid prototyping sees the development 
of prototypes as the means of 'homing in' on the target system, while model-based methodologies 
develop prototypes to test the various models as they are being developed. 
2Although some (e.g. Clancey 1992) would claim that the system itself is a model of something. 
However, this is only to say that the model is the product of the whole process. Following this 
logic, each prototype system developed along the way will also be a model of the operation of 
the system in the world. But these successive models will not be structured in any way — they 
will have no function independently of the process of development. Our point is that in model-
based development (and not in rapid prototyping), the process of development itself can have by-
products which are models, and whose content will be, in a sense, independent of the target KBS, 
and further, that these various models can each be seen as useful for the process of development 
and support. Not only that, of course, but these models can have significance outside the KBS 
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result in the following two ways. Firstly, there simply is no easy way of 
discovering redundant code in a system developed via rapid prototyping, 
whereas with a model-based approach, each bit of code is aimed at various 
specific parts of the final model, which at least expresses the structure of the 
system, and can be used to detect redundancies. Code (i.e. lines of a program) is 
redundant when it can never be used, or when its function is duplicated by other 
code. When a program is hundreds of thousands of lines long, simply storing it is 
problematic enough, never mind accessing the right line of code at the right time. 
Hence it is essential for large-scale projects that redundant code is avoided. In 
rapid prototyping, code is written specifically to create certain effects; the expert 
wants some particular output, and a few lines are added which create that output. 
Once the program is more than a few tens of lines long, it becomes increasingly 
difficult to discover whether or not code is being duplicated (especially if the 
program is a software engineering project, i.e. it is being written by a number of 
programmers under a project manager). In a model-based methodology, the code 
only gets written at the end, when it is keyed to particular sections of the 
structured model. Since the model is structured, it is relatively easier to detect 
redundancies in the model, and if there are no redundancies in the model there 
should be no redundancies in the code. And the second way in which model-
based methods can be more efficient follows from the fact that the method of 
model refinement will make the development of a system rather more clearly 
specifiable — corners can't be cut, but equally blind alleys should be avoided. 
Hence, we make no claim that all KBSs will have the properties that we have 
mentioned. Indeed, many developers of model-based systems can be very willing 
to do great violence to their models in the name of greater efficiency for the final 
system. So we should be wary even about attaching the reflections following to 
all model-based systems. However, all along I will attempt to make it clear at 
least roughly how far a system developer can go before these reflections fail to 
apply. In fact, my belief is that a 'sliding scale' will be appropriate — all systems 
depart from their conceptual models to some degree, and to that extent they will 
fail to be fully-fledged psychological competence models. But that is not an all-
or-nothing thing. 
5.2.2  Conceptual Models and Competence Models 
The main business of §5.2 will be conducted in this subsection: we need to show 
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competence models such as we discussed in §5.1.2. We begin with a reminder 
about conceptual models. 
Conceptual models are intended to model the expertise required to do the job of 
the target KBS. In general, they will contain a number of elements which are 
essential for the building of the target KBS. There are a number of theories as to 
which elements are essential, but a rough consensus has formed, and a good 
exemplar is the KADS four-layer model discussed in §2.2.2. Recall that the 
KADS methodology suggested an epistemological division of knowledge into 
four  layers, each of which represented a type of knowledge which could in 
principle be acquired separately. These layers pretty well cover the various 
possibilities, and most major modelling methodologies can be represented 
without too much violence in a KADS-like format (Karbach et al 1990). As we 
discussed earlier, we are therefore justified in using KADS models as a standard; 
if our argument applies to KADS models, it will also apply to models built using 
other methodologies (and also to hand-crafted models). 
The four layers are as follows: the domain layer contains the knowledge about 
the static objects and concepts of the domain; the inference layer contains the 
knowledge required for primitive inferences to be made about the objects of the 
domain; the task layer contains knowledge about how to put together the 
primitive inferences in order to achieve goals; and the strategic layer contains 
knowledge about how to set up goals and schedule tasks. What we need to show 
here is that each of these types of knowledge is meaningful in the context of 
psychological competence models, and that each component of a competence 
model is meaningful in the context of conceptual models. In particular, if every 
item in a psychological competence model appears in some guise in a conceptual 
model, then we can say that all conceptual models are psychological competence 
models. 
We begin by showing that conceptual models are competence models. The 
components of a competence model are as follows (recall §5.1.1): the inferential 
primitives, the inferential types, the inferential relations and the competence 
theory linking the inferential relations to the solution relation. The domain layer 
of a conceptual model basically describes the domain without reference to 
inference; hence it can plausibly be assimilated to the inferential primitives (the 
objects that end up in the solution path). There are, however, two technical 
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there is the problem of ontology, and secondly we must look at how independent 
of inference the domain representations are. Neither point turns out to be serious, 
but each deserves a brief discussion. However, the less AI-minded reader may 
wish to skip the five paragraphs which follow and take it on trust. 
The problem of ontology is that there appears to be room for a mismatch, 
because in the definition of a competence model, all inference is done with first 
order objects. The inferential relations are binary, taking their input, which must 
be an object or tuple of objects, and output, which also must be an object or 
tuple, from named inferential types. Hence all inference in a competence model 
is performed over objects, the inferential primitives. Whereas in a conceptual 
model's domain theory, it is quite likely that reasoning will be performed about 
objects and their attributes (recall our discussion in §2.1.2, where objects such 
as my-beetle had attributes such as no-of-wheels). Is it the case that this 
possibility rules out the assimilation of the object-based inferential primitives 
with the domain layer of a conceptual model? 
Fortunately, the answer is 'no'. Generally speaking, in philosophical ontology, a 
parsimonious ontology is good. However, in computational ontology, what really 
counts is the ability to get the inferences done efficiently; the ontology of a 
computer program simply consists of the things the computer reasons about, and 
that question is much less deep than its Quinean philosophical analogue, the 
question of what things there are. So what we want to know is whether it makes 
sense to treat the attributes and values of attributes of objects in a conceptual 
modelling language as objects such as are reasoned about in competence models. 
In modelling practice, it turns out that it does make sense. This is impossible to 
establish in the short space available here, without departing too much from our 
philosophical brief. But to show how it is done, we can take a quick look at the 
knowledge representation language (KRL) Ontolingua (Gruber 1992). 
Ontolingua is particularly suggestive, since its aim is to act as an all-purpose 
KRL to translate between KBs written in different KRLs (in other words, it may 
not be efficient, but it is highly expressive). The way it represents an attribute is 
as a two-place relation, which takes as its first argument a domain object (e.g. 
my-beetle), and as its second argument a value (e.g. 4). This particular 
pairing of two objects would be appropriate for the relation no-of-wheels. 
Relations are extensionally characterized, so they are sets of pairs of objects, 
which, being sets, are objects in their own right. Hence everything that might be 
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relation  itself, can be seen as an object. Even the knowledge that the number of 
wheels of my beetle is four can be seen as an object, the triple containing 
no-of-wheels,  my-beetle and 4. So the fact that competence models' 
reasoning is represented as being about objects exclusively is not a problem. 
The second technical question is the independence from inference. Obviously, 
which inferential primitives get chosen depends on what inferential relations the 
solution relation will be decomposed into. Yet in a conceptual model, the domain 
layer is supposedly independent of the inference layer. Can these points of view 
be reconciled? Of course, they could be trivially reconciled, since there is 
nothing in the definition of a competence model that insists that all inferential 
types or primitives need to be used; however, a good competence model should 
be such that each part of it is significant, and so the inclusion of redundancy 
would only answer the question in a most unsatisfactory way. 
Fortunately, there is a non-trivial reconciliation. The independence of the domain 
and inference layers is only partial. The inference layer contains patterns of 
inference that may be shared across domains (for example, the inference 
structure of systematic diagnosis that was shown in Figure 2.4, repeated as 
Figure 5.3). The domain layer is then a 'filling-in' of this inference structure. 
True independence would be achieved if the domain layer could be kept constant 
across various inference structures. So if the domain was the respiratory disease 
domain, for example, the same domain layer could be used for a diagnostic KBS 
and a prognostic KBS, or a diagnostic KBS that used the diagnostic inference 
structure heuristic classification, and a diagnostic KBS that used the diagnostic 
inference structure cover-and-differentiate. Domain layers can be transferred, but 
only up to a point. 
What actually happens is that when we switch from one inference structure to 
another, the domain layer needs to be reconceptualized and reorganized 
somewhat. Hence efficiency is lost, both in the running of the target KBS and in 
its implementation. The problem lies in the ambiguity of the notion of 'the 
knowledge required to do the job'. Suppose we had a problem P, and there were 
two structures of inference, or methods of solving the problem, M and N. 
Suppose M requires knowledge K to solve P, and N requires knowledge L, and 
that K and L were not identical (as is typically the case). Suppose also that there 
are good reasons why M and N might each be chosen to solve P. Now, what is 
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union of K and L is required, since that is the minimal set of knowledge which 
allows a choice between the two methods. But then each method would be 
weighed down with redundant knowledge. On the other hand, if K (or L) were 
chosen (as a minimal set), then the domain would not have been represented 
independently of method, since the choice of K (L) to represent the domain 
would entail the choice of the particular method M (N) to solve P. Hence 
representing the domain does in practice involve some sort of commitment to 
particular inference structures. Indeed Bylander and Chandrasekaran (1988) 
insist that the way that the domain is represented depends on which inferences 
are going to be used; the development of the system itself will be imperilled if 
the domain knowledge representation does not take into account the inferences 
that will be made over it. Therefore, in Chandrasekaran's Generic Task 
methodology, each Generic Task (= method of solution) has associated with it its 
own knowledge representation language. Since it has been shown that different 
Generic Tasks can solve the same problem (O'Hara and Shadbolt 1993b), it 
follows that choosing a representational format for the domain amounts to the 
choice of method for problem-solving. 
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Figure 5.3: The KADS-I Model of Systematic Diagnosis 
So, to summarize the outcome of this brief technical discussion, it is reasonable 
to assume that conceptual models, as well as competence models, reason solely 
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in a conceptual model will depend on the inferences performed over them, just as 
the inferential primitives (and types, for that matter) of a competence model will 
depend on the inferential relations. There are philosophical analogues of the 
problems we have tried to meet here. For the first problem, an analogue might be 
theories of arithmetic that treat numbers as objects (e.g. they can be quantified 
over). One can go along with these theories 'as if' numbers were objects, without 
being committed to the Platonic view of arithmetic. The second problem is 
perhaps similar to the question of what the basic building blocks are of, say, the 
human body. The answer here is that it will vary from inferential context to 
inferential context. For example, for the physicist or chemist, the fundamental 
parts are atoms and molecules; for the biochemist they are cells; for the 
anatomist, they are such macro-systems as the lungs, liver, bones, etc.. The basic 
primitives vary as the inferential context varies. We find the same result with the 
inferential primitives of conceptual models. Hence there is no obstacle in the 
assimilation of the conceptual model domain layer with the inferential primitives 
of a psychological competence model. 
Now we want to know what, if a conceptual model is a competence model, can 
be taken as the inferential types and inferential relations? Here, the answer can 
be found in the inference layer. Recall the model of systematic diagnosis in 
Figure 5.3. This is an inference layer structure, and connects classes of domain 
knowledge indexed by role, with primitive inferences. The whole represents a 
complex inference from a complaint to a state or process which is responsible for 
that complaint. Hence the inference structure can be seen as a decomposition of 
the solution relation which relates complaints with solutions. The metaclasses 
are the inferential types (so in Figure 5.3, the inferential types are represented by 
complaint,  system model,  universum of observables,  hypothesis,  conclusion, 
variable value, norm and difference), while the inference steps are inferential 
relations (so in Figure 5.3, the inferential relations are select, decompose, specify 
and  compare). In KADS theory, these inferential relations are sufficiently 
primitive to be regarded as understood. 
Finally, there is the competence theory, which relates the inferential relations 
with the solution relation. This can be assimilated to the knowledge in the task 
and strategic layers, in the following way. What goes on in the task and strategic 
layers is that decisions are made as to how to navigate through inference 
structures such as the one seen in Figure 5.3 so as to solve the required problems. 
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out what state (disease, malfunction) is causing it — this is what we meant when 
we said in the previous paragraph that the inference structure can be seen as a 
decomposition of the solution relation which relates complaints with solutions. 
However, the solution relation could be differently characterized. For example, 
one may, given a diagnosis (disease, malfunction), wish to work backwards to 
the complaint, so that one knows what symptoms to expect — after all, the cure 
may be worse than the disease. This is a different solution relation, and the same 
inferential relations (and their inverses, which of course can be used in 
decompositions) would have to be combined in different ways. This is exactly 
the sort of issue that the competence theory is meant to tackle. Hence we can 
assimilate the competence theory of the competence model with the task and 
strategic layers of the conceptual model. 
We have now effectively shown that conceptual models are competence models, 
as defined in §5.1.1. However, we are particularly interested in psychological 
competence models, a subclass of competence models which we defined in 
§5.1.2, because it is only psychological competence models which we have 
shown to be explanatory (§5.1.3). Hence we need to show that the constraints on 
psychological competence models apply to conceptual models, if we are to show 
that conceptual models are explanatory. 
The first constraint was that the model should be predictive. This is easily met; a 
good conceptual model will be used in novel situations, and therefore cannot 
simply be a post hoc rationalization of the expertise. 
The second constraint was that competence should be a 'smooth curve' through 
the 'cluster' of performances. Again, conceptual models bear a similar relation to 
performance of experts; it is not the case that each judgment needs to be 
preserved. 
The third constraint was that psychological competence models should 
rationalize the competence. Conceptual models are developed using KA 
techniques. These are used with the expert's co-operation, and help to map the 
structures in the conceptual model onto the expert's ontology. Indeed, if there 
were not such a mapping, the explanations of the KBS's output provided by the 
KBS would not be understandable. Hence the conceptual model does help us 
make sense of the expertise. Of course, some KA techniques are designed to 
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reasoning. As we noted above (§5.1.3), the 'constructs' uncovered by techniques 
such as repertory grid analysis would count under this heading. Furthermore, the 
terms used in a conceptual model are relatively primitive inferences; hence the 
complex problem-solving is decomposed into more or less well-understood 
steps. 
The fourth constraint is that various information processing constraints should be 
respected. This is usual for a conceptual model. 
The fifth constraint is that psychological competence models should describe the 
production of performance, rather than simply predicting the performance. The 
terms of the models themselves need to have psychological significance. It is not 
enough for the model to be a decomposition of the solution relation (always 
assuming that the model is not intended to be explanatory at level 1); it has to 
give the inferential relations corresponding to the inferences that the expert 
actually makes. The level of correspondence then depends on the level of 
explanation that the model is intended to provide — typically level 1.6. We saw 
in §4.2.4 how, all things being equal, KBS development requires a model of 
expertise at level 1.6 — in other words, a conceptual model usually describes the 
production of performance at level 1.6. We have seen that psychological 
competence models can also do the same, in §5.1.3. 
Finally, the psychological competence model need not be a function, and neither 
need the conceptual model. Admissible output only need be specified. What 
needs to be shown is that the expert's problem-solving behaviour in a specific 
instance will be a solution path of the model; it does not need to be shown 
further that this solution path is unique, or privileged in the model. 
There are just a couple more points that we need to make. Firstly, we have to 
look at the audience for whom a conceptual model would be explanatory. We 
have seen that an explanation needs an audience, and also that psychological 
competence models are explanatory. Hence it follows pretty quickly that the sort 
of people who would find a psychological competence model explanatory would 
also be interested in a conceptual model — we mentioned programmers, 
ergonomists and cognitive psychologists. Clearly, as well as these there is a 
ready-made audience for conceptual models, and that is the class of KBS 
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operation of the expertise at level 1.6, and that, it turns out, is precisely what 
conceptual models provide. 
And secondly, we noted in §5.1.3 (in the indented part) that we needed to show 
how conceptual models are contentful. If something is to be explanatory, then it 
needs to be shown that it is not the case that just any model will do. Of course, a 
conceptual model is constrained in a number of important ways. Firstly, it must 
provide an accurate specification of the solution relation. And secondly, 
associated with all the KA tools used in the KA process will be methodologies 
for their use. These will act as constraints; if a KA tool uncovers a certain 
inference pattern or ontological structure, then it should end up in the model; the 
knowledge engineer cannot just ignore selectively knowledge that he has elicited 
from the expert. 
5.2.3 Off-the-Peg  Models 
There is one final cavil which we must address, before we can complete our 
argument, a cavil we first hinted at in §2.2.3. We have shown that conceptual 
models are psychological competence models, which is the result we wanted. 
However, we do want our conclusions to apply to more than a vanishingly small 
set of KBSs; what we want to show is that the class of conceptual models which 
are also psychological competence models is a significant class. 
This is where a potential problem emerges. I think there is no doubt that we can 
be happy with 'hand-crafted' conceptual models developed for particular systems 
on particular domains, models that are 'made to measure' for the application. If a 
knowledge engineer sits down with the expert and puts together a special 
purpose model, then, assuming that the knowledge engineer is competent, the 
result will be a model that is explanatory. However, such systems are expensive 
to build; it is cheaper to develop a model using a skeletal model selected from a 
model library, as discussed in §2.2.2 (cf also O'Hara and Shadbolt forthcoming). 
There are a number of modelling methodologies that include libraries of well-
known or frequently-occurring inference structures. The model of systematic 
diagnosis featured in Figure 5.3 is a model from the KADS library of 
interpretation models (Breuker et al 1987). This is an inference structure, which 
comes with a default control structure. Chandrasekaran's Generic Task 
methodology (Chandrasekaran and Johnson 1993) provides inference and Conceptual Models, Competence Models and Psychological Explanation  185 
control structures. The Generalised Directive Model (GDM) methodology (Van 
Heijst et al 1992; O'Hara 1993) provides inference layer components which can 
be assembled using a GDM grammar. In conceptual model terms, what these off-
the-peg skeletal models provide is a specification of the inference layer and a 
partial (or default) specification of the task layer (in the case of GDMs there is 
no specification of the task layer). In competence model terms, they provide a 
specification of the inferential relations and types, and a partial (or default) 
specification of the competence theory (except in the case of GDMs). 
The complaint that we might anticipate is that it might be the case that library-
based conceptual models built out of the skeletal models in these various 
libraries do not fit the problem-solving sufficiently well to be explanatory of it. 
Even though the resulting models are good enough to build working systems out 
of, they might not count as actually explanatory. They will slip up either by not 
properly rationalizing the problem-solving, or by failing to describe the 
production of the performance at level 1.6. We might say that the expertise is 
'shoe-horned' into the shape of the model for the convenience of the system-
builders, not explained or even properly described. 
It is unknown how many model-based KBSs are built using model libraries, and 
it is also unknown how many KBSs are built using the particular libraries 
mentioned here. Nevertheless, I will focus on them as examples, to show how 
there are two answers to the criticism. I hope that these three libraries can be 
taken as representative. The KADS library of interpretation models has been 
very successfully used in many European applications (Wielinga et al 1992, 
p.46). The Generic Task library may be the oldest; it has certainly been used in a 
number of American applications. GDMs are a relatively recent invention, and 
are still at the research phase. However, they have been used to build small 
systems (e.g. Motta et al 1994). 
The early KADS interpretation model library was influential, but in fact was 
rarely used unalloyed in actual applications. The library contains a couple of 
dozen models (one of which is systematic diagnosis). What tended to happen 
was that the models did not quite fit the problem-solving (e.g. it might be that the 
problem-solving was systematic diagnosis without a system model — the list of 
hypotheses was known and the diagnostician simply ran through the list). Hence 
the library model would distort the problem-solving. But what could happen is 
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simply constructs one that actually fits the problem-solving by adjusting, adding 
to, or removing, the offending parts. The KADS model is merely taken as a 
starting point, and is built on rather than being used wholesale. The individual 
parts of the inference structure — the boxes and ovals — lend themselves to 
being removed and replaced, so this was not too onerous. The result is a model 
which does fit the problem-solving after all. 
Generic Tasks were, to begin with, even more rigid than KADS models 
(Chandrasekaran 1983). They contained, not only rigid inference structures, but 
rigid control structures and special purpose KRLs. In competence model terms, 
only the most general parts of the competence theory were left to the knowledge 
engineer's discretion. Again, this resulted in a change of tack for the 
methodology, for, although the six tasks in the library were very useful and 
ubiquitous, they were not quite flexible enough, but unlike KADS models, were 
not easy to customize. The result was a change in the methodology (and 
consequent change in the structure of the library), to a less monolithic approach 
(Chandrasekaran 1990). The Generic Tasks were replaced by generic Task 
Structures, loose families of control structures and ways of representing 
knowledge. Much more leeway was given to the knowledge engineer, and the 
result was customizable models as in KADS. 
However, the customizing of Generic Tasks could have been controlled more 
strongly (O'Hara and Shadbolt 1993b). In other words, the changes that could be 
made to large scale abstract models could also be encoded in the library; if those 
changes were sufficiently small scale, it is plausible that even a library model 
would be fine grained enough to represent the problem-solving. This is the 
insight behind GDMs, which come with a decompositional grammar to allow 
any model to be rewritten in a number of minor ways. Space dictates that this 
cannot be gone into in detail; but an analogy would be with sentences and words. 
Complete models in a library are analogous to sentences describing the problem-
solving. The GDM grammar is analogous to a formal language out of which 
many thousands of sentences can be constructed; the result is a recursive 
definition of models which means that many orders of magnitude more models 
can be expressed in the GDM library. For example, in a recent application, a 
very small library indeed (three rewrite rules) drawn up to describe teaching 
strategies was able to represent nearly a million models (Major and O'Hara 
1994). The full GDM grammar will have tens of rewrite rules. Hence only very 
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decompositional techniques. O'Hara and Shadbolt (forthcoming), discuss the 
general movement of KBS development methodologies toward this more 
decompositional position. 
Our conclusion, then, is that even off-the-peg models can be expected to describe 
problem-solving at a sufficient level of detail in a large number of cases. The 
first reason is that they are often customized by knowledge engineers. The 
second reason is that methods of representing models are getting more and more 
fine grained, and consequently more expressive anyway. To repeat, the purpose 
of this digression was to ensure that our results apply to as wide a class of 
models as possible. 
5.2.4  The Argument Completed: Conceptual Models, 
Knowledge-Based Systems and Psychological Explanation 
We have two pieces of business to transact in this subsection. We need to 
complete our arguments about the explanatoriness of the AI systems we have 
been discussing. The first argument is an argument to the effect that conceptual 
models are explanatory. This argument is very simply made. In §5.1.1 we 
defined a type of model which we termed a competence model; in §5.1.2 we 
defined a particular class of competence model which we called psychological 
competence models. In §5.1.3 we showed that psychological competence models 
are explanatory of the problem-solving behaviour that they model for a number 
of different audiences, as long as certain conditions held. In §5.2.2 we showed 
that conceptual models were psychological competence models and that the 
conditions did hold, while in §5.2.3 we showed that there need be no serious 
worry about the use of ready-made skeletal templates for the development of 
conceptual models. Since conceptual models are psychological competence 
models, then, it follows that they are explanatory of the problem-solving 
behaviour they model, for the various audiences we have mentioned, and no 
doubt others. Hence, on the assumption that expertise is problem-solving ability, 
KBS development can produce psychological explanations of expertise as by-
products. 
This shows that conceptual models are explanatory. However, our main interest 
in this thesis is in the AI systems themselves: can they be seen as explanatory? 
An examination of KBS development methodology suggests an argument to the 
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1) Model-based KBS development involves refining a series of models, 
from the user requirements specification (which may involve models 
of the users, the used-upon, the computers to be used, etc.) and the 
conceptual model of the expert, through a more implementation-
based design phase, to the implementation itself. 
2) Since the development process is one of model refinement, the final 
system will share a number of characteristics of the conceptual 
model. 
3) Anything that is sufficiently like a conceptual model in structure will 
be a psychological competence model of the expertise in question. 
4) To the extent that the final system respects the conceptual model of the 
expertise, the final system is explanatory of the expert, by virtue of its 
being a psychological competence model, which itself is true by 
virtue of its being similar enough to the conceptual model. 
 
Obviously, this argument can only refer to a subset of the set of KBSs. And the 
parameters can be argued about — I don't want to specify exactly how much a 
KBS can deviate from its conceptual model before it ceases to be viewed as a 
psychological competence model. It is certainly the case that this subset of KBSs 
will be significantly populated. Often, even if the detailed conceptual model is 
more fine grained than it need be for the system merely to run, it can happen that 
the detail of the conceptual model is welcome in other respects. For example, the 
business of providing decent explanations for the output of KBSs is an important 
one, and the finer-grained model is of use there for the final system, even if not 
for the main activity of deriving output from input. 
Obviously, similar thoughts apply to design models. They have a lot in common 
with conceptual models, often being written in the same formal language. They 
are intended to take computational limitations into account, and so therefore may 
depart from the expertise. To that extent they fail to model it. But, like KBSs, if 
they retain sufficiently many aspects of the conceptual model, they can be 
explanatory too. 
5.3  Knowledge-Based Systems, Normative and Causal 
Explanation 
§5.2 has proved our main result of the thesis. Conceptual models are explanatory 
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models. One final subsidiary question that we might wish to answer is: what type 
of explanation do they provide? Recall from §3.4 that we discussed two types of 
explanations, causal explanation and normative explanation. Each of these is a 
decent candidate for the type of explanation provided by a KBS or a conceptual 
model. In this final section of the chapter, we will examine the credentials of 
conceptual models with respect to these types of explanation. Our discussion will 
be brief and in no way conclusive; however, the conclusions we draw will allow 
us to make a tentative suggestion about the nature of expertise in Chapter Six. 
5.3.1 Normative  Explanation? 
Recall from §3.4.2 that a normative explanation is a type of non-causal 
explanation that basically sets out the norms for a particular type of behaviour. 
One would expect from a normative explanation to be told how to do a certain 
task; because the basic items in the explanation are norms, it is up to me whether 
or not I follow them. The main point is that I have an account of the task which 
tells me that if I want to perform it, this is what I do. 
But this is just what a conceptual model provides. A conceptual model is a 
psychological competence model. Hence it has the formal structure that we 
defined in §5.1.1, and meets the constraints given in §5.1.2. The solution relation 
characterizes the task, and the model decomposes the relation into a series of 
inferential relations, all of which are simpler or more tractable than the solution 
relation itself. Therefore, if each inferential relation corresponds to a relatively 
simple inference that I can make, then it follows that if I learn the conceptual 
model, I will be able to perform the task too (possibly not with the facility of the 
expert, of course). I will even be able to provide explanations and justifications 
of my output, exactly as the expert would be able to with respect to her output. 
So the conceptual model can be seen as providing a set of norms governing some 
expert conduct; it tells you that this is how it is done. Further, because we are 
dealing with experts, it is reasonable to suppose that the method outlined in the 
conceptual model is actually the best way of performing the task. 'Best' might 
have one of two senses here. It could mean that the experts know the 
quickest/easiest/most efficient/most reliable method, which is enshrined in the 
model. Or it could mean that the real life task is constrained in a number of ways 
— so that the quickest route from problem to solution cannot always be used — 
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example of such a constraint would be the necessity for an expert to be able to 
justify her output in courts of law; such a constraint might have led to a tailoring 
of the expertise to meet certain evidential conditions. 
So we can say that a conceptual model provides a normative explanation of a 
practice, in the sense that it provides a manual for how to perform the task in 
some optimal way, and plays a justificatory role too, in that it sets out a series of 
inferences which show that the output is the right output for the task (even if 
those steps were not necessarily followed). 
5.3.2 Causal  Explanation? 
Can a conceptual model count as a causal explanation? Recall from §3.4.3 that a 
causal explanation specifies a cause of the explanandum — the explanandum in 
this case being expertise, or expert performance — and specifies also the 
causally relevant property of the cause. We did not define causal relevance in 
full. One possible way in which a property can be causally relevant is for it to be 
causally efficacious. But it is difficult to see that a conceptual model outlines 
causally efficacious properties of an expert. 
The components of conceptual models are designed specifically for the 
development of KBSs, as we have seen. The domain level entities are basically 
the sorts of things that can be used to model data in a computer — classes, 
elements, attribute slots, frames, etc. — which we saw in the section on 
knowledge representation, §2.1.2. At the inference level, what we find are 
typical domain-independent inferences, and types of data, indexed as to the role 
they play in problem-solving. Examples of the former are inferences such as 
abstract, or match, and of the latter are observables, or hypotheses. At the task 
level, we have problem-solving methods such as heuristic classification or 
design by propose-and-revise.  
Now if we look at what would be the causally efficacious properties typically 
cited in psychology, we do not find that sort of entity. In this thesis, I would like 
to remain neutral between various positions on the causal story psychology tells, 
and neutral between realist and anti-realist notions of causation. But we can do a 
small survey of the field in the philosophy of psychology, to see if there is a 
glimmer of hope for the claim that conceptual models are about causally 
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We can make a rough sort of distinction between connectionists and anti-
connectionists, and consider briefly each case in turn. Anti-connectionists, such 
as Fodor or Pylyshyn, tend to see the causal entities as being at least something 
like programming language constructs, whose syntactic form is efficacious both 
semantically and causally, thereby making the link between reasons and causes. 
If this view held, then it would possibly be arguable that the domain level items 
in a conceptual model mapped onto causes relatively directly. The domain level 
items are pretty low level. They don't tend to be primitive in standard 
programming languages, but do appear in KRLs, which are after all special 
purpose programming languages. Moreover they can often appear in basic 
languages in mathematical logic. So it wouldn't be absurd to argue that they 
could be related to genuinely causal entities — neither is there any positive 
evidence that they are so related, of course. So one might reasonably hold the 
line that some structure in the brain represented, say, knowledge about the 
number of wheels a car has got, or knowledge about what temperatures can be 
taken as feverish. The classic example of such a view would be a language of 
thought account, which posits symbol types corresponding to the notions like 
'number-of-wheels', such that these symbols have causally efficacious properties 
which information processing mechanisms can make use of. Since these would 
be actually identifiable structures, the claim could be made that they are causally 
efficacious. So the anti-connectionist view at least can make a relatively strong 
claim about the causal efficacy of the domain layer of a conceptual model (this 
would be an a priori claim, since there is no empirical evidence). 
But if the jury is out for the domain level, it seems pretty unlikely that the 
inference or task layer entities could have any causal status (O'Hara and Shadbolt 
1993a). No-one seems to have suggested that high level specifications of 
inferences or domain knowledge are somehow causally efficacious. It seems 
most unlikely that the methods for problem-solving outlined by the various KBS 
development methodologies feature as brainy structures. Conceptually, the 
various domain level entities have clear antecedents, but such large scale 
inference structures such as heuristic classification or propose-and-revise are 
recent inventions/discoveries, and it is surely improbable that they represent 
causally efficacious structures in the brain. The same goes for the components of 
such methods (such as abstract, refine or match). When, say, an observable is 
abstracted into a finding, it is highly unlikely that this describes any causal 
process taking the structure corresponding to the knowledge about the 
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unlikely that the causal processes in the brain magically correspond to the 
inference layer terms of KBS development models. 
The position is even worse if one takes the connectionist or eliminativist line, 
which locates the effective causal entities in the brain as described 
neuroscientifically. For it is as plain as a pikestaff that there is no heuristic 
classification neuron, or group of neurons, that can be causally efficacious in 
ways described by conceptual models. KBS development, as a discipline, is 
firmly in the standard, logicist camp of AI. 
So, whichever philosophy of psychology is taken (at least of the main 
candidates), it is difficult to see how conceptual models can give causally 
efficacious properties. So if the only way to be causally relevant (as required for 
causal explanation) is to be causally efficacious, then conceptual models cannot 
be seen as causally explanatory of expertise. 
However, as we noted in §3.4.4, there is at least one other way to be causally 
relevant. A property can be causally relevant if its realization ensures that there 
will be a causally efficacious property in the offing (Jackson and Pettit 1990). 
Such an abstract property programs for the lower order property. Many 
properties can be efficacious in causing a particular effect; the program property 
ensures that at least one of them will be realized. In this sense we can suggest 
that a conceptual model can after all be a causal explanation of the expertise. 
Suppose a conceptual model attributes a state to an expert — for example, 
suppose that the conceptual model contains a rule 
IF temperature(patient) > 39 THEN fever(patient). 
 
This rule describes the expert's reasoning about fevers and temperatures . The 
expert behaves exactly as if she believes a universally quantified version of that 
statement. Of course, because our example is so simple, it is quite likely a 
medical expert would profess a belief in it. This example is at the domain layer, 
but equally inference and task knowledge (more usually knowledge how rather 
than knowledge that) can correspond to beliefs or knowledge that the expert has.  
The result is that we have a sort of two-level program property. At the first level, 
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of knowledge that the expert has. This programs for various beliefs that an expert 
has. For example, the expert might believe exactly that anyone with a 
temperature over 39° has a fever. Or she may have a belief which does not have 
precisely that content (she may believe that anyone who feels very hot to the 
touch has a fever, or that anyone who displays abnormal discomfiture as a result 
of high body temperature has a fever), but which is programmed for by the 
conceptual model. In other words, because she has the belief that she has, any 
model of her can contain the information that anyone with a temperature over 
39° has a fever. At the second level, the belief programs for some causally 
efficacious property (at least, this is a standard philosophical story). (Davidson 
1963) is the classic argument that beliefs can be causes; (Jackson and Pettit 
1988) argue that it is natural to see beliefs as causally programming some 
property that is actually causally efficacious. Hence — since programming in 
this sense should be transitive — the conceptual model programs for some 
causally efficacious property in the expert. Hence the conceptual model is 
causally relevant, and hence the conceptual model provides a causal explanation 
of the expertise. 
We should spend a little time considering the work performed on the psychology 
of KA (§2.2.5 above). Recall the work done by Barry Silverman using 
conceptual models to uncover biases in expertise. If biases have been weeded out 
of the expertise by the knowledge engineer, then it seems clear that, although 
there would be no problem for a conceptual model as a normative explanation, it 
could not — at least with respect to the areas of the expertise polluted by the bias 
— act as a causal explanation of the expertise. KA as critique of expertise is 
relatively rare, and so it is unlikely that this caveat rules out many existing 
systems, but it should be made clear. 
A second caveat would attach to the work of Burton et al (and others) which 
shows that experts do not always recognise their expertise. Indeed, many experts 
do not perceive themselves as manipulating rules at all, whereas most conceptual 
models and KBSs tend to be rule-based. The program story still stands with 
respect to such systems. The conceptual model programs for some belief or 
beliefs that the expert has, that lead her to behave exactly if she were following 
the rules of the conceptual model, even if this rule-following is not performed 
consciously at all. The beliefs then program for causally efficacious properties as 
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Of course, these notions of causal relevance and efficacy are at the centre of a 
great deal of current debate in the philosophy of mind, and it is fair to say that no 
real consensus has emerged. What our brief discussion, in the context of the 
theory of program explanation developed by Jackson and Pettit, has shown is 
that it cannot as yet be ruled out that conceptual models generated by KBS 
development can figure in causal explanations of expertise. 
5.3.3  Conceptual Models and KBSs are Both Normatively 
Explanatory and Causally Explanatory 
So, to conclude this chapter, we can see that conceptual models may be both 
normatively and causally explanatory. They are explanatory because they are 
psychological competence models (§5.2), which are themselves explanatory 
(§5.1). They are normatively explanatory (§5.3.1) because they describe the 
norms of expert behaviour, while they are causally explanatory (§5.3.2) because 
they program for various beliefs, which themselves program for causally 
efficacious properties, and are therefore causally relevant to the expert 
performance. 
Further, because KBSs are built from conceptual models with minimal violence 
to the models, they can be seen as embodying those models (§5.2.4), and 
therefore are normatively and causally explanatory themselves. 
This is a very interesting result — it is unusual to see an explanation touted as 
being both normative and causal (i.e. causal and non-causal at the same time). 
We will discuss the import of this dual nature of conceptual models as 
explanations in our concluding chapter, Chapter Six.  195 
Chapter Six: Conclusion: Expertise and 
Artificial Intelligence 
We have now completed the main body of work of this thesis, and it is the 
purpose of this final chapter to review the ground we have covered, and to 
enumerate the take-home messages that follow. 
6.1  Review of Chapters One-Five 
We began in Chapter One with a discussion of a general split in philosophy 
between top down and bottom up philosophy. Top down philosophy is concerned 
with aprioristic reasoning about various fields; bottom up philosophy, in 
contrast, is a more Baconian philosophy which takes the actual progress in those 
fields as the subject matter it is to evaluate. It was argued, by way of a number of 
examples, that most philosophy of AI has been top down in style, and because of 
that, that a number of interesting opportunities have been missed (which is not to 
denigrate the interesting results that top down philosophy has achieved). This led 
to the first major assumption of the thesis: that the philosophical style of the 
thesis was to be bottom up. This entailed that we would be relatively suspicious 
of a priori reasoning about AI, and would concentrate instead on evaluating an 
existing functioning sub-discipline of AI. 
In order to do this, we needed some background to such an area. Chapter Two 
introduced a relatively mundane field of AI, that of model-based KBS 
development methodologies. We saw that such methodologies have interesting 
advantages for knowledge acquisition, explanation, verification and validation, 
and archiving. We focussed on model refinement methodologies, which move 
from user requirements to conceptual model to design model to implementation. 
Examples of such methodologies include KADS, Generic Tasks and GDMs. The 
aim of the thesis could then be formulated with respect to this field: conceptual 
models built as a result of model-based KBS development projects (and, 
derivatively, design models and KBSs themselves) are explanatory of the 
expertise they model. 
Chapter Three accordingly introduced the idea of scientific explanation. We 
extended our preference for bottom up explanation in the philosophy of AI to the 
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explanation of many important philosophers of science, such as Hempel, 
Salmon, Lewis and van Fraassen. We did not dispute that these forms of 
explanation were epistemologically interesting, nor that they delineated and 
described important classes of explanation in science. But we wanted a more 
general account. Hence, from our bottom up perspective, we looked at a number 
of scientific activities that are prima facie explanatory, and tried to get a general 
account of them. This account was very context-sensitive, but we were able to 
list a series of conditions that an account of an explanatory practice should 
discuss. Our second major assumption could then be stated: a good explanation 
should help a scientist to reach understanding of some phenomenon, where 
understanding is to be read instrumentally as rendering some achievement 
with respect to that phenomenon possible. We also discussed causal and non-
causal explanation, and set out one variety of non-causal explanation, normative 
explanation, and one variety of causal explanation, program explanation. 
Since psychology is a science, the results of Chapter Three all applied to 
psychological explanation, in which we were interested. Chapter Four discussed 
some further results that applied to psychological explanation in particular. The 
main assumption reached in this chapter was that: computational/information 
processing models in psychology can be explanatory. This is not made trivial 
by the results of Chapter Three. Because we refuse (for bottom up reasons) to 
make hard and fast pronouncements about what can and cannot be explanatory, 
in one, loose, sense of 'possibility', it is 'possible' that anything could be 
explanatory. We are not using 'possibility' in this sense. When we say that it is 
possible that some practice can be explanatory, what we have to show is that 
there is some context in which the practice actually is explanatory. The result 
will be more significant according to the plausibility or ubiquity of the context. 
Following the formulation of this third main assumption, the rest of the chapter 
was devoted to setting out how computational models could be explanatory. We 
reviewed Marr's three levels, 1, 2 and 3, and Peacocke's level 1.5, and found 
them unsatisfactory for our purposes. We therefore formulated a new level, level 
1.6. 
Finally, Chapter Five attempted to put all these three assumptions together in the 
context of our chosen subfield of AI, model-based KBS development , to 
produce the main result of the thesis. §5.1 proved a lemma, that a particular type 
of competence model (defined in §5.1.1) called a psychological competence 
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used this lemma to show that conceptual models are psychological competence 
models, and therefore that: conceptual models (and, derivatively, KBSs) are 
explanatory of problem-solving behaviour at level 1.6. 
After the main result, we developed a subsidiary thesis. §5.3 looked at the 
content of these models to determine the sense in which they are explanatory, 
and produced the surprising result that, plausibly, conceptual models (and, 
derivatively, KBSs) are both causally and normatively explanatory of 
problem-solving behaviour (at least pending further research into the whole 
notion of causal explanation in psychology). 
That is a review of the work done in this thesis. For the remainder of this 
chapter, we will discuss some implications. 
6.2  Artificial Intelligence as Explanatory 
Our first task is to make sure that we have answered the question posed in the 
title of the thesis: can computational processes be regarded as explanatory of 
mental processes? The answer here is clearly 'yes'. We have shown that a certain 
class of KBS is explanatory of expertise; KBSs are computational systems, even 
if conceptual models are not, and so therefore we have an existence proof that 
computational systems can be psychologically explanatory.  
Of course, after our discussions of explanation in Chapter Three, we would 
expect this result to be relativized to a context, and this is indeed the case. We set 
out, in Chapters Four and Five, various classes of people for whom this sort of 
explanation would be interesting: knowledge engineers of course trivially leap to 
mind. Others include ergonomists and people in human factors research. Indeed, 
one major class of people for whom conceptual models at least can be 
explanatory are those for whom expertise is a commodity (e.g. industrial 
corporations). As expertise gets increasingly expensive because of the value it 
adds to products, its preservation for a corporation is correspondingly important. 
Hence conceptual models are increasingly used, not for KBS development, but 
for archiving expertise; a recent article in Fortune 500 focussed on such work in 
industry and business. Recall also Barry Silverman's work (1990), which uses 
conceptual models to explain how expertise could lead to flawed results (e.g. the 
Challenger disaster, the Bhopal disaster); this of course is of value for accident 
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Hence although the contexts in which conceptual models are explanatory are 
limited, they are not vanishingly small. This is to be expected; §§5.1 and 5.2 
showed how conceptual models are instances of a general explanatory strategy, 
decomposing a complex process into simpler ones. The basic processes are, in 
the case of conceptual modelling, fairly simple, possibly even simple enough to 
be of interest to academic cognitive psychology. Examples include selection 
(selecting an element from a class on the basis of some requirement) and 
abstraction (stripping inessential information from a proposition). Clearly such a 
strategy is going to render the complex process understandable in many 
contexts; this is certainly true given our instrumental characterization of 
understanding, but is also likely to be true given rather more traditional accounts 
of understanding. 
6.3  Expertise in Context 
We said in §6.2 that we have shown that a certain class of KBS is explanatory of 
expertise. However much expertise is context-sensitive (Agnew et al 1994), and 
does not transfer easily from the areas in which it is tried and trusted. It often 
consists largely of relatively ad hoc propositions about the domain, which are 
entailed by the underlying laws of the domain given common or standard initial 
conditions. If the conditions under which the expertise is to function change 
fairly radically, the expert often flounders. Therefore many people in AI do not 
want to make an easy assimilation between the content of the conceptual model 
and "what goes on in the expert's head" (specified in some internal, or context 
independent, way), since, for expertise to flourish, certain conditions about the 
expert's  context have to obtain as well. For example, the influential theorist 
William Clancey sees a KBS as a model of some system or organization in the 
world, encompassing the KBS and its environment. The expert is seen as an 
'informant about some system in the world (therefore knowledge acquisition is 
primarily concerned with modeling some system in the expert's world, in 
contrast to modeling his mental processes)' (Clancey 1992, p.6). 
The worry here is that the conceptual model inevitably includes information 
about the environment of the target system — or, perhaps better, is inevitably 
tainted by environmental influences. Hence we need to be clear about the claims 
we are making in the thesis. The conceptual model explains the expertise and its 
operation in a wider context. And this is not surprising — it cannot be 
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development of an operational KBS, and the function of explanation is very 
much secondary. That does not mean that one could envisage a type of model 
suitable for KBS development that wasn't explanatory; rather the point is that the 
conceptual model promotes KBS development because it explains the expertise 
in its context. The fact that the conceptual model is rooted in the context of the 
exercise of the expertise means that the expertise is simply not fully 
understandable without reference to that context, at least for the purposes of AI. 
Hence that context or situation is, or at least can be, an important factor in the 
explanation of expertise, and one would expect a model of the competence of an 
expert to include information about the operation of that expertise in the world 
(or rather, one would expect a purported model of the competence of an expert, 
that refuses to specify what aspects of the world enable it to operate, to be 
regarded as incomplete). 
For this reason, the conceptual models in this thesis can be seen as shedding 
some light on the recent debate about externalism in psychology, and externalist 
explanation in particular (e.g. Peacocke 1993). Conceptual models of expertise 
provide externalist explanations, and, furthermore, it would be impossible for a 
satisfactory internalist explanation of expertise to be given in AI, since AI's 
requirements are that the operation of the expertise in real-world contexts be 
explained (Clancey 1992). Furthermore, one vital component of any description 
of expertise is a description of its constituency (Agnew et al 1994), i.e. the 
society whose interests dictate that they defer to the expert; the way in which the 
expertise functions outside the area of interest of that constituency should not be 
covered by the description of the expertise. The expertise is not designed, 
developed or evolved to function outside that area of interest. 
6.4  Normative and Causal Explanations 
Recall from §5.3 that conceptual models can be seen as both normatively and 
causally explanatory of expertise. They are normatively explanatory, because 
they describe a practice in such a way that, if you went away and learned the 
model, you would be able to produce the same behaviour (though not necessarily 
as 'expertly'). They tell you what 'the thing to do' is in various circumstances. 
They also have a justificatory component, in that they contain sufficient 
information to allow the KBS output to be explained (justified) to the user. They 
are causally explanatory, because they program for certain sets of groups of 
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This is an interesting result because of an often unspoken assumption in the 
philosophy of explanation that causal and non-causal explanations are mutually 
exclusive; i.e. if an explanation is causal then it cannot be non-causal (and 
therefore normative) and vice versa. Of course, this is not a universal 
assumption. Davidson's reason-giving explanations of action are normative 
(because the reasons rationalise the actions) and causal (1963), while Pettit's 
normalizing explanations are similarly normative and causal (1986). Our 
discussion in Chapter Five supports the Davidson-Pettit view. In §3.4, we looked 
at fairly anodyne definitions of these types of explanation, and §5.3 discussed 
conceptual models in those terms. Assuming no error in the latter section, the 
only routes that are apparently open to those who wish to keep the unspoken 
assumption are (i)  to deny that normative explanation is a genuine type of 
explanation and (ii) to deny that program explanations are causal explanations. 
The former route would basically entail that a top down view of explanation is 
being taken; the arguments of §3.2 would therefore have to be countered. The 
latter route might be taken by denying either that program explanations are 
causal, or that they are explanations. Denying that they are causal involves 
asserting that causal efficacy is the only type of causal relevance; this would 
involve combatting the arguments of Jackson and Pettit, particularly in their 
(1990), where their point is reduced to its barest essentials. Denying that they are 
explanations would seem to rule out many apparently legitimate types of 
explanation; again this is a top down rather than a bottom up point of view, and 
would need argument. 
If we accept that conceptual models are both normative and causal explanations, 
we have the result that experts' beliefs turn out to map very closely onto the 
norms of their expertise. Perhaps this is not surprising; one factor of expertise is 
that those who have it are, all things being equal, better at performing the task (in 
context) than anyone else. Hence their own practices — which may be very 
context-dependent or ad hoc — still act as a standard for everyone else. This 
thought leads us to suggest that the conceptual relevance of the result that 
models of expertise are both causally and normatively explanatory is larger than 
might first be thought. We can make the following tentative suggestion: we can 
define expertise (possibly partially) as a psychological faculty for which it is 
possible to give an explanation which is both causal and normative. Where 
causal and normative explanations coincide, there we can expect to find 
expertise. There may be other conditions attaching to the definition of expertise 
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very plausible that there is a strong conceptual connection between the 
coincidence of causal and normative accounts and expertise. Our purpose here is 
only to point to the possibility — whether the condition is necessary, or 
sufficient, or both, or neither is a question that we leave open here. 
One possible problem is that conceptual models can vary in quality as they are 
perceived first as normative explanations, and then causally (i.e. a model could 
be a good causal explanation and a bad normative explanation, or vice versa). 
This is to be expected, and here is one reason why. Recall from Chapter Two that 
conceptual models can be built with variable numbers of expert informants. 
Suppose first of all that a model is built using a largish number of experts, and is 
developed in such a way as to resolve a number of conflicts between the KA 
testimony of the various experts. Then the model will model 'expertise' which is 
demonstrably different in some areas from the expertise of each of the experts. 
Then it seems to follow that, to the extent that the model departs from the 
expertise of an expert, it is a relatively poor causal explanation of that expert. On 
the other hand, because the model is very representative of a wide variety of 
experts, it may be a very good explanation of the discipline of problem-solving 
in that particular domain; i.e. it may be a very good normative explanation. 
Secondly, consider a model built using only one expert informant (this is a more 
usual case). Then the model may be a very good causal explanation of the expert, 
but, if the expert is idiosyncratic in some ways, it may not be quite so good a 
normative explanation. 
All that is certainly possible. Nevertheless, there will be cases where a 
conceptual model is a good explanation of the expertise both normatively and 
causally. And in those cases, our tentative suggestion does seem plausible. An 
expert is someone who does 'the right thing'; hence a model of what an expert 
does will be a normative model. But since the expert does actually do those 
things that are right, there will be a causal explanation too. And if he does 'the 
right thing' because it is the right thing, then we may get a coincidence of those 
two explanations. 
* * * 
The arguments in this thesis have been based on actual research in a relatively 
mundane subfield of AI, yet they have yielded results about psychological 
explanation, externalist explanation, and the nature of expertise. I take this as Conclusion: Expertise and Artificial Intelligence    202 
evidence that philosophical argument that is rooted in real-world endeavour can 
be as interesting and important as highly aprioristic reasoning based on ideal 
definitions and thought experiments.  203 
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